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This study of the tobacco trade between Turkey and the
United States provides new perspectives on two major themes
in Turkish-American relations between 1923 and 1929: the
effect of Turkish nationalism on American interests in
Ataturk's Turkey, and the effort to restore TurkishAmerican diplomatic ties broken during World War I.

The

marked rise in American cigarette consumption after World
War I made the tobacco trade a crucial link between Turkey
and America because it required the importation of aromatic
tobacco.

During the Turkish Republic's first decades, the

value of American tobacco imports from Turkey exceeded the
value of all American exports to that country.

The tobacco

trade survived Turkish nationalism and unsatisfactory
diplomatic relations because of the financial benefits it
brought to both states.

This analysis of the events

affecting the Turkish-American tobacco trade between 1923
and 1929 is an inquiry into the interplay of commerce and
diplomacy.

The study reveals the neglected importance of

economic factors in Turkish-American relations.
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·Preface

This study examines the role of the tobacco trade in
Turkish-American relations during the six years after the
Turkish Republic's establishment in 1923.

The significance

of the years 1923-29 lies in the rapprochement achieved
between the Turkey and the United States despite the
revolutionary changes in Turkey; diplomatic relations were
restored in 1927 and the first treaty between the two
states--a commercial treaty--was signed in October 1929.

A

study of the tobacco trade illuminates the interplay of
commerce and diplomacy in Turkish-American relations for
two reasons.

First, the effect of Kemal Ataturk's reforms

on America's chief economic interest in Turkey was of
considerable diplomatic import.

Second, a study of

America's foreign commerce in this period is necessarily a
study of American diplomacy, due to the controversy
surrounding America's role in the international community.
The basis of the Turkish-American tobacco trade was
American importation of aromatic tobacco.

Aromatic tobacco

is a relative of the plant native to the Americas, and its
rich flavor makes it ideal for blending with other tobaccos
in cigarettes.

At one time, the modifier "Turkish" generi-

cally described aromatic tobacco.
ii

This designation derived

from the leaf's place of cultivation: the formerly Ottoman
Turkish lands of Greece, Macedonia, Bulgaria and modern
Turkey.

In this study, "Turkish tobacco" denotes the

tobacco produced in Turkey, while "aromatic" refers to a
type of tobacco.
The growing popularity of cigarettes made from blends
including aromatic leaf markedly increased American
importation of aromatic tobacco in the twentieth century.
As a result of the spectacular rise in cigarette consumption, especially after World War I, aromatic tobacco came
to comprise more than half of all American imports from
Turkey during the interwar period; the value of Turkish
tobacco exports to the United states exceeded the value of
all American exports to Turkey.

To purchase Turkish

tobacco, American companies developed extensive organizations in Turkey, points of direct contact between Turks
and Americans.
Purchasing aromatic tobacco, however, was not the only
important aspect of this trade; Americans also directed the
preparation of this tobacco in Turkey.

Aromatic tobacco

needed to be "manipulated" before use, a process that
included sorting, cleaning, grading, and baling.

Manip-

ulation required considerable manual labor and companies
employed thousands of workers, especially women, to prepare
their tobacco.

To reduce costs, companies usually
iii

preferred to manipulate the tobacco in its country of
origin; Turks preferred to manipulate this tobacco as well,
because of the many jobs the industry created.

Thus,

manipulation represented a separate, but related, American
interest in the Turkish-American tobacco trade.
A third aspect of the trade lay in its potential to
attract American capital to Turkey.

A monopoly designated

by the Turkish government regulated the tobacco trade in
Turkey.

For the fifty years prior to the Turkish

Republic's creation, the Turks had granted this monopoly as
a concession to foreign investors.

Not only had the

exploitation of this monopoly proven profitable to the
concessionaire--one attraction to American investors--but
the possibility of controlling one of the major sources of
a valuable raw material through the acquisition of the
monopoly concession also provided incentive for American
capital investment in Turkey.
Thus, the three aspects of the tobacco trade were of
great importance both to Turks and to Americans, and consequently, to the Turkish-American relationship.

Yet the

American commercial presence in Turkey was both wanted and
not wanted.

On the one hand, the high economic stakes

ensured that the new regime in Turkey would want to exploit
fully the tobacco trade; the American presence in Turkey
helped make this possible.

On the other hand, the
iv

nationalistic philosophy of Ataturk's government supported
the anti-foreign sentiments in Turkey that posed potential
threats to the tobacco companies.

The tobacco trade,

therefore, was a subject of diplomatic as well as economic
concern, as the United States government, in its efforts to
protect the American commercial interests, had to cope with
this nationalist challenge.
Though the tobacco trade was statistically quite
significant, its role in the broader Turkish-American
relationship has received scant attention in the historical
literature--a fact that initially piqued my curiousity and
prompted this study.

My objectives are threefold: to

examine the effects of revolutionary changes within Turkey
on the Turkish-American tobacco trade; to determine how
trade affected--and was affected by--diplomatic relations
between the two states; and thus, to provide a more
thorough evaluation of the tobacco trade's economic and
political significance in Turkish-American relations.

v
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Chapter One
Historical Background

Despite its tremendous economic significance for
Turkey in modern times, tobacco was not always welcome in
Turkey.

At the end of the sixteenth century, shortly after

its introduction by traders into the Ottoman Empire, the
Turkish sultans declared tobacco illegal.

Smokers of the

illicit leaf were not coddled:
The method of punishment was to force the stem of
a pipe through the cartilage of the nose, seat
the victim backwards upon a mule and have him led
through the streets. It was Murat IV, however,
who, by his insane cruelties, became the terror
of smokers, having ordered several seized
"flagrante delicto" to be summarily beheaded, and
others to be hanged with a pipe thrust through
their noses.l
Customs changed and the prohibition on tobacco
consumption ended about 1656 during the reign of Mehmet
IV.

In the eighteenth century, Turkish tobacco was shipped

around the Mediterranean, into Russia, and beyond.

In

1765, Frederick the Great of Prussia delivered an edict
requiring "sultanische" tobacco from the Ottoman Empire to

lJerome E. Brooks, Tobacco: Its History Illustrated by
the Books. Manuscripts and Engravings in the Library of
George Arents, Jr., 5 vols. (New York: Rosenbach Company,
1937-52), 1, 73-74.
1

2

be imported into his northern European state and mixed with
the domestic weed to improve its smoking qualities.2
Cigarette smoking became popular in Europe following
the Crimean War (1853-56).

Returning English and French

soldiers who adopted this Near Eastern custom were aped by
their countrymen in increasing numbers.

The cigarette of

choice was made entirely of aromatic tobacco.3
The same Crimean War that led to increased popularity
of aromatic cigarettes also led to increasing Ottoman
debts, and following the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-78 the
Ottoman Empire was virtually bankrupt.4

This indebtedness

culminated in the Decree of Muharrem of 1881 in which the
Sultan Abdulhamit II (1876-1909) consolidated the ottoman
public debt and established the Public Debt Commission to
service the debt for the holders of Turkish bonds.

Accord-

ing to the decree, all revenues from tobacco and five other
2Brooks, Tobacco, 1, 208, 138; 3, 425-26.
3Jerome E. Brooks, The Mighty Leaf: Tobacco Through the
Centuries (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1952), pp. 23334; Nannie May Tilley, The Bright-Tobacco Industry 1860-1929
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1948), pp.
505-06.
4stanford J. Shaw and Ezel Kural Shaw, Reform, Revolution and Republic: The Rise of Modern Turkey, 1808-1975,
vol. 2 of History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977), pp. 155-56;
Richard D. Robinson, The First Turkish Republic: A Case
study in National Development, Harvard Middle Eastern Studies, no. 9 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1963), p.
97.

3

sources would be paid to the commission.5

Ever since the

government had legalized tobacco, various forms of state
monopoly had collected revenue from the tobacco trade,6 but
in May 1883 a predominantly French organization, the
Societe de la Regie Cointeresse des tabacs de !'Empire
Ottoman (the Regie), received the concession for the
tobacco monopoly in Turkey.

In exchange for regulating

all tobacco production, manufacture, and sale, the Regie
paid $3.3 million annually to the Public Debt Commission.
The ottoman government granted the concession for a period
of thirty years, beginning in 1884.7

5Text of the Decree of Muharrem may be found in z. Y.
Hershlag, Introduction to the Modern Economic History of the
Middle East, 2nd ed. (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1980), pp. 320-32.
6Leland James Gordon, American Relations with Turkey,
1830-1930; An Economic Interpretation (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1932), p. 84.
7oonald c. Blaisdell, European Financial Control in the
Ottoman Empire (New York: AMS Press, 1966), pp. 113-14; G.
Bie Ravndal (Consul General, Istanbul) to Secretary of
State (William Jennings Bryan), 5 May 1913, Department of
state Archives, Record Group 59, National Archives Building,
Washington, file 165.082/19, Microfilm Publication M353,
Internal Affairs of Turkey, Roll 66, frames 1167-87 (State
Deparment Records hereafter cited as DS followed by file
number; National Archives Building, Washington cited as NA;
and similar microfilm records abbreviated following this
example: M353, 66/1167-87); Shaw, "Reform," pp. 223-24;
United states Department of commerce, "Turkey: A Commercial
and Industrial Handbook," prepared by G. Bie Ravndal, Trade
Promotion series No. 28 (Washington: Government Printing
Office, 1926), pp. 96-97.
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Although the Regie was a profitable enterprise, it did
not have the economic vitality of the unregulated American
tobacco industry.

At this time, America's tobacco industry

was already well developed, yet still flexible.
in marketing and

adv~rtising

As leaders

tobacco manufacturers created

new products that pleased consumers, then sold them all
they desired.

In 1883 average tobacco consumption for each

American over fourteen years old was 6.59 pounds.

Cigaret-

tes, however, accounted for only 1% of the tobacco used.a
Though not as aggressive as the American industry, the
Turkish industry was not entirely static.

Better cultural

techniques and seed selection had improved quality.

A

Russian emigre named Penick was credited with bringing
seeds of high-quality Macedonian tobacco to Izmir in 1880.
Prior to 1880, the entire Aegean region of Anatolia produced only about 850,000 pounds of tobacco, but by 1884
over 1,000,000 pounds were produced in the Ephesus district
alone.

The volume of production increased because the

Ottoman Empire's tobacco was in demand in Europe, and
increasingly, in America.9
8Benno K. Milmore and Arthur G. Conover, "Tobacco
Consumption in the United States 1880 to 1954," Agricultural
Economics Research 8 (1956): 9-12.
9John Corrigan, Jr. (Consul, Izmir), "Tobacco Industry
of Smyrna," Report No. 34, 1 June 1927, RG 84, Consular Post
Records Smyrna, NA, file 861.33 Field Crops-Tobacco, p. 21
(Record Group hereafter cited as RG; Consular Post Records

5

At the end of the nineteenth century, both aromatictobacco cigarettes and domestic-tobacco cigarettes were
available in the United States and becoming more popular.
Acceptance of these new products, though, was hard-won.

In

1900, Americans over fourteen chewed an average of 3.56
pounds of tobacco, chomped on 1.99 pounds of cigars, loaded
1.42 pounds into their pipe bowls, and snuffed .3 pounds in
case the other modes did not suffice.

Per person consump-

tion of cigarettes had doubled, reaching .16 pounds, but
this still represented only 2% of the total.lo
Even this small percentage of the American market
represented a large investment in aromatic tobacco.

So

great was the demand that in 1902 the American Tobacco
Company, a giant tobacco trust, reportedly tried to gain
control of the Near Eastern supply market.

This effort

caused aromatic tobacco prices to soar and led to a tremendous surplus in 1903, which then seriously deflated the
market for the following three years. 11

But this inability

to control the supply of aromatic tobacco did not diminish
cited as CPR).
lOsubsequent references to average tobacco consumption
in the United states will also refer to Americans over fourteen years of age. Milmore, "Tobacco Consumption," 10.
llc. c. constantinides, Turkish Tobacco, A Manual for
Planters, Dealers. and Manufacturers (London: W. and J.
Rounce, 1912), p. 91.

6

American manufacturers' interest in Near Eastern leaf.
Before 1900, the Turkish-American tobacco trade was of no
consequence; after 1903, tobacco was the most valuable
American import from Turkey and remained so for decades.12
In the early twentieth century, innovative product
development in the United States created a demand for
larger amounts of aromatic tobacco.

In 1905 the Liggett &

Myers Tobacco Company introduced Fatima cigarettes, one of
the first "Turkish blend" cigarettes.

Fatimas contained

aromatic and domestic tobaccos in equal measure, a mixture
which "toned down" the perfumy aromatic tobacco.

According

to the company's advertising, 3.5 billion Fatima cigarettes
were sold during its first year alone.
reportedly reached 10 billion.13

By 1910 sales had

In the same year,

however, cigarettes accounted for only .41 pounds of the
8.59 pounds of tobacco consumed by the average American.
Though this represented a quantitative tripling per person

12Gordon, "American Relations," pp. 83-84; John A.
DeNovo, American Interests and Policies in the Middle East,
1900-1939 (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press,
1963), p. 38.
13Liggett & Myers Tobacco Company, Fatima cigarette
advertisement, United States Tobacco Journal, vol. 98, no.
2 (1922): 52 (United states Tobacco Journal hereafter cited
as USTJ) .
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since 1900, cigarettes remained the least popular means of
taking tobacco.14
The year 1911 witnessed the destruction of the goliath
tobacco trust that had controlled 90% of the American
trade.

The court case that busted the American Tobacco

Company for violating the Sherman Anti-Trust Act created a
supposedly independent Big Four:

American Tobacco Company,

R. J. Reynolds, Liggett & Myers, and P. Lorillard.15

The

dispersal of economic power invoked the marketplace's
master motivater: competition.
In this new competitive struggle, the R. J. Reynolds
Tobacco Company struck boldly by bringing Camel cigarettes
onto the market.

Introduced in 1913, Camels were the first

"American blend" cigarette, a combination of bright,
burley, Maryland, and aromatic tobaccos.

Though detailed

cigarette recipes remain highly guarded secrets,16 this new
type of blend generally contained about 10% aromatic

14Milmore, "Tobacco Consumption," 10.
15Joseph c. Robert, The Story of Tobacco in America
(New York: A.A. Knopf, 1952), pp. 165-67; Richard B. Tennant,
The American Cigarette Industry: A Study in Economic Analysis
and Public Policy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1950) ,
pp. 297-302; Nannie M. Tilley, The R. J. Reynolds Tobacco
Company (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press,
1985), p. 190.
16Tilley, Bright-Tobacco, p. 612.

8

tobacco. 17

Reynolds's success was imitated by American

Tobacco's Lucky Strikes and Liggett & Myers•s Chesterfields.18
R. J. Reynolds bought most of its aromatic tobacco
through the Standard Commercial Tobacco Company, established in 1910.

Headquartered in New York City, Standard

Commercial claimed to be the· 11 world 1 s largest dealer in
Turkish leaf," and served Reynolds and other companies'
aromatic needs for over a decade.

The company's Greek

president, Ery Euripides Kehaya, maintained offices and
warehouses in several cities in Greece; in Sofia, Bulgaria;
and in Izmir, Turkey.19

Reynolds, however, was not the

only American manufacturer in need of aromatic tobacco.
Through various agents American Tobacco Company spent $10

17united States Tariff Commission, "Trade Agreements
Between the United states and the Republic of Turkey:
Digests of Trade Data with Respect to Products on Which
Concessions Were Granted by the United States (Washington,
1939), p. 36 (hereinafter cited as U.S. Tariff Commission,
"Trade Agreement Digest").
18Lucky strikes came out in 1916 and Chesterfields,
which actually had appeared in 1912, were redesigned in the
hope of imitating camels' success. Tilley, Bright-Tobacco,
pp. 609-10; Robert, story of Tobacco, pp. 230-34.
19charles D. Barney & co., "The Tobacco Industry" (New
York, Philadelphia, and Winston-Salem, NC, 1924), p. 78;
Tilley, Reynolds, pp. 234-35.
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million in the Ottoman Empire to purchase and process
aromatic leaf during 1912 alone.20
Maintaining a steady supply of aromatic tobacco was
not always easy.

The Young Turk revolution of 1908-09 in

the Ottoman Empire gave foreign powers new opportunities to
prey on the fragile giant.

In 1908, Austria annexed

Bosnia-Hercegovina, and Bulgaria declared its formal
independence.

1911-12 brought war with Italy.

The two

Balkan Wars of 1912-13 placed most of the Ottoman's
European territories in the hands of quarrelsome Balkan
states.

As far as the tobacco industry was concerned,

Turkey's loss of Macedonia was the most serious blow.

The

Kavalla, Xanthe, and Salonika districts of Macedonia
produced about 24 million pounds of high quality tobacco in
a good growing year,21 almost as much as the annual
production average of 25 million pounds for all of the
Ottoman Empire's Asiatic provinces between 1909 and 1913.22
In light of these many wounds, the ottoman government
was fortunate to be able to renegotiate the concession of
20oeNovo, American Interests, p. 39.
21Ravndal to Secretary of State (Bryan), 5 May 1913, DS
165.082/19, M353, 66/1183.
22united states Department of Commerce, Bureau of
Foreign and Domestic Commerce, "International Trade in Leaf
and Manufactured Tobacco," prepared by T. L. Hughes (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1925), p. 3.
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the tobacco monopoly, which was due to expire on 15 April
1914.

The Ottoman debt of almost $550 million provided an

added incentive to squeeze more funds from one of the few
profitable enterprises in Turkey.23

In 1913 the government

invited competitive bids in hopes of winning a more
favorable contract with the Regie.

Among the bidders were

Americans, whose identities and aims remain obscure.

They

may have been simply investors, but it is likely that the
large American tobacco companies were involved.

Perhaps

these bidders only wished to make a profit by efficiently
managing the Turkish monopoly, but the ability to control a
large portion of the aromatic tobacco supply was also a
tempting opportunity.

Despite these uncertainities, events

convinced Hoffman Philip, the American charge d'affaires in
Istanbul, that American acquisition of the Turkish tobacco
monopoly was a very real possibility.

Philip wrote in July

1913:
Some two weeks ago I was informed by Talaat Bey,
Minister of the Interior, that American offers
for the tobacco concession were more advantageous
than any others and that the Government would
adopt them if a loan could be negotiated in the
United States.24
23Mustafa N. Kazdal, "Trade Relations Between the
United states and Turkey, 1919-1944" (Ph.D. diss., Indiana
University, 1946), p. 41.
24Hoffman Philip (Charge d'Affaires, Istanbul) to
Secretary of state (Bryan), 22 July 1913, DS file
867.61331/1, M353, 66/1156-57.
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Philip attempted to bring attention to and gain support for
what he considered to be "one of the most desirable undertakings for American capital" in the ottoman Empire,
despite his beliefs that the controlling French interests
would not allow the monopoly to change hands.25

Despite

the paucity of information, it is clear that closer
involvement in the Turkish tobacco industry, and even
control of this industry, interested certain Americans.
Philip's hopes did not come true.

In August 1913 the

Sultan issued a decree extending the concession to the
Regie for fifteen years, in exchange for an advance of $6.6
million.26

Americans did not gain control of the monopoly

in 1913, but the Turkish tobacco industry remained
attractive to foreign investors, for its profitability if
nothing else.

Under the terms of the 1913 agreement, the

25rbid.
26The poor reception accorded Philip's calls by the
American government can partially be understood given the
fate of an even grander American investment scheme in the
Ottoman Empire, the Chester Project. From 1908 to 1913,
Admiral Colby M. Chester obtained the official support of
the Taft Administration for a grandiose railroad and mining
project in the empire. The highest American officials
supported the plan "because the administration wished to
employ the engines of diplomacy to promote American business
activity abroad as part of its policy of Dollar Diplomacy."
This break from traditional diplomatic non-involvement
ended as a fiasco; Chester's plans proved ill-conceived and
underfunded. President Taft withdrew all support and the
new Wilson Administration would not touch the program.
DeNovo, American Interests, pp. 58-87.
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Regie paid the Public Debt Commission $3.52 million
annually.

Surpluses earned above this amount and the

monopoly's administrative costs were divided among the
Ottoman government, the public debt, and the Regie.

For

its efforts, the Regie reportedly made a profit of $1.54
million in 1913.27
Failure to obtain the concession may have irked some
in the Turkish-American tobacco trade, but the failed
negotiations of 1913 and even the years of Balkan troubles
paled in comparison to the struggles ahead.

Many factors

led Turkey into the growing world conflict, German
political influence in Turkey being only one among them.
Hereditary hostility towards Russia, growing friction with
Britain and France, and the political opportunism of Young
Turk leaders, led the ottoman government to abandon its
neutral stance and bombard Russian ports in the Black Sea
on 28 October 1914.

Thus, Turkey entered the "Great War."

During World War I, the blockade of Turkish ports on
the Aegean and Mediterranean effectively curtailed

27G. Bie Ravndal to Secretary of State (Bryan), 7 August
1913, DS 867.61331/3, M353, 66/1164-66. For the entire
convention see G. Bie Ravndal to Secretary of State (Bryan),
12 September 1913 DS 867.61331/5, M353, 66/1216-32. Even
after the regrantlng of the concession to the Regie, Philip
called for renewed American bids before the agreement was
ratified by the ottoman General Assembly. Hoffman Philip
to Secretary of state (Bryan), 3 September 1913, DS
867.61331/4, M353, 66/1210-14.
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Americans imports from Turkey.28

By 1918, these imports

had declined 99.9% from their 1910-14 average, to a modest
$222,039. 29

This blow to trade relations came about

despite the fact that America and Turkey never formally
exchanged declarations of war.

On 8 April 1917, however,

two days after the United States declared war on Germany,
the United States severed diplomatic relations with Turkey;
on 20 April the Turks reciprocated.30
Despite the lack of official diplomatic relations, a
number of factors favored increased Turkish-American trade
after the Turks surrendered unconditionally to the Allies
on 30 October 1918 (Armistice of Mudros).

In December

1918, the United States sent a diplomatic mission, known as
the High Commission, to Turkey.

This did not constitute a

formal restoration of relations, but it did renew official
representation of American interests in Turkey.

Turks

28The resulting scarcity of aromatic tobaccos actually
promoted the production of the "domestic blend" with its
lower aromatic content. Tilley, Bright-Tobacco, p. 611.
29Roger R. Trask, The United States Response to Turkish
Nationalism and Reform, 1914-1938 (Minneapolis: University
of Minnesota Press, 1971), p. 105.
30Kazdal, "Trade Relations," pp. 5-6. The Treaty of
1830 originally established diplomatic relations. The text
of this treaty may be found in Hershlag, Economic History,
pp. 306-07. DeNovo describes Turkish-American wartime relations and the war's effect on American colleges, missions,
and relief efforts. He omits, however, a discussion of
business interests during the war. DeNovo, American Interests, pp. 88-108.
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distinguished between America and other Great Powers:
Americans were not interested in controlling Turkish lands
and had no political aspirations in the region.31 Indeed,
Point Twelve of President Woodrow Wilson's Fourteen Points
stated that the Turkish portions of the ottoman Empire
should be assured a secure sovereignty.32

This positive

perception of Americans opened doors for American
businessmen in Turkey.
Other factors increased American trading potential as
well.

The American merchant fleet was in a position to

handle more of the trade between the states; shipping was
not controlled by a third party, as it had been in the late
nineteenth century by an English shipping monopoly, the
Levant Company.33

The United States had relatively more

capital available than war-ravaged European states.

Most

important, though, was a 70% decrease in the value of the
Turkish lira between 1915 and 1919.34

For political,

31Edward Mead Earle, Turkey. The Great Powers, and the
Bagdad Railway; A Study in Imperialism (New York: MacMillan,
1923), pp. 336-37.
32Thomas H. Galbraith, "The Smyrna Disaster of 1922 and
its Effects on Turkish-American Relations" (Master's thesis,
Pennsylvania state University, 1960), p. 8; Trask, U.S.
Response, pp. 240-41; DeNovo, American Interests, pp. 110-11.
33Gordon, American Relations, p. 57; Kazdal, "Trade
Relations," p. 76.
34Kazdal, "Trade Relations," p. 109.
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logistic, and economic reasons, Americans could enter the
Turkish market-place more effectively than ever before.
American's desire to expand trade with Turkey grew
just as much as their capability to trade did.

In the

years immediately after World War I, cigarettes became as
popular as other forms of tobacco; consumption of cigarettes reached almost two pounds per person.35

As w. A.

Whitaker, Vice-President of Standard Commercial, wrote:
"it was the introduction of Turkish tobacco into the
American blend which more than any other factor started
the American cigarette on the upward stride. 11 36
Some in the trade said that aromatic tobacco was to
cigarettes what salt and pepper were to food, but the
causes for cigarettes' growing popularity were more complex
than aromatic•s inclusion.

Once again war played a role as

American soldiers returned with a cigarette-smoking habit
acquired from Europeans.

Cigarettes were less expensive

than cigars and the quick smoke they provided was popular.

35Milmore, "Tobacco Consumption," 10.
36w. A. Whitaker, "The Culture of Turkish Tobacco As
Exemplified in the Smyrna Type" (reprinted from Tobacco, 26
April 1923). I would like to thank w. K. Greer, the director
of Oriental Leaf Purchasing of R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Company, for kindly making a copy of this article available to
me.
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The growing number of women smokers37 and the increasing
income of Americans contributed as well,38 not to mention
the addictive power of nicotine.
To keep up with this expanding demand Liggett & Myers
established its own company to buy aromatic tobacco.

On 13

May 1915 the Gary Tobacco Company was formed as a whollyowned subsidiary of Liggett and Myers.
the company, I.

The president of

c. Gary, had his home office in New York

City; the Turkish headquarters were in Istanbul.

The

function of this subsidiary was to purchase, process, and
resell aromatic leaf for the parent company, but it also
sold tobacco to other companies, including British and
Egyptian.39

The need for a consistent supply of aromatic

tobacco was obvious: in 1910 Liggett & Myers sold 10

37u.s. Department of Commerce, "International Trade,"
p. 4.

38Kazdal, "Trade Relations," p. 71.
39Gary also purchased tobacco in countries other than
Turkey; it purchased heavily in Greece and, to a lesser
extent, in Bulgaria and Russia (the Soviet Union). F.W.
Bell (Gary Tobacco) to Robert P. Skinner (Ambassador to
Turkey, 27 September 1933, RG 84, Embassy Records Constantinople, NA, file 851.2 Taxation (hereafter Embassy Records
cited as ER) ; Randolph Currin to Ambassador (John Van Antwerp
MacMurray), 9 March 1936, RG 84, ER Istanbul, NA, file 610.1
survey of American Interests; Moody's Manual of Investments,
1941, p. 2629.
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billion Fatima cigarettes; in 1920, 45 billion were sold.40
Gary Tobacco was created to satisfy this need.
Thus, immediately after the war, potential and desire
combined to make the United States the largest importer of
all Turkish goods and of Turkish tobacco, replacing
Austria-Hungary, which had imported the most Turkish
tobacco before the war.41

Tobacco imports from Turkey

reached $19.5 million in 1920, greater than the annual
average of all imports from Turkey between 1910-14.42

This

tobacco was exported despite the renewed turmoil in the
Near East.
The 1918 Armistice of Mudros had proven an uneasy one,
as Allied forces occupied the Straits and Istanbul--a
humiliation for the Turks--and Allied troops moved into the
portions of Anatolia allotted to the various victorious
powers by wartime agreements.43

Hostilities resumed after

the landing of a Greek army in Izmir on 15 May 1919.
40Liggett & Myers Tobacco Company, Fatima cigarette
advertisement, USTJ~ vol. 98, no. 2 (1922): 52.
41Ravndal to Secretary of State (Bryan), 5 May 1913, DS
165.082/19, M353, 66/1185; Charles E. Allen (Consul in
Charge, Istanbul), "The Turkish Regie," 13 November 1925, DS
867.61331/9, M353, 66/1283-84; Kazdal, "Trade Relations,"
p. 108.
42see Table 2.

1920 figure includes Greece-in-Asia.

43Rene Albrecht-Carrie, A Diplomatic History of Europe
Since the Congress of Vienna, rev. ed. (New York: Harper &
Row, 1973), pp. 334-39.

18

British and French arms and supplies encouraged Greek Prime
Minister Eleutherios Venizelos's dreams of glory through
expansion and Aegean empire.44

The Sublime Porte's submis-

sive acceptance of foreign control alienated the national
movement which had come to life following the Greek invasion.

Thus, this Greco-Turkish War (Turkish War of

Independence) had a dual character:

Kemal Ataturk led the

re-inspired Turkish forces in a war of liberation which was
simultaneously a war of revolution.45
Americans played a negligible role in the GrecoTurkish War.

President Woodrow Wilson had called for

Turkish sovereignty at the Paris Peace Conference, but
Britain's David Lloyd George persuaded him to acquiesce in
the British-supported Greek invasion.

When the Greek

troops disembarked at Izmir, the battleship

u.s.s.

Arizona

and five American destroyers were in the harbor, but the
American military forces took no part in the subsequent
fighting.46

In 1919 the United States had little to gain

or lose militarily in Turkey.

There were, though,

44Ibid., p. 401; Arnold J. Toynbee and Kenneth P.
Kirkwood, Turkey (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1927),
pp. 92-6.
45Mustafa Kemal Pasha received the name "Ataturk,"
meaning "Father of the Turk" or "first and foremost Turk,"
in 1934. Trask, American Response, p. 69.
46Galbraith, "Smyrna Disaster," p. 13.
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commercial risks from both the war and rising Turkish
nationalism.
In April 1920 Ataturk directed the formation of a new
Turkish government in Ankara.

The foremost goals of this

new government were resistance to foreign aggression and
the revocation of the Treaty of Sevres of 10 August 1920-the Paris Peace Conference's solution to the Eastern
Question.47

In many respects the Treaty of sevres dealt

even more harshly with Turkey than the Treaty of Versailles
did with Germany.

The treaty demanded, in essence, the end

of an independent Turkish state.

Turkey would consist of

Ankara and its immediate surroundings, but would be subject
to "economic, judicial, and financial bondage to the . . .
Powers. 11 48

Ataturk intended to terminate this subjugation.

Turkish revisionism demanded an American response.
American interests in Turkey at this time were largely
47The so-called National Pact outlined the nationalists'
aims. The text of the National Pact may be found in J. c.
Hurewitz, British-French Supremacy, 1914-1945, vol. 2 of The
Middle East and North Africa in World Politics, A Documentary Record, 2nd ed. (New Haven and London: Yale University
Press, 1979), 209-211.
48Harry N. Howard, The Partition of Turkey: A Diplomatic
History, 1913-1923 (New York: Howard Fertig, 1966), pp. 24249. The Treaty of sevres 1) left Istanbul under Allied
occupation, as it had been since 20 March 1920; 2) imposed
international control on the Straits; 3) gave the region
around Izmir to Greece; 4) included the Mediterranean areas
of Anatolia in the French and Italian spheres; and 5) created
an independent Armenia to be under British and American
supervision.
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commercial.

Admiral Mark L. Bristol, the American high

commissioner in Turkey (1919-27), believed that only
through representation to Ataturk's new government could
American economic interests in Turkey be protected.49

With

this in mind Bristol ordered Julian E. Gillespie, the
assistant trade commissioner, from Istanbul to Ankara.SO
Gillespie made an "unofficial" trip, a ploy enabling the
United States to deny that it recognized the Ankara
government, while at the same time providing some sort of
representation.

Gillespie's journey from December 1921 to

February 1922 focused on "questions relating to general
economic prospects in Turkey and to particular conditions
that might affect American trade and business."

The

satisfactory responses Gillespie received prompted the
State Department to send an official representative, Robert
Imbrie, to Ankara in 1922, presumably to protect American
commerce.

According to Imbrie, however, "American

49Laurence Evans, United states Policy and the Partition
of Turkey, 1914-1924 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1965),
pp. 330-6; Peter H. Buckingham, International Normalcy, The
Open Door Peace with the Former Central Powers, 1921-29
(Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources, 1983), pp. 75-6.
50Gillespie was an influential figure in Turkey. As
DeNovo notes: "From 1920 until his death in 1939, Gillespie
served as trade commissioner and then as commercial attache
at Istanbul, where he became intimately associated with
Turkish businesmen and political leaders. DeNovo, American
Interests, p. 253.
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commercial interests, except for tobacco, were negligible.1151
The concerns of this only significant American
interest in Turkey took two forms.

First, American

companies worried that the nationalist regime would try to
finance its efforts with the companies' stocks of tobacco.
In 1922 the London Times reported that the Turkish
nationalist government had ordered the confiscation of all
abandoned stocks of tobacco and the requisition of 15% of
all other tobacco holdings.52

on 25 July 1922 the United

States Commerce Department notified the major American
tobacco companies of a nationalist decree to this effect.53
The Commerce Department's communication caused considerable anxiety within American Tobacco Company's management in the United States, because Ataturk's forces
already occupied Samsun, the center of an important
tobacco growing region in on the Black Sea.

Jonathan H.

Holmes of American Tobacco expressed the concern to
Secretary of State Charles Evans Hughes that the Turks
51Evans, U.S. Policy, p. 338.

Emphasis added.

52 11 Tobacco Requisitions," Times [London), 28 June 1922,
p. 7, col. f {London Times hereafter cited as Times).
53cpG {District Manager, Commerce Department) to American Tobacco Company, 25 July 1922, RG 151, Records of the
Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce, NA, file 303
Turkey, {Records of the Bureau of Foreign and Domestic
Commerce hereafter cited as·FDC Records).
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would requisition a million pounds of tobacco stored by the
company in the Samsun region.S4

Admiral Bristol tried to

dispel the fears of American cigarette manufacturers.

He

cited the assurances of an American tobacco buyer in Turkey
that no tobacco had been requisitioned in Samsun, despite a
threat of such action in 1921, and that no grounds for
continued concern existed.SS

such assurances, however, did

little to console the men who feared the steps Ataturk's
militaristic, nationalistic government might take to
finance its war and secure its rule.
The war itself also caused concern among American
tobacco buyers as the Greek effort faltered.

In August

1921 the sound of Greek artillery could be heard in Ankara
as the invaders pushed towards the nationalists' capital.
By Sep-tember 1922 the Greeks were fleeing towards the
Aegean, carrying out a devasting scorched-earth policy as
they fell back on Izmir--the second-most important international trading center in Turkey and a major tobaccoproducing region.

As General Ismet Inonu led the Turkish

S4Jonathan H. Holmes (American Tobacco) to Charles
Evan Hughes (Secretary of State), 2 August 1922, RG 84, ER
Constantinople, NA, file 3SO Claims.
SSMark L. Bristol (High Commissioner to Turkey) to
Secretary Hughes, 24 October 1922, RG 84, ER Constantinople,
NA, file 3SO Claims.
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forces westward in 1922, tobacco traders' concern grew.56
Purchases of war insurance for merchandise held in Izmir
evinced this fear.

Insurance rates had jumped from 3% of

the good's value per month in early September to 5% (and to
7.5% for some materials) by mid-September.57

The

underwriters obviously considered the threats to tobacco
interests to be real.
Unrelated events intensified the concerns of Alston
Tobacco58 and Standard Commercial's managements.

In late

August 1922, a fire in Salonika, Greece, destroyed
56Arnold J. Toynbee, an eye-witness to the fighting
provides an interesting account of the war. Toynbee,
Turkey, pp. 92-110; Shaw, Reform, pp. 340-69.
57 11 war Risks at Smyrna," Times, 8 September 1922, p.
15, col. b; "Insurance in Germany and Smyrna," Times, 11
September 1922, p. 17, col. c; "Insuring Merchandise in
Smyrna," Times, 12 September 1922, p. 16, col. c; "Insurance
and the Smyrna Fire," Times, 16 September 1922, p. 13, col.
b; "Near East Insurance Developments," Times, 19 September
1922, p. 17 col. c.
58The Alston Tobacco Company, named after William H.
Alston, was a subsidiary of P. Lorillard Tobacco Company of
New Jersey. At various times Alston served as a buyer for
a number of American manufacturers, besides its parent company, e.g., American Tobacco, R. J. Reynolds, and Philip
Morris. Like Gary, Alston had branch offices around Turkey:
in Samsun, Izmir, and on some Aegean islands, as well as
extensive operations in Greece. Frederick o. Byrd (American
Delegate, Izmir) to J. English (American Tobacco), 30
October 1924, RG 84, CPR Smyrna, Supplement, NA, file 300
Protection of Interests; P. E. King (Alston Tobacco) to
Consul General, 6 September 1924, RG 84, Consulate General
Records Constantinople, NA, file 861.3 Tobacco (Consulate
General Records hereafter cited as CGR); Tilley, Reynolds,
p. 235.
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warehouses of tobacco owned by Alston and seriously damaged
Standard Commercial's holdings, eliminating a considerable
portion of both companies' aromatic tobacco stocks.
Although insurance payments probably compensated for the
$1,625,000 in losses, the two companies became even more
dependent on their Turkish holdings.59

The Salonika fire

was not war-related, but it was a harsh reminder of Near
Easter~

cities' susceptibility to devasting conflagrations.

The American tobacco companies had even more to fear
in Izmir, as the fighting approached the city at an awkward
time:

by September the majority of the tobacco had been

harvested and was already in warehouses.

Alston Tobacco

alone reported storing 2,577,824 pounds of tobacco valued
at $1,239,682.60
The American tobacco men's worst fears were realized.
on 9 September, Turkish troops entered Izmir.

Then, on 13

September, fires broke out which destroyed half of the
city.61

Among the ashes were American losses, including

59 11 American Plant Ruined in Fire at Saloniki," USTJ,
vol. 98, no. 10 (1922): 3.
60william [Fingelly] (illegible) (Alston Tobacco) to
Consulate General in Izmir, 4 September 1922, RG 84, CPR
Smyrna, Supplement, NA, file 300 Protection of Interests.
6lshaw, Reform, p. 363.
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tobacco warehouses and stocks of leaf worth millions of
dollars.62
The capture of Izmir was the climax of the GrecoTurkish war.

In early October 1922 Ismet Inonu met British

and Greek representatives in the Marmara Sea resort town of
Mudania to arrange an armistice.

The agreement signed

there on 11 October satisfied almost all of the National
Pact's territorial demands.

The Lausanne Conference began

on 21 November 1922 to formulate a new peace.

The Turkish

victory had ended the war, one of the greatest obstacles to
Turkish-American trade.

Other obstacles remained, includ-

ing political battles in the United states.
In 1921 growers and dealers of bright tobacco in
Virginia and North Carolina began to call for protectionist
measures.

They argued that the large and increasing

imports of aromatic tobacco hurt sales of bright tobacco.63
The prevailing tariff of $.35 per pound was ineffective in
hindering imports of Turkish aromatic.

Although the

62Galbraith, "Smyrna Disaster," passim. It is noteworthy, though, that the Greco-Turkish War had not stopped
the tobacco trade. In 1921, 9.5 million pounds of tobacco
were imported into the United States from Izmir, and in 1922,
13.3 million pounds came from Izmir. "Annual Declared
Export Return," n.d., 1923, RG 84, CPR Smyrna, NA, file 600
Commercial Relations.
63Bright tobacco is a mild, fragrant, low-nicotine leaf
grown in Virginia and North Carolina. Its distinctive golden
color gives it its name. Tilley, Bright-Tobacco, p. vii.
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southern Democratic Senators who represented these tobacco
men would ordinarily have opposed protectionist legislation
of any sort,6 4 the growers were able to rally support in
the "interest of the farmer. 11 65

In June 1922, a provision

in the Senate's version of the tariff bill requested a duty
of $1.00 per pound on "filler tobacco of the kind known as
Turkish. 11 66

The Senate version had to go to conference

committee, but "as the weight of opinion in the trade
favored the Senate provisions," it was expected that the
bill would pass.67
In the fall of 1922, however, the conference committee
approved the tobacco tariff schedule, but struck the provision which would have raised the duty on aromatic leaf. 68
The growers and dealers lost, but curiously, they also
gained something by losing.

Aromatic tobacco did not

64According to Democratic Party policy of the day,
tariffs should only have been enacted for revenue purposes,
while the Republican Party was the traditional protariff
party. Stefanie Ann Lenway, The Politics of U.S. International Trade, Protection, Expansion and Escape (Boston,
London, Melbourne, and Toronto: Pitman, 1985), p. 61.
65 11 virginians Want High Tariff on Turkish Tobacco,"
USTJ, vol. 97, no. 6 {1922): 36.
66 11 senate Adopts $2.10 Duty on Wrapper," USTJ, vol. 98,
no. 1 {1922): 10.
67 rbid.
68 11 Tariff Bill is Finally Settled," USTJ, vol. 98, no.
12 (1922): 7.
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compete with bright tobacco:

to the contrary, the

inclusion of the leaf in tobacco blends actually increased
total tobacco consumption in the United states.

A $1.00

per pound duty probably would have provided an effective
barrier to the leaf's importation, with a consequent loss
to the industry as a whole.

Approval of the final tariff

bill removed another obstacle to the Turkish-American
tobacco trade.
In sum, the economic importance of aromatic tobacco in
both Turkey and America, and in Turkish-American relations
increased steadily over the half-century preceeding the
Turkish Republic's establishment, especially during the
period after World War I.

According to a leading tobacco

trade journal, "tobacco in the Near East bears about the
same relation to its prosperity that cotton bears to the
prosperity of the southern states in the United States. 11 69
The American cigarette industry, which depended increasingly on aromatic tobacco, was not only essential to the
prosperity of certain regions of America, but it also
produced over $150 million in federal revenues from the
excise tax on sales in 1922 alone.70

The inability to

69 11 Turkish Leaf Gluts Near East Markets," USJT, vol.
101, no. 5 (1924): 49.
70chas. o. Barney & co., "The Tobacco Industry; consolidated Annual Reviews 1932 and 1933," p. 24.
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grow aromatic tobacco in America maintained manufacturers'
dependence on Near Eastern tobacco supplies.

This is in

contrast to the role of other Turkish commodities, such as
dried figs and raisins.

Previously, these two had been

America's most valuable imports from Turkey, but imports
declined as their cultivation in California developed.71
Thus, unique conditions in both countries made the tobacco
trade one of the fundamental points of contact between
Turkey and America.
This historical survey demonstrates the tenacity of
the demand for Turkey's tobacco, despite the numerous
obstacles encountered in obtaining it.

Equally important

to an understanding of the Turkish-American tobacco trade,
however, is recognition of the agricultural and economic
forces that shaped the supply of and market organization
for the aromatic leaf.

71Kazdal, "Trade Relations," pp. 64-66.

Chapter Two
The Crop and the Market

International trade hangs on customs duties and world
markets, consumption trends and political predilections.
International trade in tobacco, however, is also dependent
on an obvious but forgettable truth:
agricultural crop.

tobacco is an

The raw materials for this twentieth-

century industry were just as susceptible to harvest
failures, droughts, and diseases as were the potato crops
of nineteenth-century Irish farmers.

Simply put, the

foremost elements determining supply were growing
conditions.

Equally important to the Turkish-American

tobacco trade was the way in which tobacco was cultivated
in Turkey, a factor which conditioned American participation in the Turkish tobacco market.
Aromatic tobacco was grown in many places in postwar
Turkey:

along the Black Sea coast from the border with the

Soviet Union to Sinop, on both the European and Anatolian
sides of the Sea of Marmara, and along the Aegean coast and
Aegean islands.

For the American trade, three areas in

Turkey were significant.

The region around Samsun and

Bafra on the Black Sea had the reputation for producing a
high-quality tobacco desirable to Americans cigarette
29
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manufacturers.

A less important, though active, market

from which the Americans bought was around Bursa.

The

center of the trade, though, was Izmir,l the focal point of
a large tobacco-growing hinterland.
Tobacco growing in Turkey was not only geographically
dispersed, but growers produced numerous types of aromatic
leaf as well.

Different purchasers prized varying charac-

teristics in the aromatic tobacco.

Americans had the repu-

tation of buying the highest quality tobacco.

Egyptians,

on the other hand, preferred a strong dark leave from the
Trebizon region, while the central European tobacco monopolies bought poorer grades at low prices.

Despite these

differences of location and type, tobacco growing methods
all over Anatolia were similar.
Tobacco growing was overwhelmingly a family affair in
Turkey.

As one commentator put it, perhaps with slight

exaggeration:
High-grade Turkish tobacco owes its worldwide
reputation to the fact that the production of
tobacco in Turkey is in fact a tradition carried
on by families and that the quality of the

lwhat was referred to as the "Izmir district" actually
included several "vilayets" besides Izmir, including Aydin,
Balikesir, Manisa, Mugla. J. M. English to J. v. A. MacMurray (Ambassador), 4 April 1936, RG 84, ER Istanbul,
General Archives Division, Washington National Records
Center, Suitland, Md., file 610.1 Survey of American Interests (Washington National Records Center hereafter cited
as WNRC).
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tobacco constitutes the pride of each one of
those families.2
These families worked small farms.

"Small" meant an

average of 1.1 acres of tobacco per grower, with production
averaging 782 pounds per grower for the years 1923-30 (see
Table l}.

Before any harvest, however, almost a full year

of manual labor went into growing tobacco according to
long-held traditions.

In late winter seeds were sown in

specially prepared beds.

Growers transplanted the

seedlings to fields about six to eight weeks after sowing.
The dates for these operations varied in accordance with
the location, the altitude, and the weather.

As a rule of

thumb, though, transplanting around Izmir needed to be
completed by early May.

In the Marmara and Black Sea

regions a month's delay was common.
Weather conditions were supremely important.

Trans-

planting required dry ground, but the seedlings needed
spring rains.

During late spring and summer, near-

continuous sunshine needed to be interspersed with timely,
but limited, rainfall.

Insufficient rain reduced the size

of the crop, but paradoxically improved the quality--if the

2Quote from "Turkish Tobacco," Asian Review, no. 198
(1958): 152. Whitaker, "Culture of Turkish Tobacco;" U.S.
Department of Commerce, "Turkey: A Handbook," pp. 95-97;
John Corrigan, Jr., "Tobacco Industry of Smyrna," Report
No. 34, 1 June 1927, RG 84, CPR Smyrna, NA, file 861.33
Field Crops-Tobacco, pp. 8-9.
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crop survived.

Too much moisture, on the other hand,

created coarse-leaved, inferior tobacco.

Thus, quantity

and quality depended largely on unpredictable and uncontrollable elements.
Hand cultivation of the closely-spaced plants went on
through the summer.

Tobacco slips were planted five to six

inches apart to encourage the development of small leaves.
Around Izmir, harvesting began about the end of June.
Individual_ leaves were picked as they matured, from the
bottom of the plant upward.

Each leaf fell into a category

according to its position on the stalk and its size.

The

top three leaves were the most desirable as they contained
the most body and aroma.

As no more than four leaves were

picked from a plant at one time, harvesting extended over a
long period, sometimes from the end of June through September.
Each leaf was threaded onto strings that were hung in
the sun to dry.

The weather again had to cooperate:

would spoil the tobacco.

rain

The leaves were even brought

under cover at night to protect them from dew.

After three

to four weeks of this curing process, the grower baled the
strings of tobacco.

The growers, however, were not known

to be exacting in their grading and baling.

Short of funds

or time, they carelessly packed bales which were sold
quickly, generally with as much scrap material or excess
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weight concealed in them as possible.3
No fewer than

so,ooo or more than 180,000 growers were

reported to have planted tobacco during any year of the
interwar period (see Table 1), but these figures include
neither the labor of the grower's family members--an
average of five per household4--who also worked in the
fields, nor any hired help which was required.

The fact

that hillsides were favored over flatlands for growing did
not make these workers' chores any easier.

Thousands of

hands produced millions of pounds of tobacco each year in
this back-breaking, unmechanized ritual of tobacco
growing.
Tobacco growers were not only subject to these fixed
seasonal ceremonies, but also to the rules of the tobacco
monopoly.s

According to the original 1883 convention, the

Regie was to lend growers money to plant their crop and
then to purchase all of the tobacco produced in the empire.
3Whitaker, "Culture of Turkish Tobacco;" U.S. Department of Commerce, "Turkey: A Commercial and Industrial
Handbook," p. 96; James F. Hodgson, Gardner Richardson and
Julian E. Gillespie, "Trade Financing and Exchange in
Egypt, Greece and Turkey," Trade Information Bulletin No.
506 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1927), pp.
19-21.
4Ahmed Armud, "Turkey, Carrying Eight Million Bales
per Season," Tobacco: Generator of Wealth (London and New
York: World Tobacco, 1983), p. 87.
Sshaw, Reform, p. 233.
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Such total control was immediately abandoned as the Regie
chose not to buy all the tobacco grown in the first year of
its operation. 6

Officially this control was ended by the

renewed charter of 1914, in which the monopoly was required
to buy only the tobacco it needed, 7 but the monopoly
continued to regulate all aspects of the trade.
Every grower had to obtain permisson--a certificate
known as a "koc;an"--from the Regie to plant a crop. 8

By

presenting proof of ownership or a lease of the property
where the tobacco was to be planted, this permission was
granted automatically and free of charge.

Only extremely

small plantings, one-eighth of an acre or less, could be
denied permission.9

During the growing season, representa-

6corrigan, "Tobacco Industry of Smyrna," Report No. 34,
1 June 1927, RG 84, CPR Smyrna, NA, file 861.33 Field CropsTobacco, p. 22.
7see Article II of the renewed convention of the tobacco
monopoly found in Philip to Secretary of State (Bryan), 12
September 1913, OS 867.61331/5, M353, 66/1215-32.
Bseveral participants in the aromatic tobacco trade
were kind enough to discuss with me many details of the
trade which included here. Richard English, interview with
author, Richmond, VA, October-November 1985 (English's
insights are all the more valuable because his father,
Joseph M. English, was the manager of American Tobacco's
buying organization in Turkey for decades, beginning in
about 1924); Irving Finold, interview with author, Richmond,
VA, November 1985; H. K. Greer, interview with author,
Winston-Salem, NC, November 1985; Ed Leight, interview with
author, Walkertown, NC, November 1985;
9Ravndal to Secretary of State (Bryan), 5 May 1913, DS
165.082/19, M353 66/1170.
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tives of the Regie inspected every stand of tobacco and
estimated the expected harvest.

The Regie calculated the

traditional Turkish agricultural tithe on the basis of
these estimates.lo
Upon selling the tobacco, which usually took place on
the farm or in a nearby village, the farmer had to
transport the tobacco to the nearest warehouse of the
Regie.

This required a transfer permit known as a "pafta."

At the Regie station, the tobacco was weighed and an
official certificate of change of ownership, a "nadea," was
issued.

The Regie was required to ensure that no grower

had to transport his tobacco for more than a ten-hour
journey, a journey usually made by camel, donkey or cart.11
Thus, the network of Regie facilities was extensive.

Based

on the location of these stations, the tobacco-growing
regions were divided into administrative districts, the

lOone source states that Regie demanded 12.5% of a
grower's tobacco harvest. U.S. Department of Commerce,
"Turkey, A Commercial and Industrial Handbook," p. 97.
Another sources state that the tithe was 12%. Corrigan,
"Tobacco Industry of Smyrna," Report No. 34, 1 June 1927,
RG 84, CPR Smyrna, NA, file 861.33 Field Crops-Tobacco, p.
22.
llRavndal to Secretary of State (Bryan), 5 May 1913, DS
165.082/19, M353 66/1171; Corrigan, "Tobacco Industry of
Smyrna," Report No. 34, 1 June 1927, RG 84, CPR Smyrna, NA,
file 861.33 Field Crops-Tobacco, p. 22.

36
name for which often derived from the village where the
Regie warehouse was located.12
The "nadea" also served as permission for the
purchaser to transfer the tobacco.

In other words, every

pound of tobacco was to be accompanied by an official
permit at all times:
the road.

in the field, at a warehouse or on

Despite all this supervision, smuggling remained

a formidable problem.

The Regie was reported to have as

many as 12,000 armed men working to control the illegal
trade.13
So tobacco traders in Turkey were subject to the laws
of nature and of man, if not always willingly.

The trade

had to work within the framework of economic laws as well.
The availability of financing was almost as significant a
factor as growing conditions and was more important than
the monopoly's regulation in influencing the supply of aromatic tobacco.

As mentioned above, in the Regie's original

concession, growers were to be financed by the monopoly.
These no-interest loans were theoretically to be repaid
from the sale of tobacco to the monopoly, but there is no
evidence of such a system in operation during the twentieth
12Whitaker, "Culture of Turkish Tobacco."
13Ravndal to Secretary of State (Bryan), 5 May 1913,
DS 165.082/19, M353 66/1171; Corrigan, "Tobacco Industry of
Smyrna," Report No. 34, l.June 1927, RG 84, CPR Smyrna, NA,
file 861.33 Field Crops-Tobacco, p. 22.
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century.

In reality, obtaining funds for planting and

caring for a tobacco crop was a persistent problem.
There was no effective financial institution to make
loans to tobacco growers; in general the farmers had to
finance their crops themselves.

Some funding came from

local merchants or tobacco buyers, but this was usually in
the form either of advances for a crop that then could be
bought at a reduced rate, or of a loan at an usurious rate,
up to 80%, with the crop as a guarantee.

This loan

information was frequently written on the back of the
"koc;an" so that any potential purchaser would be aware of a
lien on the crop.

American purchasers were occasionally

known to provide loans to dependable growers at legal rates
of interest--9% plus a 6% banking commission--or to give
advances to procure an option on a crop, but these methods
were neither widespread nor permanent.14
This lack of regular, reasonable financing made the
growers' future output heavily dependent on tobacco prices.
If a grower could cover current expenses and have funds
left over, then he could afford to plant the following
year.

By the same token, if rising prices one year

indicated that there would be heavy demand for the next

14Hodgson, "Trade Financing," p. 21; Corrigan, "Tobacco
Industry of Smyrna," Report No. 34, 1 June 1927, RG 84, CPR
Smyrna, NA, file 861.33 Field Crops-Tobacco, p. 22.
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crop, then merchants or buyers were more likely to extend
loans or make advances.

On the other hand, low prices left

a grower barely able, or perhaps unable, to cover his
expenses, and the same low prices gave no incentive to
lenders to speculate.
With this price dependency in mind, the controlling
economic laws become obviously apparent.
prices brought increased production.
eventually brought surpluses.

Times of high

Increased production

surpluses led to lower

prices which in turn reduced production.

Resulting

shortages closed the circle by encouraging high prices.
This theoretical cycle was influenced and distorted by
numerous other factors, but by and large, such progressions
held true before the First World War and continued
afterward.15

Stability was not a characteristic of the

Turkish tobacco industry and these economic cycles were a
crucial part of the trade's development.
Growing conditions, regulations, and economics determined the supply of aromatic tobacco.

In order to under-

stand the Turkish-American trade, though, the overall
international demand for this tobacco and the nature of the
Turkish tobacco market must also be considered.

The First

World War disrupted Turkish tobacco's international

15constantinides, Turkish Tobacco, pp. 90-1.
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market.

Before the war, England had bought about 25% of

Turkey's tobacco, but after the war bought only about 3%.
Germany's postwar financial situation temporarily precluded
heavy involvement in the Turkish tobacco market.

The

destruction of Austria-Hungary removed that multinational
empire from its role as the leading purchaser of Turkish
tobacco, and the tobacco monopolies in the various Central
European successor states did not take its place.16

The

gap left by these disturbances in the international
aromatic tobaccco trade, combined with the already-cited
improvements in Turkish-American trading relations (see pp.
12-13), made American buying one of the most influential
forces in the Turkish market.
The American presence was a direct response to
consumer demand in the United States.

American cigarette

manufacturers wanted the best grades of aromatic tobacco
for their products and they purchased more Turkish tobacco
than any other country did during the interwar period.

To

maintain a sure and steady supply of aromatic leaf, these
manufacturers worked with or established American companies
in Turkey.

The presence of American-run buying organiza-

16Allen, "Turkish Regie," 13 November 1925, OS
867.61331/9, M353, 66/1282-83.
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tions in Turkey was another reason for substantial American
influence in the demand component of the trade.17
In theory, the operations of these buying agents were
quite simple.

The manufacturing companies in America

decided upon a strategy of buying and a purchase order for
an amount of certain grades of aromatic tobacco was
delivered to the Near Eastern offices.

In calculating this

order, the companies considered existing stocks, needs for
the future, condition of the present crop, and the fact
that a crop bought one year would be used in cigarettes
between one and four years after its purchase.
The specialized aromatic tobacco-importing companies
transformed strategy into tactics.

A handful of Americans

working in conjunction with Turkish employees surveyed the
tobacco crop as it grew and purchased from the different
growing regions in Turkey.

This meant Americans and their

representatives were in direct contact with thousands of
growers around Turkey.
demanded this.

Tobacco cultivation in Turkey

The large number of small producers called

for an extensive organization to meet the needs of American
manufacturers.

17Ed Leight, interview with author, Walkertown, NC,
November 1985; Dick English, interviews with author, Richmond, VA, October, November 1985.
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Whenever necessary, though, American buyers purchased
tobacco through the same channels as other foreign buyers-through Turkish merchants--rather than going directly to
the growers.

These native middlemen, serving as one of

the few sources of financing for tobacco farmers, were
often able to control large supplies of tobacco by
exploiting the inveterate indebtedness of the growers.
After the hefty profits taken by these merchants, though,
the price of this tobacco for foreign buyers could increase
by as much as 200%.

Circumventing these merchants was one

of the reasons that cigarette manufacturers created the
American buying organizations.la
There were several smaller American firms that bought
Turkish tobacco, mostly specialty producers of aromatic
cigarettes.

They played only a minor role in the trade,

and their role continued to diminish as aromatic cigarettes
declined in relative popularity.1 9

In the early 1920s,

three American companies wielded influence in the market:
Gary Tobacco, Standard Commercial, and Alston Tobacco, the
18Allen, "Turkish Regie," 13 November 1925, OS
867.61331/9, M353, 66/1284.
19 11 Hallas & Landau, New Turkish Firm, Have Incorporated," USTJ, vol. 98, no. 3 (1922): 6; "Anthony Melachrino
Leaves for the Near East," USTJ, vol. 104, no. 6 (1925): 7;
Samuel w. Honaker (American Delegate) to Admiral Mark L.
Bristol, 2 July 1925, RG 84, ER Constantinople, NA, file
851.2 Taxation; Irving Finold, interview with author,
Richmond, VA, November 1985.
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companies that bought for the Big Four manufacturers in
the United States.
The individual Americans who ran these buying organizations in Turkey were both important and conspicuous.
They not only actively participated in the Turkish tobacco
markets, but they also played a role in the larger American
community in Turkey.20

High Commissioner Bristol consider-

ed American banks to be the most crucial institution for
the expansion of American trade in Turkey.

In the summer

of 1921, when he called on the tobacco buyers to help save
the only American bank in Turkey from financial ruin the
tobacco men responded immediately.21

The American Chamber

of Commerce for the Levant, established in 1911, was the
second-oldest organization of its kind, preceeded only by
the chamber in Paris.

In 1923, F. B. Stem of Gary Tobacco

was on its board of directors.22

Gary's offices served as

20other long-established and influential American firms
in Turkey included the licorice producers MacAndrews and
Forbes, and the vacuum Oil Company, a subsidiary of Standard
Oil of New York (Socony). DeNovo, American Interests, pp.
38-40, 264-65.
2lpeter Michael Buzanski, "Admiral Mark L. Bristol and
Turkish-American Relations, 1919-1922" (Ph.D. diss, University of California, Berkeley, 1960), pp. 239-42.
22Letterhead of American Chamber of Commerce for the
Levant, 2 May 1923, RG 84, CPR Smyrna, NA, file 610 Trade
Extension.
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the chamber's headquarters in Izmir,23 and at the same time
as an official meeting place for all Americans in that
city.24

Besides the role the buyers played in the American

business community in Turkey, they had close ties to
American diplomats there and they enjoyed access to high
Turkish government officials.
The economic gap between the American buying agents
and the Turkish tobacco growers made the buyers conspicuous.

The Americans were, by Turkish standards, very

wealthy.

Glenn Tobacco paid a beginning buyer $300 per

month.25

In comparison, in January 1930 the average

unskilled laborer in Turkey earned a daily wage of $.5o.26
The American buyers were also part of a sophisticated and
efficient international business organization.

In

contrast:
The vast majority of the small farmers who
produce the bulk of the tobacco crop of Turkey
seem continually in financial distress and live
in a state bordering on wretchedness according to
23Translation of article appearing in the Izmir newspaper "Yeni Turan," 8 December 1922, RG 84, ER Constantinople, NA, file 610.23 Chambers of Commerce.
24Memo, A. Wallace Treat (Consul, Izmir), 4 September
1923, RG 84, CPR Smyrna, NA, file 610 Trade Extension.
25Ed Leight began working for Glenn Tobacco in Turkey
in 1930. Ed Leight, interview with author, Walkertown, NC,
November 1985.
26This was the pay rate for January 1930.
American Relations, p. 299.

Gordon,
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American standards. In addition to the usual
handicaps of the farmer, they are insufficiently
supplied with means of communication in Turkey;
are proverbially ignorant and improvident; have
no cooperative associations to discuss and encourage improved methods of cultivation, packing
and marketing; are satisfied to sell their crop
without knowledge of prices prevailing in other
growing districts; and in many cases have no
option as the larger part of the crop is pledged
in advance as security for loans. The marketing
machinery available to the [American] corn,
wheat and cotton farmer, are undreamed of
here. 27
The nature of aromatic tobacco's production in Turkey
caused market instability.

As with many agricultural pro-

ducts, the supply fluctuated greatly due to weather and
market conditions.

Governmental regulation, although

present in theory, scarcely influenced the amount produced,
nor did it bring stability.

And the plethora of small-

scale producers did not contribute to market coordination.
The resultant swings in the market are a natural focus for
a study of the trade; one must seek to determine how these
changes affected the Turkish-American trade.

The

characteristics of this market also determined American
participation in the Turkish tobacco market.

The Turkish

trade's primitive infrastructure made direct contact with
thousands of growers and bypassing native merchants both
desirable and economical, and in turn, this intimate
27corrigan, "Tobacco Industry of Smyrna," Report No.
34, 1 June 1927, RG 84, CPR Smyrna, NA, file 861.33 Field
Crops-Tobacco, p. 22.
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American presence influenced the market.

such interaction

is another focal point of this study.
The presence of American buying organizations in
Turkey not only emphasized the economic importance of the
tobacco connection, but it also made these Americans
immediately available to Turks as pressure points when
changes in Turkish-American relations--either commercial or
political--were desired.

The relative wealth of these

representatives and the sharp contrast they presented made
it all the more likely that they be singled out if pressure
could be applied correctly.
The American tobacco men's intimate connection to a
vital sector of the Turkish economy made these men a steady
source of information for America's diplomatic representatives.

American consular officers in Turkey received

regular requests for reports on the industries of that
country.

These officers frequently consulted American

tobacco men in Turkey for assistance in collecting the
required information, as in the case of an elaborate
questionnaire prepared by the tobacco section of the Bureau
of Foreign and Domestic Commerce in 1923 concerning the
world tobacco trade.28

The participants in the aromatic

28 11 Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce Solicits
Trade for Full Data on Present Condition in World's Tobacco
Industry," USTJ, vol. 100, no. 6 (1923): 3, 48; Wilbur J.
Carr (for the Secretary of State) to "Certain American
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tobacco trade served as sources of information in a
different manner as well.

The State Department requested

ten copies of an article written by

w.

A. Whitaker, vice

president of Standard Commercial Tobacco Company.

The

State Department then sent Whitaker's article, "The Culture
of Turkish Tobacco as Exemplified in the Smyrna Type," to
American missions and consulates, referring to it as a
well-prepared and valuable source of information.29
As A. Wallace Treat, the consul in Izmir, noted,
"while the American colony in Izmir is relatively small in
numbers, the capital represented by the members thereof is
enormous," and, therefore, "the office is in constant
contact with the American colony and the interviews with
the members thereof, occur too frequently to be
recorded. 11 30

This intimate contact was evidence of a

symbiotic relationship.

The consulates served to protect

American interests, but in return the consular officers
Consular Officers," 15 September 1923, RG 84, CGR Constantinople, NA, file 861.3 Tobacco.
29Alvey A. Adee (Second Assistant Secretary of State)
to Standard commercial Tobacco Company, 7 July 1923, DS
867.61331/6, M353, 66/1260; Whitaker reported sending the
requested reprints of his article the following week. w.
A. Whitaker to Secretary of State (Hughes), 13 June 1923,
DS 867.61331/6, M353, 66/1259.
JOA. Wallace Treat (Consul, Izmir) to Secretary of State
(Hughes), "General Activities at Smyrna Consulate General,"
Report No. 128, 24 July 1923, RG 84, CPR Smyrna, NA, file
610 Trade Extension.
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mined the American tobacco men for information concerning
Turkey's tobacco trade--obvious interplay between commerce
and diplomacy.
On the one hand, a lucrative, but volatile, trade presented opportunity and motive for powerful American industrialists to attempt to influence America's relations with
Turkey.

On the other hand, the trade's value gave Turks

the incentive to use tobacco as a tool to their national
economic and political advantage.

Both of these positions

were apparent in late 1922 and 1923 as the diplomats met to
negotiate in Lausanne and the nationalists extended their
influence within Turkey.

Chapter Three
The Lausanne Conference and its Treaties, 1923

Since the 1917 break in diplomatic relations between
Turkey and the United States, American tobacco buyers in
Turkey had had to endure the insecurity that resulted from
a lack of formal ties.

Late in 1922, a conference met in

Lausanne, Switzerland, to replace the defunct Treaty of
Sevres with a new peace for the Near East and to determine
Turkey's place in the international community.

The confer-

ence produced two treaties that are of consequence here:
the Treaty of Lausanne between Turkey and the Allies, and
the Turco-American Treaty of Amity and Commerce.

The

latter included provisions for the restoration of TurkishAmerican diplomatic relations.
The August 1923 signing of the Turkish-American treaty
did not, however, end the American campaign to restore
diplomatic relations with Turkey.

Rather, it signalled the

beginning of the next phase of the battle, the struggle for
ratification of the treaty.

The Department of State's

considerable efforts towards this end culminated in failure
four years later on 18 January 1927 when the United States
Senate rejected the treaty.

In the interim, 1923-1927,

High Commissioner Bristol continued his work of protecting
48
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American interests in Turkey.l

This chapter examines the

interplay of the tobacco trade and diplomacy in the negotiation and ratification process of the Turkish-American
treaty.

The Lausanne Conference met in two sessions, from 20
November 1922 to 4 February 1923, and from 23 April to 24
July 1923, and concluded with an Allied-Turkish treaty that
the United States was not party to.

The Treaty of Lausanne

recognized the legitimacy of Ataturk's nationalist government, established boundaries for the new Turkey, and abolished the extraterritorial rights known as capitulations,
which foreign powers had long enjoyed in the Ottoman
Empire.2
Secretary of State Charles Evans Hughes's desire to
secure guarantees for American economic interests in Turkey
overcame his aversion to political entanglements in
Europe,3 but this reluctance defined the nature of the
American mis-sion sent to Lausanne.

In response to an

invitation by the conference's sponsors--Britain, France,
loeNovo, American Interests, p. 153-66; Trask, U.S.
Response, pp. 37-47.
2The text of the Lausanne Treaty, slightly abbreviated,
may be found in Hurewitz, British-French Supremacy, pp.
325-37.
3Buckingham, International Normalcy, pp. 182-3.
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and Italy--Hughes opted to send "observers" to Lausanne.
The observer status limited the American mission's
participation in the Lausanne negotiations leading to the
Allied-Turkish treaty.

Thus, the chief American represen-

tatives during the first portion of the conference--Richard
Washburn Child, ambassador to Italy; Joseph

c.

Grew,

ambassador to Switzerland, and Admiral Bristol--were not
official delegates, but were only present to convey
American interests to the negotiating parties.4
Despite their limited role and restriction to observer
status, the Americans had specific goals in this
conference. Secretary Hughes defined the areas of American
interest to be defended at the conference:

maintenance of

the capitulations, claims, commerce, minorities, international financial control of Turkey, the Straits,
educational and missionary activity, and archeological
research.5

As the first five of these points directly

affected the tobacco trade, the potential for diplomatic
and commercial interaction was high.

Beginning in June

1923, Ambassador Grew and Ismet Inonu, the leader of the
Turkish delegation in Lausanne, hammered out agreements on
most of these issues in bilateral Turkish-American nego4Ibid., pp. 83-97.
5Hurewitz, British-French Supremacy, pp. 312-8.
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tiations.

On 6 August 1923, two weeks after the signing of

the Treaty of Lausanne, Grew and Inonu signed the TurcoAmerican Treaty of Amity and Commerce.6
Realizing that a treaty would affect the tobacco
trade, American buyers of Turkish tobacco lobbied their
diplomatic representatives.

Their personal relationships

with American diplomats aided this effort.

Even as Admiral

Bristol and Julian E. Gillespie travelled to Lausanne in
November 1922, they were in touch with participants in the
trade.

In Gillespie's chatty description of his and

Bristol's journey to Switzerland aboard the Orient Express,
he noted that upon arrival in Trieste, "we all went up to
the hotel to see some of our Constantinople Gary Tobacco
friends."'

6Buckingham, International Normalcy, pp. 97-100; DeNovo,
American Interests, pp. 150-53; Gordon, American Relations,
pp. 273-8; Joseph c. Grew, Turbulent Era: A Diplomatic
Record of Forty Years. 1909-1945, Walter Johnson, ed.
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1952), 1, 475-585. For
the full text of the treaty see Papers Relating to the
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1923 (2 vols.,
Washington, 1938), 2, 1153-71 (hereafter cited as FRUS
1923). A summary of the treaty may be found in Grew,
Turbulent Era, 1, 603-5.
'Julian E. Gillespie to Klein (Director of Bureau of
Foreign and Domestic Commerce), 9 December 1922, RG 151,
FDC Records, NA, file 443.3X, p. 2-3. For more on High
Commissioner Bristol's strong interest in and close connections to American businesses in Turkey see Buzanski, "Admiral
Bristol," pp. 211-46.
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Maintenance of the capitulations was of paramount
concern to both American tobacco men and American
diplomats.

Since the sixteenth century, the capitulations

had provided immunity from Ottoman law and taxation to
westerners in the empire.

These

extraterrito~ial

rights

represented order and security to foreigners in Turkey.
Robert Imbrie, the first permanent American delegate to
Ankara, believed that "the capitulations were absolutely
necessary to American commercial enterprises in Turkey.
The courts were venal, bribes were essential, and
interference by minor officials looking for bribes was
endemic. 118
Turkish opinion of the capitulations was quite different.

Upon entering World War I, the ottoman government

unilaterally abolished the capitulations on 1 October 1914,
an act which the Allies had never recognized. 9

At

Lausanne, Inonu adamantly insisted on acceptance of the
abrogation of the capitulations.

British delegate Lord

Curzon, equally adamant and with the full backing of the
American delegation, continued to reject the Turkish
position.lo
8Evans, U.S. Policy, p. 338.
9Geoffrey Lewis, Modern Turkey (London and Toronto:
Ernest Benn, 1974), p. 88.
lOBuckingham, International Normalcy, pp. 92-3.
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American tobacco interests also registered their
support for the capitulations.

In February 1923,

w.

A.

Whitaker of Standard Commercial Tobacco Company protested
to the Near Eastern Division of the State Department about
nationalist Turkish activities which effectively abolished
the capitulations. Whitaker proclaimed this to be an
unacceptable change.11

State Department personnel

responded supportively, citing several diplomatic efforts
at the Lausanne Conference to maintain the capitulations in
lieu of other sufficient guarantees for American interests
in Turkey.12
In 1922-23, however, military realities forced the
Allies to recognize not only Kemal Ataturk's liberation of
Turkey from foreign military control, but also the
liberation of Turkey from foreign civil influences.13

On

30 May the Allies accepted the subordination of foreigners
in Turkey to Turkish law and courts.1 4

This Allied

concession undermined the American position and, despite
llw. A. Whitaker (Standard Commercial) to the Department
of State, 17 February 1923, RG 84, ER Constantinople, NA, file
850.3 Capital Corporations.

12unsigned letter prepared for Secretary of State
(Hughes) to Standard Commercial Tobacco Company, n.d., RG
84, ER Constantinople, NA, file 850.3 Capital Corporations.
13Evans, U.S. Policy, pp. 376-99.
14Buckingham, International Normalcy, p. 94-5; Shaw,
Reform, p. 367.
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further debate in the bilateral negotiations, served as a
precedent for Article II of the Turkish-American treaty
which accepted the capitulations' abrogation.

Neither

tobacco men nor diplomats desired this outcome, but without
recourse to armed intervention it was inevitable.
Another extremely delicate point in Lausanne was the
issue of financial claims against Turkey.

After heated de-

bate during the Allied-Turkish negotiations, the Allies'
World War I claims had been balanced against Turkish claims
resulting from the War for Independence.

As a result, all

of the participants of the conference eventually dropped
their demands for compensation.15

Grew, however, insisted

on the legitimacy of American claims and the bilateral
Turkish-American negotiations almost collapsed around this
issue.

Until almost the very end of the negotiations,

Inonu steadfastly rejected the legitimacy of American
claims.16
American tobacco interests attempted to influence the
treatment of financial claims during the treaty.
February 1923, Franklin

w.

In

Bell of Gary Tobacco wrote to

Admiral Bristol in Lausanne, suggesting that "forgetting
and forgiving the past" would lead to "mutual

succe~s

in

15z. Y. Hershlag, Turkey: An Economy in Transition,
(The Hague, 1958), p. 25.
16auckingham, International Normalcy, pp. 98-9.
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the future."

In this spirit, he recommended a bilateral

cancellation of all past financial obligations, including
taxes that the nationalist Turkish government was trying to
collect from the American tobacco companies for the period
1914-22.

Bell also proposed specific dates for this

nullification of obligations.

If the treaty cancelled all

debts dated prior to the Izmir fire of 1922, then the back
taxes that the Turks wanted to collect would be disallowed.
But such timing would still allow the companies to press
their claims for damages from the fire and their claims for
confiscation by the Turks of tobacco on which the companies
had paid advances to the Greeks.17

Bell wrote to Bristol

again in July 1923 about claims that Gary Tobacco filed
against the Turkish government for losses resulting from
the occupation of Izmir.

Bell wanted to keep Bristol

informed because it "occurred to us that it might be well
for us to advise you (Bristol] of our action for such
attention at Lausanne as, in your opinion, the occasion may
suggest. 11 18
The Turkish-American treaty partially fulfilled Bell's
requests.

Article XXIX of the treaty stated that "no taxes

17Bell to Bristol, 3 February 1923, RG 84, ER Constantinople, NA, file 851.2 Taxation.
18F. w. Bell to Admiral Mark c. Bristol, 7 July 1923,
RG 84, ER Constantinople, NA, file 350 Claims.
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are to be collected from American citizens for any taxable
periods prior to the fiscal year 1922-1923 which, under the
laws in force on August 1, 1914, were not applicable to
them. 11 19

The broader claims problem proved to be

unsolvable during the negotiations, a problem that the
Americans felt would hinder the treaty's ratification.
Grew and Inonu, therefore, agreed that a solution would be
found outside of the treaty negotiations.

Accordingly, in

December 1923, Admiral Bristol and a Turkish representative
drew up a separate agreement that called for a mixed
arbitration tribunal (i.e., with Turkish and American
representatives) to handle American claims within six
months of the treaty's ratification.20

Thus, the

settlement of the claims issue gave the American tobacco
companies incentive to support Senate ratification of the
treaty with Turkey.

But, as ratification of this treaty

never came, resolution of the American tobacco companies'
claims had to wait for more than a decade (see pp. 71-76) .
Another point in Secretary Hughes's 1922 list of American goals for Lausanne Conference was the preservation of
19council on Turkish-American Relations, "The Treaty
With Turkey, Why It Should Be Ratified" (New York, 1926),
p. 148.
20Bristol to Adnan (Delegate at Istanbul of the Turkish
Ministry of Foreign Affairs), 24 December 1923, FRUS 1923,
2, 1190; Adnan to Bristol, 24 December 1923, FRUS 1923, 2,
1190-1.
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American commercial interests in Turkey.

More important

than tobacco in discussions on this issue were the Chester
Concession and the "Mosul Question. 11 21

More broadly,

Hughes called for the implementation of Open Door policies
in Turkey and the cancellation of all pre-war concessions-such as the Regie--to foreigners.22

Joseph

c. Grew, the

sole leader of the American mission during the second phase
of the conference, won Allied acceptance of the Open Door
in the Treaty of Lausanne.23

Grew was unsuccessful,

however, in his attempt to obtain the cancellation of all
concessions in Turkey; foreigners retained those granted
before 1914.24
2lrn the renewed Chester concession the Ottoman-American
Development Company attempted to win the concession for
extensive railroad and mining projects in Anatolia. The
Turks granted the concession to this group in April 1923,
but cancelled it later in the year when the company failed
to raise sufficient capital. DeNovo, American Interests,
pp. 210-28. The Mosul question involved the boundary
between Turkey and Iraq, an important international issue
because of the oil reserves located in this disputed region.
Ibid., pp. 191-9.
22Buckingham charges that Hughes's support of the Open
Door was insincere, as Hughes simultaneously sanctioned
secret negotiations between American oil companies and the
Turkish oil monopoly. Buckingham, International Normalcy,
pp. 78-97.
23Evans, U.S. Policy, pp. 344-48, 403.
24william M. Hale, The Political and Economic Development of Modern Turkey (New York: St. Martin's, 1981) pp.
38-9; Hershlag, Turkey, pp. 17-30, 45.
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The American mission's emphasis on commercial rights
benefited the tobacco interests, even though debate on this
issue had not focused on the tobacco trade.

Article IV of

the Turkish-American treaty recognized the right of foreign
companies to exist and to own property in Turkey.

Article

VI stated that no forced loans or exceptional levies could
be demanded of foreign nationals or corporations.

Article

VII provided that taxation of foreign nationals or foreign
corporations had to be formulated on the same basis as
taxation of native persons or companies.

Article VIII

conferred most-favored-nation trading status on the countries.

The inclusion of these guarantees for commercial

interests was another reason for American tobacco buyers to
support the treaty.
Of major significance at the Lausanne Conference was
the issue of minorities in Turkey, also one of Secretary
Hughes's points in his 1922 outline of American interests.
In an attempt to eliminate one of the primary causes of
tension between Greece and Turkey, a convention signed in
Lausanne on 20 January 1923 provided for the mandatory and
reciprocal expulsion of minority populations--as defined by
religious affiliation--from Greece and Turkey.25

The

interests of American diplomats and American tobacco
25stephen P. Ladas, The Exchange of Minorities Bulgaria,
Greece and Turkey (New York: MacMillan, 1932), pp. 335-52.
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companies diverged on the minority issue.

The American

mission's goal was to obtain guarantees for the religious
freedoms of Christian minorities remaining in Turkey,26
guarantees similar to those provided in Section III of the
Allied-Turkish treaty.27

The tobacco buyers' concerns

focused on the emigration of the thousands of Christians
who had played a major role in the trade.

Franklin

w.

Bell

of Gary suggested to the American consul general in
Istanbul that the return of the ousted Greeks was one of
the only means of restoring the war-ravaged Turkish tobacco
industry.28

The exchange of minorities had numerous,

enduring effects, which will be treated later.

Suffice it

to say that the American diplomatic endeavors at Lausanne
concerning minorities were largely irrelevant to the
tobacco trade.
Secretary Hughes's 1922 list of talking points also
included the international financial control of Turkey.
Hughes sought the inclusion of any future American loans to
Turkey in the Turkish public debt.

As the debt was still

administered by an international commission, this step
26Buckingham, International Normalcy, pp. 98.
27Hurewitz, British-French Supremacy, pp. 330-1.
28Franklin w. Bell to G. Bie Ravndal (Consul General,
Istanbul), 14 May 1923, RG 84, CGR Constantinople, NA, file
861.3 Tobacco.
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would provide Americans with international guarantees for
their investments in Turkey.29

Thus, Hughes insinuated

American governmental support for loans to Turkey, a
promising development for any American tobacco interests
considering the Turkish tobacco monopoly as an investment.
That American interests propounded by diplomats at
Lausanne paralleled the economic interests of Americans in
the Turkish tobacco trade was duly noted by the political
opponents of the treaty in the United states.

During

Senate debate on ratification of the treaty, for example,
Senator William H. King charged that the primary advisers
of the American diplomats at Lausanne "were agents of oil
and tobacco interests" (see pp. 112-3).30

As one historian

maintains, the American diplomats in Lausanne did "pursue
economic considerations much more diligently than they did
humanitarian concerns. 11 31

It is true that the American

tobacco industry had a receptive ear within the mission to
Lausanne, especially in Bristol and Gillespie,32 and that
29Hurewitz, British-French Supremacy, p. 315.
30 11 Asks an Inquiry on Lausanne Deal; Senator King Says
'Oil and Tobacco' Interests Forced the Cabinet to Accept
Compact," New York Times, 24 December 1926, p. 8, col. 5.
31suckingham, International Normalcy, p. 106.
32Bristol, however, only attended the first session of
the conference, travelling back .to Turkey with Ismet Inonu
on the Orient Express in February 1923 to resume his duties
as high commissioner. Buckingham, International Normalcy,
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American representations were generally in line with the
tobacco trade's best interests.
Though American tobacco companies were not shy in
expressing their views on the crucial and complex matters
under negotiation, these firms were not able to dictate the
contents of the treaty.

Both American tobacco interests

and diplomats failed to gain their objective of maintaining
the capitulations.

American claims cases received more

favorable attention than the Allied claims, but American
claims still had to be upheld by a mixed arbitration
commission.

The rights of American companies granted in

the treaty's commercial provisions were common to many
American agreements with foreign powers.33

Diplomatic and

tobacco industry concerns on the minorities problems had
completely different foci.

And diplomatic support for

American investment in Turkey was generic in nature, not
specific to the tobacco industry.
In reality, the American negotiators worked within the
realm of the possible, and not to the tune of tobacco manufacturers.

Talks in Lausanne could not have effected

changes that were inimicable to Turkish nationalism.

It

p. 90.

33see, for example, the provisional commercial agreement
between the United States and Persia of 14 May 1928. Hurewitz, British-French Supremacy, pp. 396-8.
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was possible, however, for American diplomats in Lausanne
to protect the tobacco trade, simply because the trade was
of as much value to the nationalist Turks as it was to
American tobacco buyers.
Despite the State Department's considerable efforts,
diplomacy provided insufficient guarantees for the
protection of American commercial interests in Turkey--the
secretary of state's fundamental goals at Lausanne.
valuable than diplomacy were economic means.

More

In fact,

Secretary Hughes preferred "to play an international
political role primarily through economics. 11 34
An episode on 9 August, three days after the treaty's
signing, both illustrates this predilection and indicates
the relative weight of commerce and diplomacy in TurkishAmerican relations.

on Admiral Bristol's orders, Acting

Commercial Attache R. o. Hall visited the Turkish Director
General of the Commissariat of Commerce, Akif Bey, to
explain the American perception of Turkish-American trade.
First, Hall told Akif Bey that whereas Turkish goods
entering the United States enjoyed favorable tariff
treatment, Turkish trade policies hindered several American
exports to Turkey.

He warned that American goods must

enter Turkey more freely for Turkish goods to maintain

34Buckingham, International Normalcy, pp. 182-83.
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their advantageous status.

Tobacco, of course, constituted

the bulk of Turkish exports to America.

Second, Hall

recommended that American tobacco buyers be allowed to
operate freely in Turkey or they would look elsewhere--to
Greece, for example--for aromatic tobacco.

If American

businessmen, such as the tobacco buyers, were not allowed
this freedom, the chances for American investment in Turkey
would diminish.JS
One may deduce from Hall's message that the American
perception of Turkish-American relations had two dimensions.

First, Bristol, and by extension Hughes, considered

diplomatic guarantees to be less effective in maintaining
satisfactory commercial ties with Turkey than the threat of
economic retaliation.

Second, the means of retaliation was

tobacco.
Even if of limited value, the diplomatic agreements
signed at Lausanne did propose new solutions to old
problems in Turkey and accept many of Ataturk's reforms-both important consequences.

The replacement of the

humiliating Treaty of Sevres by the treaties of Lausanne
was in many ways a triumph for modern Turkey.

But this

35Hall went bearing gifts. He presented Akif a copy of
Whitaker's article on the Izmir tobacco industry, pointing
out "the unusual value of this carefully prepared monograph"
and suggesting that it be translated into Turkish for the
commissariat's use. Memo, R. o. Hall, 14 August 1923, RG
84, ER Constantinople, NA, file 861.33 Field Crops-Tobacco.
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triumph and these changes laid down numerous challenges for
foreigners in Turkey.

The American tobacco men in Turkey

would have to answer these challenges, or leave the field.

Chapter Four
Lausanne:

The Immediate Aftermath

The Lausanne Conference of 1922-23 provided international acceptance of the momentous changes taking place in
Turkey.

But in addition to acceptance, the dramatic

Turkish reforms demanded a response from foreigners in
Turkey.

American tobacco companies' intimate involvement

in Turkey subjected them to the brunt of Ataturk's
revolutionary reforms; they had to respond.

The abolition

of the capitulations, accepted by both the Allied and
American treaties with Turkey, was especially distressing
to the Turkish-American tobacco trade.

The expulsion of

non-Turkish minorities, agreed to by a convention signed in
Lausanne, was equally worrisome.

The issue of reimburse-

ment for American losses suffered during the Greco-Turkish
War was annoyingly complex in Lausanne, and it remained so
for a decade afterwards.

The Turkish treatment of

concessions and monopolies that were left in foreign hands
at Lausanne created both complications and opportunities
for Americans.

As a result, tobacco firms considered

alternatives to Turkey's role in the tobacco trade, and
sometimes implemented them.

This chapter examines the
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American tobacco companies' response to the major changes
agreed to at Lausanne.

As mentioned previously, the American tobacco
companies in Turkey felt especially threatened by the
abrogation of the capitulations, because this subjected
them to Turkish law and taxation.

The most important law

regulating foreign corporations in Turkey had been enacted
on 30 November 1914, shortly after the Ottomans had
unilaterally abolished the capitulations.

That law had

required every foreign business to register with the
government its name, place of incorporation, nationality,
capitalization value, and a copy of its charter of
incorporation.

In addition, each company had to delegate a

power of attorney to an individual who would represent the
company in Turkish courts, and the companies were to
observe all Turkish laws affecting business transactions.1
Obviously, adherence to the 1914 law would have constituted a "de facto" end of the capitulations.

But just as

the Great Powers rejected the 1914 Turkish abolition of the

1 11 Law on Nov. 30th, 1914 on Foreign Corporations and
Foreign Stock Companies," RG 84, ER Constantinople, NA,
file 850.3 Capital Corporations; Julian E. Gillespie,
"Turkish Company Law Requirements," Special Report No. 67,
13 December 1934, RG 151, FDC Records, NA, file Istanbul.
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extraterritorial rights, they ignored the the law on
foreign corporations.
Following their military victory in 1923, the Turks
stepped up pressure on firms to comply with the registration law.

It was to protest the enforcement of this law

that W. A. Whitaker of Standard Commercial had written the
State Department in February 1923 (see p. 47) .2

The Turks

fixed 18 March 1923 as a deadline for compliance,3 but the
American tobacco firms could not gather the required
materials in such a short time.

By May 1923, the Turkish

authorities in Izmir threatened to shut down those firms
that did not register immediately.4
High Commissioner Bristol encouraged American compliance, but suggested that registration be made under protest
and include a reservation clause stating that the American
companies had "in no sense the intention of surrendering
the guarantees which may be provided in the future Treaty
2w. A. Whitaker to the Department of State, 17 February
1923, RG 84, ER Constantinople, NA, file 850.3 Capital
Corporations.
3G. Howland Shaw (First Secretary of the Embassy,
Istanbul) to Theron J. Damon (Secretary of American Chamber
of Commerce for the Levant, Galata), 16 March 1923, RG.84,
ER Constantinople, NA, file 610.23 Chambers of Commerce.
4A. Wallace Treat to American High Commissioner
(Bristol), 28 May 1923, RG 84, ER Constantinople, NA, file
850.3 Capital Corporations.
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of Peace concerning the status of foreigners in Turkey. 11 5
In August 1923, State Department officials wrote that
American firms "have without exception made patent
endeavors to comply with the provisions of the Turkish
law," but that additional time was needed to obtain all the
necessary papers.6

Both the desire to continue doing

business in Turkey and the hope of recouping losses
suffered in the war increased the American companies'
willingness to register.

On the other hand, subjection to

Turkish law and the ensuing taxation--both future and
retroactive--made these companies dread registration.?
In regard to extraterritorial rights, the goals of the
American tobacco firms mirrored the goals of the American
statesmen.

The tobacco men wanted to continue buying under

the new regime in Turkey, but maintain their old privileges; the diplomats wanted to recognize the new regime,
but maintain the capitulations.
same fate.

Both sets of goals met the

The diplomats responded to Turkish nationalism

by accepting the capitulations' abrogation in the treaty;
5shaw to Damon, 16 March 1923, RG 84, ER Constantinople,
NA, file 610.23 Chambers of Commerce.
6A. Wallace Treat to Barnes, 18 August 1923, RG 84, ER
Angora (Correspondence), NA, file 850.3 Capital Corporations.
7p. w. Bell (Gary Tobacco) to Admiral Bristol (American
Special Mission, Lausanne), 3 February 1923, RG 84, ER
Constantinople, NA, file 851.2 Taxation.
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the tobacco men responded to Turkish nationalism by
submitting to the law on foreign corporations.

By 1925,

Gary, Alston, and Standard Commercial had registered.a
Failure to have done so would have terminated the American
tobacco presence in Turkey; not consenting to Turkish
sovereignty would have ended the American diplomatic
presence there.

The formerly unacceptable now had to be

accepted.
The American tobacco companies went beyond merely
accepting the new Turkish regime, they offered their
assistance in rebuilding the Turkish tobacco market in
exchange for "the best co-operation on the part of the
Turkish Government. 11 9

The establishment of two new

American tobacco companies in Turkey could be perceived as
an expression of confidence in the nationalist regime.

The

Glenn Tobacco Company, a subsidiary of R. J. Reynolds,
began the registration process in March 1923,lO and the
8Julian E. Gillespie, "Foreign Joint-stock Companies in
Turkey, Their Capital and Business Lines," 23 May 1925, RG
84, ER Constantinople, NA, file 600 Commercial Relations.
9Bell to Bristol, 3 February 1923, RG 84, ER Constantinople, NA, file 851.2 Taxation.
lORadio dispatch, James Harriss to Alston Tobacco
Company, 20 March 1923, RG 84, ER Constantinople, NA, file
850.3 Capital Corporations. This company took its name from
its director, J. w. Glenn, a Reynolds' employee since 1905.
Actually, Glenn Tobacco had been operating in Greece since
1922. Tilley, Reynolds, pp. 234-35.
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American Tobacco Company of the orient (American of the
Orient), a subsidiary of American Tobacco Company, began
buying aromatic tobacco in Turkey.11

These companies, like

Gary and Alston, purchased and processed aromatic leaf for
their parent company.
The establishment of new firms in Turkey, however,
should not be interpreted exclusively as a gesture of
American confidence in Ataturk's regime.

The fact that

Standard Commercial, previously the primary buyer for R. J.
Reynolds, was at the center of unspecified controversies
and rumors of unethical practices certainly encouraged
Glenn's creation.12

The ultimate motives behind these

companies' involvement in Turkey are unknown, but this does
not deny the significance of their establishment.

Rather

than fleeing from the nationalist revolution, every one of
the Big Four American tobacco manufacturers was willing to
risk the uncertainties in Turkey, abolition of the
capitulations notwithstanding.
ll 11 J. E. Archbell Here From Athens, Greece," USTJ, vol.
103, no. 16 (1925): 8; memo of conversation between Russell
Henry Kuhn (American of the Orient) and the Ambassador, 3
January 1930, RG 84, ER Angora (Correspondence), NA, file
350 Claims; memo "Regarding Income Tax Cases Against the
American Tobacco of the Orient, Inc.," n.d., 1932, RG 84, ER
Istanbul, NA, file 851.2 Taxation. By 1925 American of the
Orient had also begun the registration process. A. Wallace
Treat, "Certificat," 10 December 1922, RG 84, CPR Smyrna,
NA, file 621 Documentation of Merchandise.
12Tilley, Reynolds, pp. 234-35.
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The nature of Turkish nationalism presented another
problem for the Turkish-American tobacco trade.

Ziya

Gokalp, the seminal ideologist of Turkish nationalism,13
defined the Turkish nation as including only Turkishspeaking Muslims.14

The government of the Turkish Republic

embraced the concept of an homogeneous Turkish nation.

One

aspect of this policy's implementation was the expulsion
of most of Turkey's Greek population, in accordance with
the February 1923 convention signed in Lausanne (see p. 523) .15

By 1930 almost 2,000,000 Greeks had left Turkish

territory and were replaced by only

soo,ooo Muslims.

say "replaced," however, is misleading.

To

Many, but not all,

of the departing Greeks were skilled artisans, merchants,
and professionals; almost 90% of the immigrating Muslims
were peasant farmers.

Even the non-farming Muslims were

frequently settled in agricultural locations.16
Although the Turkish Republic had created a Ministry
of Reconstruction, Exchange, and Settlement in November
1923, the state had no central plan for settling immigrants
13shaw, Reform, p. 301-04.
14uriel Heyd, Foundations of Turkish Nationalism, The
Life and Teachings of Ziya Gokalp (Westport, CT: Hyperion
Press, 1950), pp. 130-2.
15The bulk of the transfers took place prior to 1926.
Hershlag, Turkey, p. 2.
16Ladas, Exchange of Minorities, pp. 705-19.
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on an economically advantageous basis.

Incoming Muslims

were settled in lands vacated by exiting Christians.

For

example, some immigrants from Macedonia, specialists in
tobacco cultivation, were settled in mountainous Anatolian
territories more suited to vine crops.

They removed the

vineyards, planted tobacco, and disappointedly learned why
grapes had been cultivated there in the first place.

The

Turks spent over $4.5 million in their settlement programs,
but the lack of adequate organization contributed to the
financial hardship of the immigrants and of the economy as
a whole.17
The exchange of populations inevitably affected
American interests in Turkey and it had a direct impact on
the tobacco trade.

Before the expulsions, a large number

of Greeks in the Izmir region had been tobacco farmers.
the opinion of Americans in Turkey, they would be missed:
The Greeks were good planters and it is
maintained were more careful in their methods of
cultivation and manipulation and in protecting
the crop after being harvested. Before the war,
most of the labor employees in the tobacco
fieldsi and particularly all skilled labor, was
Greek. 8

11Ibid.
18corrigan, "Tobacco Industry of Smyrna," Report No.
34, 1 June 1927, RG 84, CPR Smyrna, NA, file 861.33 Field
Crops-Tobacco, p. 22.
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Franklin W. Bell of the Gary Tobacco Company
described the damage of the Christian emigration to the
industry. Responding to a consular request for information
on the trade, Bell stated that "the war and the exodus of
Greeks and Armenians proved a terrible blow to the Turkish
tobacco industry."

Quantifying the damage, he estimated

the 1923 harvest of 28 million pounds to be one-third of
Turkey's normal pre-war production.

He offered the

following advice on coping with these problems:
If peace soon can be concluded and the Turkish
army disbanded so that the soldiers may go to
work in the tobacco fields, the production of
tobacco will naturally be increased. But in
order that Turkey may compete with her principal
competitor {Greece), it will be necessary either
that Greeks be permitted to return to their farms
in Anatolia or that Turkish planters, now
residing in Macedonia and Thrace be transferred
to farms abandoned in Anatolia.l 9
The Greeks were not going to farm Anatolian soil
again.

It remained to be seen how well the immigrating

Turks could replace the emigrants in a trade requiring
skill born of experience.

The diplomatic negotiations in

Lausanne provided a number of guarantees for American
commercial interests in Turkey, and the American cigarette
19Franklin w. Bell to G. Bie Ravndal, 14 May 1923, RG
84, CGR Constantinople, NA, file 861.3 Tobacco. Ravndal
placed Bell's words and ideas almost verbatim in his May
1923 report "Commerce and Industries of Turkey." G. Bie
Ravndal, "Commerce and Industries of Turkey," 29 May 1923,
RG 84, CGR Constantinople, NA, file 610 Trade Extension, p.
53.
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manufacturers had decided to continue their operations in
Turkey.

But these commitments to American tobacco

interests were of limited value, if Turkey's tobacco
industry, damaged by the exchange of minorities, was unable
to continue playing its role as a producer in the tobacco
trade.
The statistics on American imports of Turkish tobacco
would seem to support doubts about Turkey's capability in
this role.

Direct shipments of tobacco from Izmir to the

United States decreased from 13.3 million pounds in 1922 to
1.6 million pounds in 1923.20

similarly, direct shipments

from Samsun to the United states declined from 4.7 million
pounds to .2 million pounds over the same perioa.21

These

figures, however, do not include the millions of pounds
shipped indirectly to the United States via Trieste.

one

must also recall that shipments in any year usually
consisted of crops from the previous year.

The war had

reduced production of tobacco in 1922; the Izmir fire
destroyed a considerable amount as well.

Thus, the 1923

20 11 Annual Declared Export Return," n.d. 1923, RG 84, CPR
Smyrna, NA, file 600 Commercial Relations; Samuel W. Honaker
(Consul in Charge, Izmir) to Messrs. Sullivan and Company,
22 September 1925, RG 84, CPR Smyrna, NA, file 610 Trade
Extension.
21charles E. Allen, "Annual Declared Export Return,"
n.d. 1923, RG 84, CGR Constantinople, NA, file 600 Commercial
Relations.
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export figures do not necessarily imply a reduced Turkish
capability as a producer, nor a reduced American interest
in buying tobacco from Turkey.
Indeed, several factors reassured American buyers
about Turkey's potential as a tobacco supplier.

Production

around Izmir increased from 1922 to 1923,22 despite the
numerous disruptions.

During the same time period, the

number of growers in the Samsun region also grew by one
third.23

Tobacco production for the entire country in

1923, 57.5 million pounds (see Table 1), was above the
1919-22 average of about 50 million pounds.24

As prices

had doubled compared to previous years, there was evidently
strong demand for this tobacco.25

Turkey could and did

continue to play its role as a producer of aromatic
tobacco, even during this time of uncertainty.
22In 1922, 20,224 growers produced 15,675,429 pounds.
In 1923, 24,708 growers produced 16,473,170 pounds.
"The
Tobacco Industry at Smyrna," Tobacco Markets and Conditions
Abroad, no. 113 {1927): 6 {Tobacco Markets and Conditions
Abroad hereafter cited as TMCA).
23In 1922 there were 6,120 growers and in 1923 there
were 8,039. P. E. King (Alston Tobacco) to Consul General,
6 September 1924, RG 84, CGR Constantinople, NA, file 861.3
Tobacco.
24Ravndal, "Commerce and Industries of Turkey," 29 May
1923, RG 84, CGR Constantinople, NA, file 610 Trade Extension, p. 53.
25Ravndal, "Commerce and Industries of Turkey," 29 May
1923, RG 84, CGR Constantinople, NA, file 610 Trade Extension.
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Though Turkey proved resilient as a producer, its
secondary role, as manipulator of aromatic leaf, faced
more serious challenges.

The exodus of minorities not only

created a shortage of experienced growers, but as P. E.
King of Alston Tobacco wrote, there were no experienced
tobacco manipulators left in the Samsun region; they had
all emigrated to Greece.

Alston Tobacco and other

companies were forced to hire and train new personnel,
presumably all Turkish.26
Losses around Samsun, however, were not the gravest of
the tobacco companies' problems.

The primary manipulating

center in Turkey for American-bought tobacco had been Izmir, 27 but after the fire of 1922, Izmir was ill-equipped
to support this industry.

Much of the city was in ruins,

most of the skilled Christian workers had fled, and
insurance rates for property and tobacco stocks were
exorbitantly high.

The new regime was a wild card; no one

could predict its stability, much less how it would treat
foreign-owned businesses.

All these factors motivated

American companies to seek a new location for manipulating
their tobacco.

26King to Consul General, 6 September 1924, RG 84, CGR
Constantinople, NA, file 861.3 Tobacco.
27Manipulation facilities were also located in Istanbul.
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A new site needed to meet many requirements.

The

manipulation industry required cheap, efficient labor.
For fermentation and storage, inexpensive real estate was
desirable.

In addition, shipping millions of pounds of

tobacco required good harbors and transportation
connections.

Low tax and insurance rates were also

important criteria.
New York City and low-wage Southern towns near the
cigarette manufacturing centers in the United States may
have met many of these requirements, but an additional
factor made them unsuitable.

As mentioned previously,

since 1890 the American government had levied a $.35 per
pound import duty on unstemmed cigarette leaf tobacco.28
Manipulation not only isolated quality tobacco from bulk
purchases, it also isolated grades of tobacco not suitable
for American use.29

Removal of inferior tobacco before

shipping it to the United States avoided costly duty
charges; delaying importation of the tobacco for a year
while it fermented postponed large payments as well.
Therefore, it was advantageous to locate the manipulation
28u.s. Tariff commission, "Trade Agreement Digest," p.
32; Gordon, American Relations, p. 184.
29on average, this low grade tobacco amounted to 12% of
the manipulated tobacco. Department of Commerce, Bureau of
Foreign and Domestic Commerce, "The Manipulation of Eastern
Tobacco in Trieste," TMCA, no. 304 (1931): 1-2.
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industry outside the United states.

At the same time,

manipulating tobacco in a middleman country with tariffs
similar to those in the United states would have been no
better.
The requirements for an alternative to Turkey's role
in the manipulating industry were demanding.

The American

tobacco men felt that the Italian port of Trieste met these
requirements.

Trieste offered a number of advantages.

The

Porto Duca d'Aosta and Porto Vittorio Emanuele II, two free
zones, were areas outside the customs jurisdiction of the
Italians.

Here, tobacco could be manipulated and stored

without the assessment of duties.

Trieste possessed an

abundance of low-cost and efficient labor in Trieste (experienced tobacco graders received $.50 for an eight-hour
day as late as 1932).
in Greece.

Insurance cost one-third what it did

Trieste provided better housing for the

industry than Izmir: the ports were superior: and direct
shipping connections to America and good rail connections
to central Europe were available. 3 0

Although the American

companies did manipulate tobacco in other European cities
during the interwar period--Glenn Tobacco, in particular,

30George M. Hanson (Consul, Trieste), "New Tobacco
company in Trieste," 22 May 1924, RG 84, CPR Trieste, NA,
file 861.3 Tobacco: "The Manipulation of Eastern Tobacco in
Trieste," TMCA, no. 304 (1931): 1-2: "Manipulation of Tobacco
at Trieste," TMCA, no. 428 (1933): 5-6.
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shipped large quantities to Pireaus, Greece31--the
tremendous volume shipped to Trieste made it far and away
the most important site for American manipulation of
Turkish tobacco.
After the Izmir fire, the administrators of Trieste's
Magazzini Generali (bonded warehouses) permitted Gary
Tobacco to use the facilities in the free port.

In

February 1923, Franklin W. Bell of Gary declared the
transfer of operations a success:

almost four million

kilograms of tobacco were being processed by 1,200 Gary
employees.

Bell noted that "all of our friends"--the other

American tobacco companies--had also shipped their Izmir
purchases to Europe for processing.32

Although Bell

expressed the desire to continue some manipulation work in
Turkey as long as possible,33 Gary's decision to remain in
Trieste, and the fact that other major companies followed
suit, indicate a lingering skepticism about Turkey's role
in the tobacco trade.
3lw. Perry George (Consul, Izmir) to Charles E. Allen,
22 May 1933, RG 84, CPR Izmir, NA, file 861.33 Field CropsTobacco.
32According to Bell, Gary Tobacco was the only American
company to maintain large-scale manipulating facilities in
Izmir immediately after the war. Bell to Admiral Bristol,
3 February 1923, RG 84, ER Constantinople, NA, file 861.3
Tobacco.
3 3Ibid.
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The American tobacco companies encountered trying
setbacks in their attempts to recoup losses suffered in the
Greco-Turkish War.

The Turkish and American diplomats at

Lausanne had agreed to handle American claims outside of
the treaty negotiations, but as noted previously, the
failure to ratify the Turkish-American delayed the claim
commission's convention until 1933-34.
One American tobacco company was able to press a claim
immediately.

In this case, curiously enough, the company

company sought compensation on the grounds that the Turks
were not responsible for damages to American property
during the war, more specifically, that the nationalist
forces were not responsible for the fire that destroyed
stocks of tobacco in Izmir 1922.
Prior to the Turkish occupation of Izmir, Guardian
Assurance Company, a British firm, insured the American
Tobacco Company's stocks of aromatic leaf in Izmir warehouses.

When the fire destroyed this tobacco, American

Tobacco sought compensation from the insurer.

Arguing that

the insurance policy did not cover damages resulting from
an act of war, including fire, Guardian refused to pay.
The resultant civil suit came to trial in a London court in
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December 1924.34

American Tobacco lawyers contended that

the fire was not the result of an act of war, but of arson
by individuals and that such a calamity was possible in any
Oriental city.

Guardian countered that the nationalist

Turkish occupation of Izmir had led to the fire and that
the destruction was a result of war.

Justice Rowlatt

decided that there was a causal connection between the
nationalist occupation and the fire:

arsonists in the

Greek and Armenian quarters of the city had been able to
start the fires only because the Turks failed to maintain
order and discipline in the newly-captured city.

Although

the Turks had tried to put the fires out, the conflagration
was connected with their arrival and, thus, was a
consequence of war.

Rowlatt rejected American Tobacco's

claim; the first attempt to recoup war losses failed.35

34American Tobacco sued for £168,245 4s. ld, but this
suit was viewed as a test case which could have led to $20
million in claims from other companies. "The Smyrna Fire:
Insurance Claim; American Tobacco Company, Incorporated v.
Guardian Assurance Company, Limited," Times, 20 December
1924, p. 4, col. e; "American Tobacco Co. sues for $2,000,000
Loss in Smyrna Fire," USTJ, vol. 102, no. 23 (1924): 5.
35 11 The Smyrna Fire: Insurance Claim, American Tobacco
Company, Incorporated v. Guardian Assurance Company,
Limited," Times, 20 December 1924, p. 4, col. e; Fred K.
Nielsen, American-Turkish Claims Settlement: Under the
Agreement of December 24. 1923, and Supplemental Agreements
between the United States and Turkey, Opinions and Reports
(Washington: Government Printing Office, 1937), pp. 24-6.
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On the basis of this 1924 British ruling, American
tobacco companies could--and would--hold the Turks responsible for American losses.

The companies' original stance,

i.e., that the Turks had not themselves burned half of the
second most important city in Turkey, had been logical and
had appealed to Turkish sentiment.

It was far from certain

that the Turks would accept a tactical reversal by the companies which would point an accusatory finger towards
Ankara.
But this is precisely what occurred.

The American

tobacco companies filed claims against the Turkish
government for the losses suffered in the Izmir fire.
American Tobacco demanded $469,760.85, Standard Commercial
$803,305.65,36 and Gary Tobacco $80o,ooo.37

In this second

attempt, American Tobacco argued that "the approximate
cause of the fire was the occupation of Izmir by the
Turkish Army and the failure of the Turkish military
authorities in occupying Izmir to maintain order. 11 38
American Tobacco had turned their former opponent's defense
into their own offense, but this strategy foundered in the
new judicial forum.

The commission agreed with Justice

36Nielsen, American-Turkish," pp. 128-41.
37F. w. Bell (presumably to Admiral Bristol), 7 July
1923, RG 84, ER Constantinople, NA, file 350 Claims.
38Nielsen, American-Turkish Claims," pp. 128-41, 145-8.
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Rowlatt•s decision that the Turks could not be blamed for
starting the fire, but differed from Rowlatt by insisting
that Turkish liability had to be established by the
claimant.

American Tobacco had to prove:

negligence of Turkish authorities in preventing
incendiarism and the spread of destruction of
property; or acts of those authorities resulting
in destruction; or liability for acts of
soldiers, if loss is attributed to depredations
said to have been committed by them.39
American Tobacco could not do this to the commission's
satisfaction; the tribunal rejected all of the companies'
claims of this type.

The second attempt to recoup losses

from the Izmir fire had also failed.
The American tobacco companies suffered from a
different kind of war casualty as well.

The companies had

made advance payments to both Muslim and Christian growers
in the Izmir region prior to the Turkish occupation.

Just

as the Greek army fled from the advancing nationalists, so
did many Greek civilians.

After the Christian Greek

growers fled, the Turkish forces seized their tobacco as
abandoned property and sold it at auction.40
Shortly after the Turkish victory, American of the
Orient filed a claim for about $80,000 with the Turkish
39Ib'd
1 . , p. 24 .
40J[oseph] M. English (American of the Orient) to
Joseph c. Grew (Ambasador, Istanbul), 26 March 1930, RG 84,
NA, ER Istanbul, file 350 Claims.

84
ministry of finance for a reimbursement for such advances. 41

Gary Tobacco filed a similar claim.

From July to

September 1922 Gary paid roughly $101,000 to Greek
planters around Izmir, which represented 40% of the value
of the planter's tobacco.

During the same period, Gary

paid about $25,000 to Turkish growers in the region.

The

Turks delivered their contracted tobacco and were paid the
balance due them: the Greeks fled and Gary received
nothing.42

In the summer of 1923, the Turkish Minister of

Finance, Hassan Fehmi, recommended that the two companies
be reimbursed "with utmost speed" with funds from the sale
of confiscated tobacco.43

No record of payment on these

claims is available, but payment in full was almost
certainly not made, as both of these companies refiled
claims in 1930 for losses on these same advance payments to
Christians:

American of the Orient for about $64 1 000 4 4 and

41This is a rough conversion of the actual amount,
TL 126,168. Ibid.
42F. w. Bell (presumably to Admiral Bristol), 7 July
1923, RG 84, ER Constantinople, NA, file 350 Claims.
43Memo, Hassan Fehmi (Turkish Minister of Finance) to
Turkish Ministry of Finances, 7 June 1923, RG 84, ER Angora,
NA, file 350 Claims: memo, Hassan Fehmi, 11 July 1923, RG 84,
ER Angora, NA, file 350 Claims.
44American of the orient requested TL 136,000, to be
exact. English to Grew (Ambassador), 26 March 1930, RG 84,
ER Istanbul, NA, file 350 Claims.
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Gary for $85,ooo.45

The claims commission rejected these

claims on the grounds that the companies could not provide
sufficient proof of ownership of the confiscated tobacco.
With the signing on 25 October 1934 of a TurkishAmerican agreement, the Turks agreed to pay $1.3 million to
the American government for damages suffered by American
citizens.46 None of these funds, however, went to the
tobacco companies.47

Although the Turks honored their

international agreements, the failure of the Turkish
government to provide compensation for losses suffered by
the American tobacco companies was certainly not an
adequate answer to Franklin Bell's call for cooperation and
support from the nationalists.48

This failure to resolve

satisfactorily the claims issue could only have decreased
the companies' confidence in Ataturk's regime.
Traditional historiography treats the Lausanne Treaty
as a diplomatic triumph for Turkey, the only defeated power
45Memo of conversation between Joseph c. Grew (Ambassador) and Franklin w. Bell, RG 84, ER Angora, NA, file 350
Claims.
46The commission reduced this amount to $899,388.09 in
1937. s. Walter Washington to Numan Menemencioglu (Acting
Minister for Foreign Affairs), 23 September 1937, RG 84, ER
Istanbul Confidential File, NA, file 400 U.S.-Turkey Claims.
47Nielsen, American-Turkish Claims, pp. 145-48, 128-41.
48Bell to Bristol, 3 February 1923, RG 84, ER Constantinople, NA, file 851.2 Taxation.
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of the First World War to revoke a "Diktat" imposed by the
victors. 49

Nevertheless, not all of the provisions of the

Lausanne agreement worked to Turkey's advantage.

One nega-

tive aspect was the retention by foreigners of all concessions granted prior to 1914.50

This was true of the

tobacco concession, the Regie, left in the hands of a
French group and not due to expire until 1 April 1929.

The

treaty forbade Turkey to nationalize the tobacco monopoly,
but a special convention made on 23 June 1923 between the
Turkish government and the Regie allowed the Turks to
purchase the concession from its foreign holders.

The

Turks definitely desired a change, for the Regie had "a
certain objectionable political significance • • • savoring
• • • of the former capitulatory regime in Turkey," and
reminding Turks of the lack of sovereignty which the
capitulations had represented.51

In light of these

factors, Julian Gillespie suggested in May 1924 that:
the present attitude of the Turkish government
toward the • • • Regie • • • be discreetly
49Bernard Lewis, The Emergence of Modern Turkey (London,
New York, and Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1961), p.
249; G. Lewis, Modern Turkey, p. 87; Shaw, Reform, pp. 36569.
50Hale, Political and Economic Development, pp. 38-9;
Hershlag, Turkey, pp. 17-30, 45.
51Julian E. Gillespie, "Turkish Tobacco Monopoly,"
Special Report No. 104, 30 May 1924, RG 84, ER Constantinople, NA, file 860.2 Monopolies and Concessions.

87

communicated to American concerns who might
possibly be interested in same, with the view
that some American group may possibly find it
advantageous and desirable to study the tobacco
monopoly in Turkey and enter into negotiations
for acquiring same.52
Thus, Turkish nationalism created an opportunity for
American tobacco interests to control the Turkish tobacco
monopoly.

Actually, Gillespie's suggestion was a mirror

image of Hoffman Philip's 1913 plan (see pp. 8-10).
Gillespie, "a popular and influential figure in Turkey,n53
with as much insight into Turkish economic affairs as any
American, certainly must have had cause to believe that
his suggestion was grounded in reality.

In fact, several

conditions made his proposal reasonable.
First, in the early 1920s American investors,
including the tobacco magnate James B. Duke, held long
negotiations for the purchase of the French tobacco
monopoly.

Though ultimately unsuccessful in France, this

was an investment opportunity similar to that available in
Turkey.

The Americans had promised to restructure the

French monopoly on modern business lines;5 4 surely the
52Ibid.
53DeNovo, American Interests, p. 253.
54nwill France Sell Tobacco Monopoly to Americans?"
USTJ, vol. 98. no. 2 (1922): 3; "France to Keep Tobacco
Monopoly," USTJ, vol. 98, no. 12 (1922): 10; "Ask France to
Sell Tobacco Monopoly: Duke, Whalen and Ryan Reopen Negotiations with the Government for outright Purchase," New York
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Turkish monopoly could stand even more modernization.
Thus, there were incentives for both Americans and Turks to
consider such an investment opportunity.
A second reason which made acquisition of the Turkish
monopoly a viable concept was Turkish interest in American
investment.

Despite his nationalistic, anti-foreign

impulses, even Ataturk was in favor of using foreign
capital to Turkey's advantage.

In 1923 he was quoted as

saying that "our country is extensive.
effort and great capital.

We require great

Therefore, we are always

prepared to provide the necessary security to foreign
capital on the condition that its profits be regulated. 11 55
Moreover, Turks expected American capital to come without
the political strings that usually accompanied European
investment.56

The American government also expressed

interest in the concept of investment in Turkey, as shown
by Secretary of State Hughes's attempts to win at Lausanne
international guarantees for American investments in Turkey

Times, 11 February 1923, sec. II, p. 12, col. 1; "Whelan
Plans 2,500 Stores for France: Tobacco Prices to be Reduced
if Americans Obtain Right, He Says," New York Times, 12
February 1923, p. 13, col. 3.
55Robinson, First Turkish Republic, p. 106.
Hershlag, Turkey, p. 45.
56Trask, U.S. Response, p. 127 ff.

Also see
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(see pp. 53-54).57

Both Turks and Americans had an

interest in dollars capitalizing Turkey, most notably
demonstrated by the Grand National Assembly's granting of
the revived Chester Concession to the Ottoman-American
Development Company in April 1923.58
A third reason lay in the nature of the Turkish
reaction to the Regie.

Opposition to continued foreign

control over a valuable revenue source arose not only
because of Turkish nationalism, but also for economic
reasons.

In February 1923, tobacco farmers' represen-

tatives to an economic congress in Izmir voted to abolish
the Regie and introduce free cultivation and exportation of
tobacco,59 a move presumably in the farmers' economic
interest.

Later the same year there was popular agitation

for the abolition of the Regie, accompanied by propaganda
that a government takeover of the tobacco monopoly would
increase state revenues by LT 20 million, 6 0 a claim
emphasizing the nation's economic interest in making a
57Hurewitz, British-French Supremacy, pp. 312-8; DeNovo,
American Interests, pp. 139-40; Evans, U.S. Policy, p. 396.
58oeNovo, American Interests, pp. 210-28; Gordon,
American Relations, pp. 257-65, 275-84; Trask, U.S. Response,
p. 130.
59nTurkey," Times, 26 February 1923, p. 9, col. d.
60 11 Anatolian Railways; Turkish Policy," Times, 28 November 1923, p. 11, col. f.
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change.

In early 1924, calls in the Grand National

Assembly for replacement of the monopoly with a
"banderolle" system--an excise tax on tobacco sales6l __
focused again on the national economic gains that were
possible through liberalization.

The American tobacco

industry's profitability was certainly a strong recommendation for American management of the Turkish industry, if
financial considerations were the principle concerns.
Yet despite these favorable factors, American tobacco
interests did not take control of the Turkish tobacco
monopoly.

The third role of the tobacco trade in Turkish-

American relations--as a focal point of American investment
in Turkey--remained potential rather than actual.

Control

of the production, manufacture, and sale of tobacco in
Turkey, along with influence over the international market
for Turkey's tobacco, would have been lucrative and would
have dramatically altered the nature of Turkish-American
relations, given the economic importance of tobacco in
Turkey.62

6l 11 Turkey; Fiscal Innovations," Times, 31 January 1924,
Annual Financial and Commercial Review Section, p. 15, col.
f.

62see Table 5 for the annual profits of the monopoly,
and consider that the monopoly's earnings supplied as much
as 10% of all government revenues in Turkey during the late
1920s. Hershlag, Turkey, p. 69.
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The reasons for this failure remain unknown to this
author, but this uncertainty does not detract from the
importance of the monopoly issue in the historiography of
Turkish-American relations.

Historian Roger R. Trask has

contended that nationalism was "foremost among the factors
conditioning American relations with Turkeyn63 during this
time.

Obviously, a decision on the future of the tobacco

monopoly would not be based on the principles of
nationalism alone; rather, economic considerations were
foremost in both popular and political thinking.

This

perception supports a thesis that is at odds with Trask's,
namely that expounded by historian Leland James Gordon in
his classic study of Turkish-American relations from 1830
to 1930, that "the accumulated evidence

• leads to the

conclusion that economic considerations lie at the base of
international relations. 11 64

The Turkish tobacco monopoly

not only presented American tobacco interests with an
opportunity, but a study of the monopoly's fate also
presents the historian an opportunity to re-evaluate
broader Turkish-American relations.

Such an examination

demonstrates that although Turkish nationalism may have

63Trask, U.S. Response, p. 242.
64Gordon, American Relations, p. 345.
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·influenced these relations, one should not neglect the
important role of economics.
The damages of war, the loss of established privileges, the exchange of minorities, and the inability to
receive compensation for legitimate grievances all made
Turkey less inviting as a place for Americans to do
business in 1922-23.

The American tobacco companies'

reactions to the changes in Turkey, however, were not so
much a response to Turkish nationalism per se, as a
response to economic factors.

The response to the end of

the capitulations was to remain in Turkey, even under
uncertain circumstances.

To the contrary, two new American

companies established organizations in Turkey to buy
aromatic tobacco.

The major companies did remove their

manipulating operations from Turkey, but this was more a
response to the destruction in Izmir, the loss of
experienced workers, and a concern for security in a
troubled area, than a response to nationalist reforms.

The

claims issue had less to do with Turkish nationalism than
it did with international law, and Turkish treatment of the
tobacco monopoly actually created potential opportunities
for American investment in Turkey.
Restated, the revolutionary changes in the new
republic affected the Turkish-American tobacco trade, but
Ataturk's reforms were not the only determinants of the
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American tobacco companies' behavior in 1922-23.

As the

Turkish-American tobacco trade was fundamentally an
economic relationship, the companies' responses to changes
in Turkey were, understandably, determined by economic
factors.

Chapter Five
More Changes, New Conflicts, 1924-26

In October 1923 the Grand National Assembly declared
Turkey to be a republic and Kemal Ataturk to be its first
president; thereafter the pace of revolutionary reform
quickened.

Laws passed by the Grand National Assembly to

improve rural life and agricultural production included the
abolition of the tithe and purchase of the tobacco
monopoly. These changes, despite their magniture, affected
the American tobacco companies relatively little.

More

influential were the consequences of the capitulation's
termination, namely, subjection of the companies to Turkish
taxation.

This chapter examines the impact of these

changes during the period 1924-26.

Though Ataturk rapidly introduced westernizing reforms
into Turkey, it was not the republican government's actions
that were responsible for the doubling of tobacco
production between 1923 and 1924, to over 114 million
pounds (see Table 1).

More important to this agricultural

recovery were the high prices paid for the 1923 crop--a
result of the shortage caused by the war--and favorable
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growing conditions that increased the quality and average
size of the harvest.l
The influx of Muslims from Greece and Macedonia also
played a role in this production increase.2

Though histor-

ians usually judge the exchange of minorities to have been
deleterious to Turkey, 3 in 1924 the assistance of the
incoming Muslims to the regeneration of the tobacco
industry was considerable.

Between 4000 and 5000 of these

immigrants began growing tobacco in the Samsun region in
1924, bringing the total number of growers there to
13,ooo.4

In all of Turkey, the number of growers increased

by 50,000 over 1923, reaching more than 175,000 (see Table
1).

This positive aspect of the exchange of minorities

contradicts general assumptions that these populations
transfers were detrimental to Turkey.
Four major American companies purchased tobacco in
Turkey in 1924:

Gary, Alston, American of the Orient, and

lKing to Consul General, 6 September 1924, RG 84, CGR
Constantinople, NA, file 861.3 Tobacco.
2Allen, "Turkish Regie," 13 November 1925, DS
867.61331/9, M353, 66/1279-80.
3Hershlag, Turkey, pp. 26-7, 29-30.
4King to Consul General, 6 September 1924, RG 84, CGR
Constantinople, NA, file 861.3 Tobacco.
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Standard Commercial.5
Izmir.6

All of these firms had branches in

In Izmir, Edward M. Yantis directed Gary's opera-

tions, W. P. Johnston led Alston, and Joseph M. English
headed American Tobacco of the orient.7

In Istanbul,

Franklin W. Bell managed Gary's headquarters,8
King ran Alston's operations. 9

and P. E.

In addition to the

representatives in Turkey, the men in the home offices
remained active.

I.

c.

Gary of Gary Tobacco and Ery E.

Kehaya of Standard Commercial were listed as Directors of
the Federated American Chambers of Commerce of the Near
East.lo
In 1924, these four companies shipped over 7 million
pounds of tobacco worth $4.3 million from Turkey directly
5Bell to Ravndal, 14 May 1923, RG 84, CGR Constantinople, NA, file 861.3 Tobacco. Alston was still purchasing
in Turkey for R. J. Reynolds while Glenn operated in Greece
and Macedonia. Tilley, Reynolds, pp. 234-5.
6Trade List provided by Consulate General, Izmir, 1
March 1924, RG 84, CPR Smyrna, NA, file 610 Trade Extension.
?Frederick G. Bird (Vice Consul, Izmir) to J. M.
English; Bird to w. P. Johnston; Bird to Edward M. Yantis,
22 August 1924, RG 84, CPR Smyrna, NA, file 865.86 Manufactures.
8Bell to Ravndal, 14 May 1923, RG 84, CGR Constantinople, NA, file 861.3 Tobacco.
9charles E. Allen to P. E. King, 3 September 1924, RG
84, CGR Constantinople, NA, file 861.3 Tobacco.
lOLetterhead of Federated American Chambers of Commerce
of the Near East, Inc., 19 June 1924, RG 84, CPR Smyrna, NA,
file 610 Trade Extension.
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to the United States (see Table 2).

These figures do not

include, however, tobacco shipped indirectly to the United
States through Trieste.

Neither American nor Turkish

governmental statistics indicate how much of the Turkish
tobacco shipped to Italy was actually destined for the
United States.

This lack of statistical information makes

quantification of Trieste's importance impossible.

Its

significance, however, is demonstrated by American of the
Orient's decision to follow Gary's lead and establish
manipulating facilities in Trieste in 1923,ll and by the
start of Alston's operations there in 1924.

In 1925, 9.8

million pounds of tobacco were shipped from Trieste to the
United States, "but the major portion of the tobacco
reported as from Italy consists of transshipments from
Turkey. 11 12
The Ankara government evidently did not approve of the
decrease of manipulation in Turkey.

In October 1924 Julian

Gillespie reported on a proposed law which would have
prohibited the exportation of unmanipulated leaf tobacco.13
llGeorge M. Hanson, "Tobacco Industry in Trieste," RG
84, CPR Trieste, NA, file 861.3 Tobacco.
12u.s. Tariff Commission, "Trade Agreement Digest," p.
40.
13Julian E. Gillespie, "Projected Law Relative to the
Creation of a State Tobacco Monopoly in Turkey," Economic &
Trade Note, 31 December 1924, RG 84, ER Constantinople, NA,
file 860.2 Monopolies and Concessions.
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Nationalistic impulses were likely to have played a role in
sponsoring this law, but economic motives were certainly
equally important, as bringing this law into effect would
have created jobs in Turkey.

The Grand National Assembly

never passed the proposal, so ·Americans could continue
letting financial considerations guide their involvement in
the Turkish tobacco trade.

Trieste stayed in business.

In 1925 the Turkish government took measures that did
have an immediate impact on the tobacco trade.

Especially

important among these measures was the abolition of the
tithe.

In the previous year the tithe had provided roughly

40% of the total state revenues.

By relieving the peasant

majority of this disproportionately heavy taxation and
shifting the burden to urban dwellers, Ataturk sought to
improve rural life and win the support of this conservative
group for his reforms.14

The tithe had required tobacco

growers to give 12% of their harvest to the tobacco
monopoly.

The abolition of this requirement in February

1925 represented a significant increase in potential
earnings for the grower.

It also forced the tobacco

14The official 1927 census in Turkey listed the population at 13,600,000. 76% of these people were classified as
living in rural settings. Shaw, Reform, p. 375.

99
monopoly to buy tobacco on the market, a consequence which
could only bode well for tobacco prices.15
Another major change soon followed.

On 28 February

1925 the Turkish government cancelled the tobacco
concession long held by the Regie.

The Turks paid the

concessionnaire 40 million French francs and took control
of the monopoly's assets on 1 March 1925.16
monopoly, though, was uncertain.

The fate of

Ongoing discussion in the

Grand National Assembly brought divergent calls for the
banderolle system, for retaining the monopoly under Turkish
administration, and even for granting the concession to
other foreign commercial interests.1 7

The assembly

actually passed a law on 25 March 1925 abolishing the
monopoly and establishing banderolle system, but the

15Hershlag, "Turkey," pp. 12, 54; Shaw, "Reform," pp.
388-89; Gesellschaft zur Erforschung der Turkischen Geschichte, Geschichte der Turkischen Republic (Istanbul: Devlet
Matbaasi, 1935), pp. 348-52.
16 11 Proposal to Extend Government Tobacco Monopoly,"
TMCA, no. 15 (1925): l; "Turkish Monopoly Ends Next March,"
USTJ, vol. 102, no. 7 (1924): 26.
17 11 The Turkish Cabinet; Reported Dissensions," Times,
23 February 1925, p. 11, col. e; "Turkish Government Temporarily Takes over Tobacco Regie, 11 USTJ, vol. 103, no. 25
(1925): 38.
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assembly quickly reversed itself, leaving the monopoly in
Turkish hands for another year, until 1 March 1926.18
The decisions taken by the Turkish government in the
first three months of 1925 are significant for several
reasons.

First, despite the apparent revolutionary

character of the decisions, there was as much continuity as
there was change.

The monopoly was to function in the same

manner as it had in the past; only the the destination of
the revenues was altered.

On the one hand this represented

a display of nationalism; on the other it was a pragmatic
evaluation of how Turkish revenue resources could best be
exploited.

Second, the beginning of state control of the

tobacco monopoly in 1925 conflicts with the standard
interpretation of Turkish economic development.

Historians

traditionally view the 1920s as a "liberal" period,
followed by an "etatist" period after 1929-30.19

The 1925

rejection of a free-market approach to the tobacco industry
represents an earlier adoption of state intervention than
18nproposal to Extend Government Tobacco Monopoly,"
TMCA, no. 15 {1925): 1; "Turkey to Abolish Tobacco Monopoly,"
USTJ, vol. 103, no. 25 {1925): 30; Althoff to Miller DuBrul
& Peters Mfg. co., 30 July 1925, RG 151, FDC Records, NA,
file 303 Tobacco-Turkey.
19Hale, Political and Economic Development, pp. 33-85;
Hershlag, Turkey, passim; c;aglar Keyder, "The Political
Economy of Turkish Democracy," in Turkey in Transition, New
Perspectives, ed. Irvin c. Schick and Ertugrul Ahmet Tonak
(New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987), p.
33; B. Lewis, Emergence of Modern Turkey, pp. 275-82.
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is typically recognized.

Third, the plan to continue the

monopoly under Turkish administration put a potentially
effective tool for social change into the government's
hands.

One of the republic's foremost economic goals

during its first decade was to improve the farmer's
condition.20

If the tobacco monopoly developed a pur-

chasing policy not only according to its manufacturing
requirements, but also according to socio-political goals,
then the monopoly's ability to affect the market (e.g., by
supporting prices) could directly affect American tobacco
buying.
The new Turkish tobacco monopoly very quickly had an
impact on the tobacco market.

Monopoly purchases in August

1925 of 4.4 million pounds supported the market and firmed
prices,21 and the monopoly anticipated making total purchases of over 22 million pounds. 22

In a new tactic, the

monopoly began buying directly from farmers in some areas,
as opposed to purchasing only from the markets, as it had

20Gesellschaft zur Erforschung, Geschichte, pp. 348-49.
21 11 Turkish Tobacco Market During the Month of August,"
TMCA, no. 15 (1925): 2.
22 11 The Turkey Tobacco Crop," TMCA, no. 16 (1925): 6-7;
"Turkish Tobacco Market During October," TMCA, no. 23 (1925):
7-8.
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previously. 23

Thus, the monopoly increased its capability

to implement a more politically-minded purchasing program.
On 8 February 1926 the Grand National Assembly
extended the life of the new Turkish tobacco monopoly for
an additional three-year trial period.24

The monopoly's

trial year had proven successful, according to General
Director Seifi Bey, who claimed that LT 11 million in
revenues had been collected in the first year and that
administrative costs had been reduced.

Previously, it had

taken four years to amass the same revenues as were
collected in this one year.

Moreover, the monopoly had

improved its ability to resell the tobacco it had purchased. 25

Despite changes and improvements, the monopoly

did not greatly affect American tobacco interests, largely
because the American companies bought expensive grades of
leaf and the Turkish monopoly purchased much lower quality
grades; the two were non-competitive participants in the
same market.
23nconstantinople Tobacco Market During December, 1925,"
TMCA, no. 32 (1926): 6-7.
24"Turkey," TMCA, no. 27 (1926): 3; "Notes on Countries
Supplying United States Tobacco Imports," TMCA, no. 192
(1929): 8.
25"Turkey," TMCA, no. 43 (1926): 5; "The Turkish Tobacco
Regie," TMCA, no. 49 (1926): 7; "Notes on the Turkish Tobacco
Market," TMCA, no. 68 (1926): 10.
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In 1925, more acreage under cultivation by more
tobacco growers produced a 124 million pound crop in
1925,2 6 but even this was much smaller than expected.
Drought in the Izmir region reduced the crop there by as
much as 40%.

The immigrants from Macedonia and Western

Thrace once again affected the size of the crop.

They had

brought with them tobacco seeds which produced a high
quality tobacco.

This very aromatic type of tobacco

produced small, fine leaves, a factor which contributed to
the smaller-than-expected harvest.27

overall the quality

of the 1925 crop was quite good, with little disease and
few coarse-leaved tobaccos.

As a result of high quality

26production figures should be taken as guidelines
rather than exact facts. The Bureau of Foreign and Domestic
Commerce had difficulties in choosing which statistics it
should use for the production totals for 1925, because an
international agricultural institute at Rome, the Department
of Agriculture and the Turkish Monopoly all cited significantly different amounts. Louise Moore to Constantinople
Office, 25 July 1928, RG 151, FDC Records, NA, file 303
Turkey; Julian E. Gillespie to Director of Bureau of Foreign
and Domestic Commerce, 28 August 1928, RG 151, FDC Records,
NA, file 303 Turkey. I have again chosen to use the figures
provided by the Turkish Tobacco Monopoly, the only agency
to claim that it weighed all of the tobacco produced in
Turkey.
27These immigrants had other effects on the crop.
Julian Gillespie cited newspaper articles which claimed
that these immigrants would inaugurate "a new era of tobacco
culture" in Turkey. J. E. Gillespie, "Turkish Tobacco Harvest," Economic and Trade Note, 14 January 1925, RG 84, ER
Constantinople, NA, file 600 Commercial Relations. This
positive result must be weighed in the overall evaluation
of the exchange of populations.
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and firm demand, prices remained steady for stored tobacco
at the markets, and increased 10-15% for purchases directly
from growers.2 8

The American commercial secretary in

Istanbul stated that "practically the whole of the Izmir
crop and 8,818,400 pounds of the Samsun crop appears likely
to be bought up by American firms. 11 29
American cigarette consumption demanded this.

on

average, Americans smoked over three pounds of tobacco as
cigarettes in 1926--more than 1,000 cigarettes per person-representing one-third of all the tobacco used in the
United states.30

Ery Kehaya of Standard Commercial

estimated that more than 75% of these cigarettes contained
aromatic tobacco,31 making America by far the largest
consumer of such leaf .32

Thus, the marked changes in the

tobacco industry in Turkey did not affect American tobacco
companies' buying habits in Turkey as much as did the
habits of smokers in the United States.
28rrconstantinople Tobacco Market During December,
1925," TMCA, no. 32 (1926): 6-7; "New Turkish Leaf Costs
10% More," USTJ, vol. 104, no. 3 (1925): 3.
29"The Turkey Tobacco Crop," TMCA, no. 16 (1925): 6-7.
30Milmore, "Tobacco Consumption," 10-11.
31"Ery Kehaya, Sailing For Europe, Forsees Bigger
Tobacco Market," USTJ, vol. 104, no. 3 (1927): 7.
32rru.s. Largest Importer of oriental Tobacco," USTJ,
vol. 104, no. 12 (1925): 46.
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Despite increasing consumption, the large Turkish
crops of 1924 and 1925 tested the limits of the market's
demand.

The low prices for the 1925 crop, bought in 1926,

caused growers to suffer more than usual from the persistent difficulty of financing their crops.33

This was

probably a factor in the slight reduction of the 1926 crop
to 120 million pounds.

Reports in 1926 stated that on

average, American firms bought about 33 million pounds of
tobacco annually in Turkey, including about 20 million
pounds per year in Izmir.34
In 1926 one American official noted the growing trend
of shipping Turkish tobacco directly from Istanbul to the
United states, rather than via Trieste. 3 5

In fact, Gary

33 11 Turkish Tobacco Industry," TMCA, no. 88 (1927): 5;
"Turkey--Financing the Tobacco Crop," TMCA, no. 91 (1927):
4-5.
34This compared to estimated purchases of 26.5 million
pounds by the Turkish Tobacco Monopoly and 14 million pounds
by German importers. "Turkish Tobacco Market During October,
1926," TMCA, no. 76 (1926): 8-9; "Tobacco in Turkey," TMCA,
no. 109 (1927): 6.
35Raymond A. Hare (Clerk, Istanbul), "Analysis of
Declared Export Return for 1926," 11 April 1927, RG 84, CGR
Constantinople, NA, file 600 Commercial Relations. This
may serve to explain partially the discrepancy between
Turkish and American statistics on the tobacco trade for
1926 and 1927. Manipulating tobacco in Turkey meant a
delay in the exportation of tobacco grown in one year to
the end of the following year, at the earliest. If shipped
at the end of one calendar year, 1926 for example, it would
appear in Turkish export figures under 1926. Much of this
tobacco, however, would not arrive in the United States
until early 1927, thus being listed as 1927 imports in
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Tobacco discontinued its manipulation in Trieste during
1926. 36

In the same year Gary also reported employing

4,000 Turks in Istanbul, 2,000 in Izmir, and 1,000 in
Samsun. 37

Other companies employed another 4,500 Turkish

workers in Izmir.38

By 1926 Turkey was recovering its role

as a manipulator of tobacco, but it was not yet capable of
ending American reliance on Trieste.

Some companies

hesitated to invest large amounts of capital to establish
manipulating facilities without having the guarantees
American statistics. The total of American figures for
tobacco imports from Turkey for 1926 and 1927 combined is
30.8 million pounds; the total of Turkish figures for
tobacco exports to the United States during the same two
years is 29.7 million pounds--a relatively small difference.
Thus, the apparent discrepancy between Turkish and American
figures for these two years might be explained by the
increasing American manipulation of tobacco in Turkey.
36Howard A. Bowman (Vice Consul, Trieste), "Annual
Review of Commerce and Industries in the Trieste Consular
District," 5 February 1929, RG 84, CPR Trieste, NA, file 600
Commercial Relations; Howard A. Bowman, "Summary Value of
Declared Exports at Trieste," 4 January 1930, RG 84, CPR
Trieste, NA, file 600 Commercial Relations.
37p. Lammot Belin to R. A. W. Treat, 22 October 1926,
RG 84, ER Constantinople, NA, file 851.2 Taxation.
38samuel w. Honaker "Commerce and Industries for 1926,"
Report No. 69, 29 December 1926, RG 84, ER Constantinople,
NA, file 600 commercial Relations. American of the Orient
reported in 1925 that in all of Turkey it employed 30-35
permanent Turkish workers and 700 seasonal laborers at this
time, paying wages of over $2,000 per week during peak
season. John H. Lane to Consul (Izmir), 1 July 1925, RG 84,
ER Constantinople, NA, file 851.2 Taxation.

107
provided by formal diplomatic relations.39

The failure of

the Senate to ratify the Turkish-American treaty may have
been, therefore, of significant economic consequence for
Turkey.
The changes that the Turkish government effected
between 1924 and 1926 held considerable potential for
influencing the Turkish tobacco market and the American
companies in Turkey.

In many instances, however, it was

unofficial government action that affected the American
tobacco companies more deeply, in particular, the creative
taxation schemes of local authorities.

For example, in

July 1925 the "defterdar" (local director of finance)
assessed most of the American tobacco companies in Izmir
with a school tax.

By national law all residents of Turkey

could be required to pay as much as 1% of their income for
a school tax.

John H. Lane, an employee of American of the

Orient, objected to the LT 3000 tax on his company on the
grounds that the defterdar had innovatively interpreted
this law to apply to companies.40

The Turkish Ministry of

39 11 u.s. cigarette Firms Awaiting Decision on AmericanTurkish Pact," USTJ, vol. 107, no. 3 (1927): 16.
40Taxes levied on other companies were as follows:
Alston Tobacco, LT 6000; Gary Tobacco, LT 5000; Herman
Sperry, LT 5000; Shark Tobacco, LT 5000; Macedonian Tobacco,
LT 2000. John H. Lane to Consul (Izmir), 1 July 1925, RG
84, ER Constantinople, NA, file 851.2 Taxation; Honaker to
Bristol, 2 July 1925, RG 84, ER Constantinople, NA, file
851. 2 Taxation.
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the Interior provided an interpretation of this tax law,
stating that corporate bodies were liable to the school
tax, bnt according to the amount of capital invested
locally, rather than on the basis of its income, i.e.,
profits.41
The major tobacco manufacturers in America incorporated their subsidiary purchasers of aromatic tobacco
with a minimal capitalization value.
example, was only $6,250.42

Gary's value, for

The parent companies paid the

subsidiaries a paper profit on this amount--profit which
was never seen in Anatolia.43

The buying organizations

sold their stocks of tobacco to the corporate parent at
cost, so the subsidiaries in Turkey showed no real profits.
Thus, the application of the school tax on the tobacco
companies may have been proper, but the amounts were
inordinately high.
41Translation of article from the Constantinople
"Provincial Gazette," 26 August 1925, RG 84, ER Constantinople, NA, file 851.2 Taxation.
42Gary Tobacco to Off ice of the Tax Collector (Galata) ,
5 December 1925, RG 84, ER Constantinople, NA, file 851.2
Taxation. Glenn's original capitalization value was $1,000.
Radio dispatch, James Harriss to Alston Tobacco, 20 March
1923, RG 84, ER Constantinople, NA, file 850.3 Capital.
43American of the orient received 6% of its capitalization value in profits from the parent company annually.
Memo, "Regarding Income Tax Cases Against the American
Tobacco Company of the Orient, Inc.", n.d., 1932, RG 1984,
ER Istanbul, NA, file 851.2 Taxation.
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The school tax was only the beginning of an increasingly exasperating series of tax problems.

In December

1925, local Turkish fiscal authorities requested that Gary
Tobacco pay LT 15,000 for a military transportation tax.
The company claimed that such high taxation was illegal and
that a Turkish firm with a comparable capitalization value
would only pay LT 30 or 40.

Gary demanded a justification

for this tax.44
Then, at the beginning of 1926, Alston Tobacco became
involved in a much more serious case.

Local authorities

assesed the company's Istanbul office a military transportation tax of LT 10,000.

Alston's protests resulted in an

immediate reduction of the assessment to LT 7,500, partial
proof of the whimsical nature of this tax.

Admiral Bristol

recommended that the company refuse to pay even this
reduced amount, but after Alston employees followed his
advice, local treasury department officials seized and
sealed the Alston office on 26 January, threatening to sell
the furnishings if Alston did not pay within 24 hours.
Bristol's endeavors on behalf of the company succeeded in
postponing the public auction of Alston's property, but
numerous communications with Ankara failed to resolve the
44The outcome of this dispute was not found in State
Department records. Gary Tobacco Company to Office of the
Tax Collector, 5 December 1925, RG 84, ER Constantinople,
NA, file 851.2 Taxation.
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dispute. 45

A correspondent for the London Times reported

that,
the Turks openly stated to (one of the Alston
managers] that this pressure was being put on
Americans only, because they had not ratified the
treaty of Lausanne, and that there was no
intention to deal similarly with British, French,
and Italian firms.46
The pressure on the Alston company came from as high as the
ministerial level in Ankara.

Minister of Finance Hassan

Bey reportedly said to P. E. King's lawyer that no solution
to Alston' case would be found until "conventions were
exchanged between the United States and Turkey.n47

Admiral

Bristol considered this intransigence to be entirely in
character for Hassan Bey, and he therefore· turned to
Foreign Minister Tevfik Rushtu Aras, who was better
disposed towards American interests.

Through this policy

of divide and conciliate, the seals were removed from

45Mark L. Bristol to Secretary of State (Kellogg), 7
May 1926, RG 84, ER Constantinople, NA, file 851.2 Taxation;
"Turks Oppressing American Firms: Object Said to Be Forcing
United States Signature to Treaty of Lausanne," New York
Times, 29 January 1926, p. 4, col. 5.
46 11 Taxing Americans in Turkey," Times, 29 January 1926,
p. 11, col. e.
47R. A. w. Treat to Ernest Linwood Ives (Delegate,
Ankara), 21 April 1926, RG 84, ER Constantinople, NA, file
851.2 Taxation.
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Alston's Istanbul office on 6 May 1926 although the tax had
not been paid.48
The London Times stated that a wave of Turkish nationalism was responsible for many of the foreign companies'
problems.

Although laws of the Turkish Republic guaranteed

th,e rights of all minorities and foreigners in Turkey,
there was considerable anti-Christian and anti-foreign
sentiment.

Calls for "Turkification" of the economy and

"Turkey for the Turks" were widespread and not limited to
uneducated peasants;49

even some Turkish government offi-

cials encouraged the elimination of foreign tobacco firms
in Turkey.SO

Recalling the claims of Seifi Bey, the

director of the tobacco monopoly, one might be led to think
that the monopoly's increasing efficiency would make it
capable of replacing the foreign buying organizations in
Turkey.

48Bristol to Secretary of State (Kellogg), 7 May 1926,
RG 84, ER Constantinople, NA, file 851.2 Taxation; Ernest
L. Ives to R. A. w. Treat, 7 May 1926, RG 84, ER Constantinople, NA, file 851.2 Taxation; memo, J. P. [Jefferson
Patterson], 30 December 1929, RG 84, ER Constantinople, NA,
file 851.2 Taxation.
49 11 Foreign Traders in Turkey," Times, 20 March 1926, p.
11, col. a.
50 11 Turks and Treaty at Lausanne," Times, 8 February
1926, p. 11, col. b.; Allen, "Turkish Regie," 13 November
1925, OS 867.61331/9, M353, 66/1286.
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But Hassan Bey's blunt approach to foreign policy was
not characteristic of Ataturk's foreign policy.51

on the

contrary, historians Roger Trask and John A. DeNovo praise
Turkey's behavior during the interwar years for its use of
legal, rather than martial, implements in its international
intercourse, even in events simultaneous to the Alston
lockout, such as the resolution of the Mosul question.52
Incidents such as the Alston case, however, show that
nationalism could influence Turkish foreign policy in a
most undiplomatic manner, and that commerce and diplomacy
were perceived to be inextricably intertwined.
such dubious taxation methods as outlined above may
not have reflected official Turkish policy, but did reflect
popular opinion.

Many Turks did not believe the claims of

low profits made by the subsidiary tobacco-buying companies; they viewed the companies as deserving of taxation.
51Bristol to Secretary of State (Kellogg), 7 May 1926,
RG 84, ER Constantinople, NA, file 851.2 Taxation.
52The "Mosul Question," for instance, was resolved at
this time. A League of Nations' council successfully arbitrated this conflict. In reference to the Mosul question,
Trask writes: "Much to Turkey's credit, a potentially
dangerous problem had been settled peacably by compromise.
Turkey illustrated the spirit which it was to demonstrate
frequently during the interwar period." Trask, U.S. Response,
pp. 218-19. In summarizing the United States' interaction
with the international politics of the Turkish Republic
between the wars, DeNovo states: "the two nations shared
the belief that orderly diplomatic processes should govern
international change." DeNovo, American Interests, p. 249.
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The companies' claims of low profits were nominally
correct.

But low profits on small assessed values did not

seem realistic to many Turks, who saw these companies spend
millions of dollars on tobacco each year.

Higher taxes

were appropriate, according to the Turkish view.
A conflict of cultures was another factor leading to
these unacceptable taxes.
between Rufus

w.

An encounter during July 1925

Lane--a businessman, former American

consul and long-time resident of Izmir--and a local tax
collector illustrates this conflict.

The tax collector

informed Lane that he, like the tobacco companies, had to
pay the school tax.

The ensuing conversation took place:

Question (Lane): What is your authority?
Answer (Tax Collector): From the Defterdar.
Q: Who decided how much I should pay?
A: Five residents of Bournabat [Lane's home
village].
Q: Who gave this commission authority to decide
my tax.
A: The Mudir [village leader].
Q: Is there a law authorizing him to do that?
A: I never heard of such a law.
Q: How did all of this come about then?
A: Well you see we needed Ltqs. [Turkish lira]
11,000 for the schools in Bournabat and the
Mudir decided we should collect it as was
being done in other villages in Turkey. He
therefore named a committee who decide how
much each resident should pay, to make up
that sum.
Q: on what basis did they decide how much I
should pay?
A: I don't know but I understand that it is
based on the manner of living of each person.
The opinion of each delegate was taken and
they decided that Ltqs. 80 would be about
right for you.
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Q:
A:
Q:
A:

Q:
A:

Q:
A:
Q:
A:

Q:
A:
Q:
A:

It is then within the power of this committee
to decide, absolutely at their own descrition
(sic], how much every one must pay?
Yes it is so.
Then having taxed me Ltqs. 80 this year they
can make it Ltqs. 800 or 8000 next year, if
they wish so. Is that so?
Yes it is so but they probably will not do
that.
Does the committee not give notice so a tax
payer can present his side of the situation?
Yes your names and the amount of the tax were
posted on the door of the Mosque fifteen days
before the tax was due.
Was any publication or notice given through
the newspapers?
No.
Will the same procedure be followed this
year?
No we will give notice in the papers or
individually.
What will happen if I refuse to pay you?
The Defterdar will take your furniture from
your house in Bournabat and sell enough to
cover the tax.
When will this be done?
Within the next few days.

Following this conversation, Lane paid the tax under protest. 53
The conflict expressed in this encounter runs much
deeper than the eternal desire to evade the tax man; it is
a genuine cultural conflict.

Although Turkish society was

being revolutionized, it still moved informally, with religious overtones, and with an understood sense of obligations.

The two ways of thinking expressed in this conver-

sation undoubtably were paralleled in encounters between
53Rufus w. Lane to Samuel Honaker, 12 July 1925, RG 84,
ER Constantinople, NA, file 851.2 Taxation.
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tobacco companies and the local authorities.
represented a classic, multifaceted conflict:

This
a western,

individualistic, legalistic view of man clashed with an
eastern, communal, traditional view of society.54
Though very real conflicts existed, the highestranking American diplomats in Turkey often understated the
severity of problems to the State Deparment.

As Admiral

Bristol once wrote to Secretary of State Hughes:
the difficulties encountered every now and then
are not different in degree from those diff icul ties to which, during the Sultan's regime,
they [American interests in Turkey] had become
accustomed, and • • • the Turkish authorities in
settling these difficulties have been found to be
reasonable and well disposed.55
An Alston Tobacco employee concurred, noting that the
difficulties of the 1920s generally stemmed from the overzealousness of a subordinate official and could generally
be solved by going higher up the administrative ladder.56
Whether problems were great or small, the American tobacco
companies frequently turned to their official representatives for support.

The response of the American government

to these difficulties varied according to the request made
54Robinson, First Turkish Republic, pp. 39-62.
55Bristol to Hughes, 8 December 1923, PRUS 1923, 2,
1150-51.
56H. w. Harvey (Alston Tobacco) to J. V. A. MacMurray
(Ambassador}, 17 March 1936, RG 84, ER Istanbul, NA, file
610.1 survey of American Interests.
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by the tobacco company involved.

In relatively minor

cases, such as the school tax incident, a company informed
consular officers of a problem, but did not request
official action.

In more serious cases, e.g., the Alston

closure, a company requested immediate representation by an
American diplomat or consular official.

In both types of

cases the American State and Commerce Department officers
in Turkey served the tobacco companies' interests well;
when necessary, Admiral Bristol used the full authority of
his office in support of the American tobacco interests.
American tobacco companies faced problems that ranged
from the serious to the ridiculous.
latter,

w.

As an example of the

H. Day of Standard Commercial wrote to Admiral

Bristol about a case involving his company's attempt to
ship 300 kilograms of tobacco from Istanbul to Hamburg,
Germany.

It took from 11 May to 17 May 1926 for the

Turkish officials to decide how to administer the export
tax on this transaction.
2.5% tax would suffice.

On 18 May they determined that a
Then, stamps proving payment of

the tax, which amounted to LT 4191.30, had to be attached
to the shipment's invoice.

Unfortunately, the only stamps

available were of very small denominations, mostly one and
two liras with only a few tens.

It took seven men from

10:00 in the morning to 7:00 in the evening to attach the
hundreds of stamps to the invoice, which finally measured
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almost five feet wide by over four feet high.

The invoice

was finally approved, but the Turks requested that this
bureaucratic nightmare not be sent with the tobacco to
Europe, fearing the ridicule that it obviously deserved.57
As Day pessimistically remarked in his letter to Bristol:
I believe that you will readily see that a
continuation as [conditions] exist at present can
only result in the eventual complete destruction
of commerce. The papers are full of contradictory announcements concerning the application
of the [export] tax and the city is full of
rumours. All merchants are hesitant about
shipping and I am informed that many ships that
usually leave here with full cargoes are now
leaving with no cargo whatsoever.
For your further confidential information we
have not purchased neither do we intend to
purchase any tobaccos of the 1925 crop.58
Though one 1927 consular report names Standard Commercial

57w. H. Day (Standard commercial) to Mark L. Bristol,
26 May 1926, RG 84, ER Constantinople, NA, file 851.2
Taxation. This inefficiency contrasts sharply with the
official Turkish account of the orderly and sane conditions
resulting from Ataturk's reforms. The Turk Tarihi Tetkik
Cemiyeti (Society for the Research of Turkish History) had
the self-proclaimed mission of bringing "Turkish national
history into the light of truth." (Gesellschaft zur Erforschung, Geschichte, p. 328) In its 1935 Geschichte der
Turkischen Republic, the society published before-and-after
photographs of a land registry off ice in order to represent
Turkey's pre-revolutionary chaos and post-revolutionary
efficiency. Presumably, reality in Turkey was somewhere
between Day's despair and the society's sycophancy.
58Day to Bristol, 26 May 1926, RG 84, ER Constantinople,
NA, file 851.2 Taxation.
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as an exporter from Izmir,59 there are no State or commerce
Department records of this company buying tobacco on the
Turkish market after 1925, though the company remained
active in aromatic tobacco trading in other countries.
Turkish harassment may not have been the only cause for
Standard Commercial's departure, but it cannot be
overlooked.
In October 1926, Turkish officials again asked Gary
Tobacco to pay the military transport tax, this time in the
amount of LT 8000.

Turkish officials insisted that the

Gary office would be closed down--a la Alston--if it did
not pay the tax immediately.

Gary employee F. B. Stem

informed the American High Commission that he had received
orders to quit all operations in Turkey if such action were
taken.60

There are no reports of either the Turkish threat

or Gary's counterthreat being carried out, but the conflicts resulting from the changes in Turkey--especially
the subjugation of American companies to Turkish taxation-would not go away.
Uncertainty concerning the fate of the Turco-American
Treaty of Amity and Commerce also plagued American tobacco
59John Corrigan, Jr., "Tobacco Industry of Smyrna,"
Report No. 34, 1 June 1927, RG 84, CPR Smyrna, NA, file
861.33 Field Crops-Tobacco, p. 25.
60selin to Treat, 22 October 1926, RG 84, ER Constantinople, NA, file 851.2 Taxation.
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companies in Turkey during this time.

Despite the

consistent support that the American high commission in
Turkey provided the tobacco companies in coping with the
far-reaching changes in Turkey and the occasional
harassment, the lack of formal Turkish-American relations
impeded the companies' work, as mentioned before.

From the

signing of the treaty in August 1923 until the Senate's
action on the treaty in 1927, the State Department worked
hard in support of the treaty's ratification,61 and state
Department officers in Turkey and the United States called
upon men in the tobacco trade for assistance in this
effort.
President Calvin Cooldidge submitted the treaty to the
Senate on 3 May 1924,62 and both pro and con forces
marshalled information and troops.

The tobacco companies

joined other commercial interests, missionary groups, and
educators in Turkey in providing statements in favor of the
treaty.

With this ammunition in hand, Secretary of state

Hughes told William E. Borah, chairman of the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee, that "it is the unanimous
opinion of the Americans who have interests in Turkey,

61Trask, U.S. Response, pp. 240-5.
62rbid., p. 36.
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whether philanthropic or commercial, that the ratification
of the Treaty is of the highest importance.n63
The treaty did not, however, receive unanimous support
in the United States.

Opponents of the treaty had a full

arsenal of powerful arguments.

The treaty failed to

require the new Turkish regime to accept any responsibility
for the massacres of Armenians that the ottoman government
had supposedly committed during World War I; indeed it
included no mention of the Armenian question.

The treaty

did not address the question of minority rights, as the
Allied-Turkish treaty had.

It accepted Ataturk's abolition

of the capitulations and restrictions on church and
missionary work in Turkey.64

Prominent foes of the treaty

included Armenian-Americans, Episcopal bishops, and Senator
William H. King of Utah, who were more vocal and more
effective than the treaty's proponents.65
Though no action was taken on the treaty in 1924-indeed it never left the Senate Foreign Relations Committee
--it remained a controversial political issue.

The

Democrats condemned it in their 1924 presidential plat-

63oeNovo, American Interests, p. 160.
64Gordon, American Relations, pp. 210-1.
65Trask, U.S. Response, p. 37-40.
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form,6 6 lending weight to the belief that the treaty was
not opposed so much for its content, but for its domestic
political relevance.

Democrats, in a move intended to

damage the Coolidge administration, used the "Terrible
Turk" stereotype to support their rejection of the
treaty.67
The treaty remained in committee for most of 1925.

It

was reported out, but the Senate returned it to committee
after only three weeks.

Meanwhile, a new round of informa-

tion and support-gathering began under the new Secretary of
State, Frank B. Kellogg.68

Meanwhile, in 1925 several

internal disturbances rocked Turkey.

Kurdish revolts in

the southeast led to the government's assumption of
dictatorial powers in March.

The central government also

had to act quickly to quash conservative groups that
opposed the Ankara regime's reforms.

The brief life of a

second political party--opposing Ataturk's Republican
People's Party--was snuffed out in June.69

None of these

disturbances affected American tobacco buying, but they
66Ibid., pp. 158-9.
·G1rbid. pp. 37-45.
68Kellogg became Secretary of State in March 1925 following the Hughes's resignation. DeNovo, American Interests,
pp. 161-2; Trask, U.S. Response, pp. 37-45.
69shaw, Reform, pp. 380-1.
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underscored the fact that American companies were still
without the protection of formal Turkish-American
diplomatic relations if they needed them.
On 29 January 1926 the Senate committee finally recommended the treaty to the full Senate.

Fearing that ratifi-

cation was not imminent, however, Secretary of State
Kellogg requested Bristol to negotiate a "modus vivendi"
· with the Turkish government that provided for mutual mostfavored-nation treatment in commercial matters.

Kellogg

felt that a temporary agreement on commercial matters was
necessary even though the treaty would have provided the
most-favored-nation status.

Bristol fulfilled Kellogg's

request by an exchange of notes with Turkish Foreign
Minister Tevfik Rushtu Aras in February 1926. 70
Kellogg's fears were soundly based as the Senate did
not take up debate on the treaty before adjournment.
Instead, discussion was scheduled for December 1926.

This

prompted Grew, in his capacity of acting secretary of
state,71 to ask Bristol to seek an extension of the
February commercial modus vivendi.

In advising Bristol how

70 Bristol to Tewfik Rouchdi [Tevfik Rushtu Aras]
(Minister for Foreign Affairs), 17 (18?) February 1926,
Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United
States, 1926 (2 vols., Washington, 1938), 2, 999 (hereafter
cited as FRUS 1926); DeNovo, American Interests, p. 162.
71Grew, the Undersecretary of State, assumed the duties
of Secretary when Kellogg was away.
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to parry any Turkish rebukes or threats for the slow
progress on the treaty, Grew told the high commissioner to
emphasize Turkey's economic interest in maintaining good
relations with the United States.
For example, you should point out that should our
fig and tobacco markets be open to the products
of Turkey on less favorable terms than at the
present time, the economic consequences in Turkey
could not fail to be other than unfortunate.72
Leading State Department officers had reason to
believe that American firms in Turkey needed the protection
of these interim agreements, as some of the negative
aspects of Turkish nationalism continued to vex American
operations.

In fact, local Turkish authorities shut down

Alston company's Istanbul office in 1926 "because [the
Americans] had not ratified the treaty of Lausanne 11 73 (see
p. 98).

Even more serious, the London Times reported that

"there are Turks

• • . who declare that they are

determined to oust the foreigner even at the cost of
national prosperity. 11 74
In 1926, the tobacco men intensified their efforts in
72Grew (Acting Secretary of State) to Bristol, 24 June
1926, FRUS 1926, 2, 981-3.
73 11 Taxing Americans in Turkey," Times, 29 January 1926,
p. 11, col. e.
74 11 Foreign Trading in Turkey," Times, 20 March 1926, p.
11, col. a.
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support of the treaty.75

Employees of American tobacco

companies in Turkey--including I.
F. W. Bell of Gary Tobacco and

w.

c.

Gary, F. B. stem, and

P. Johnston and P. E.

King of Alston Tobacco--signed a petition in support of
ratification that was sent to the secretary of state in
January.7 6

In the United states, standard Commercial

Trading Company, Liggett & Myers Tobacco Company, and
Lorillard Tobacco Company were just a few of the groups
that signed another petition in favor of the treaty and
sent it to the Senate in Apri1.77

The American tobacco

manufacturers with extensive interests in Turkey obviously
believed that the treaty was in their best interest.
Likewise, the State Department intensified its
efforts.

Undersecretary of State Joseph

c. Grew gave one

senator a list of reasons why the treaty should be ratified, including the statement that all the Americans in
Turkey wanted ratification:
They see no reason why the work to which they and
their predecessors have given many years of

75oeNovo, American Interests, pp. 162-5; Grew, Turbulent
Era, 1, 674-81.
76council on Turkish-American Relations, "The Treaty
With Turkey, Why It Should Be Ratified," pp. 70-4.
77oeNovo, American Interests, pp. 163-4.
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effort should be lightly thrown overboard by the
failure of ratification.78
Though this sentiment was true for the tobacco interests,
the State Department may have gone beyond the bounds of
discretion in obtaining evidence of the tobacco industry's
support for the treaty.

Admiral Bristol asked Charles E.

Allen, the American consul in Istanbul, to write a letter
of support for the treaty for the use of F. B. Stem, the
vice-president of Gary Tobacco.

An abbreviated, but almost

verbatim version of Allen's letter appeared as a letter
bearing Stem's signature in the pamphlet "The Treaty with
Turkey:

Why it Should Be Ratified. 117 9

In June 1926 the

council on Turkish-American Relations gave this tract to
78Grew to Senator Charles Curtis, 20 May 1926, FRUS
1926, 2, 980.
79Allen's 11-page document began: "I have known Turkey
for years under both the Young Turks and the Republican
regimes. Being in the business of buying tobacco and preparing it for export to the United States I have been
forced to come into contact with every class of the population from the peasant who grows the tobacco up through the
merchant class to the government official." Stem's only
change in the beginning of his 3-page document was to
quantify his years in Turkey by including a "fourteen."
Allen concluded: "I can see only two alternatives open to
us: ratification and the consequent assumption of a position
of equality with the other powers; or a complete rupture
of relations for which there is not the slightest justif ication." Stem evidently agreed, he left Allen's version
unchanged. Council on Turkish-American Relations, "The
Treaty With Turkey, Why It Should Be Ratified," (New York,
1926), p. 98-100; memo, Charles E. Allen, 1 May 1926, RG
84, CGR Constantinople, NA, file 710 Political RelationsTreaties.
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every senator and congressman and to 220 newspaper editors
around the country.BO

Although the letter contained Stem's

real sentiments regarding the treaty, Allen's authorship
demonstrates a questionable degree of collusion among the
pro-treaty forces.
After much maneuvering (and much delay), the TurcoAmerican Treaty of Amity and Commerce came up for debate in
the United States Senate in December 1926.

The same argu-

ments for and against the treaty that had been bandied
about since 1923 were heard once more.

Pro-Armenian

pressure groups played on "emotional and uncritical
prejudices" in their opposition to the treaty.Bl
Democratic Senator King denounced the treaty and called for
an inquiry, charging that the primary advisors of the
American diplomats at Lausanne "were agents of oil and
tobacco interests," and that these interests were behind
the sellout of Christians in Turkey that this treaty
constitutea.8 2
80DeNovo, American Interests, p. 164.
81Ibid., p. 166.
82"Asks an Inquiry on Lausanne Deal: Senator King Says
'Oil and Tobacco' Interests Forced the Cabinet to Accept
Compact," New York Times, 24 December 1926, p. 4, col. 1.
King's Senate resolution calling for an inquiry may be
found in Congressional Record, 69 Cong., 2 Sess., 68, pt.
1, 910-1.
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Finally, on 18 January 1927--three and one-half years
after being signed--the treaty came to a vote.

one Farmer-

Labor, five Democratic, and forty-four Republican Senators
voted for the treaty.

One Republican and thirty-four Demo-

cratic Senators voted against it.

Although this consti-

tuted an absolute majority of the votes cast, the count was
six votes

short of obtaining the two-thirds majority

necessary to ratify a treaty.

Partisan politics defeated a

treaty that was both grounded in economic and political
realities, and beneficial to American commercial
interests.83

As a result, Turkish-American relations

remained uncertain.
In conclusion, the period from 1924-26 presented
numerous challenges to American participants in the
Turkish tobacco trade.

Many of these complications did not

arise from planned Turkish reforms, but from spontaneous
problems with local authorities.

The rapid development of

some minor conflicts into crises threatening the entire
operations of a tobacco company demonstrated the fragility
of the American presence in Turkey.

To augment the

security of their investments, American tobacco manufacturers advocated ratification of the Turkish-American
treaty.

Their support for the treaty indicated that they

83Galbraith, "Smyrna Disaster," p. 103; Trask, U.S.
Response, pp. 44-45.
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accepted the changes in Turkey, but that they were
convinced of the necessity of Turkish-American diplomatic
relations.

That the American tobacco companies continued

to operate in Turkey despite these many obstacles implied
that the Turkish-American tobacco trade represented a
mutual economic dependency.

Both sides had incentives for

making their commercial relationship work.

Chapter Six
New Beginnings, 1927-29

Not satisfied with the Senate's rejection of the
Turkish-American treaty, the Coolidge administration
established formal diplomatic relations with Turkey through
executive action in February 1927.

This important turning

point in Turkish-American relations affected several
aspects of the Turkish-American tobacco trade, but it did
not end the problems of American tobacco companies in
Turkey.

This chapter examines the diplomatic rapprochement

and the ongoing changes in Turkey between 1927 and 1929,
and the tobacco companies' response to these changes.

On 18 January 1927, the same day that the Senate
rejected the Turkish-American treaty, Secretary of State
Frank B. Kellogg telegraphed instructions to Admiral
Bristol, ordering the high commissioner to assure Turkish
Prime Minister Ismet Inonu that the United States still
desired good relations with Turkey.

Kellogg directed

Bristol to negotiate an agreement restoring diplomatic
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relations between the two countries.1

An exchange of

diplomatic notes at the executive level would allow Kellogg
to bypass the Senate, as this did not require congressional
approval.

Sending and receiving ambassadors was a

constitutional right of the president.
On 17 February 1927, only one month after the
disappointing Senate vote, High Commissioner Bristol and
Turkish Foreign Minister Aras exchanged notes that
established full diplomatic relations and prolonged the
commercial modus vivendi of February 1926.

The agreement

regularizing diplomatic relations stated that the
"essential provisions of the Turkish-American treaty
shall constitute the basis for the treatment, which • • .
shall be accorded the nationals of the United States of
America in the territory of Turkey. 112

Thus, the Coolidge

administration obtained many of the defeated treaty's
benefits while circumventing the domestic political
opposition that had wrecked the treaty itself.

While some

of the same voices that had opposed the treaty in the

lKellogg to Bristol, 18 January 1927, Papers Relating
to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1927 (3 vols.,
Washington, 1942), 3, 766-8 (hereafter cited as FRUS 1927).
2Bristol to Rouschdy (Aras], 17 February 1927, FRUS
1927, 3, 794-5.
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United States spoke out loudly against the new agreement,
in general it was well-received.3
In his February 1927 telegraph to the high commissioner, Secretary Kellogg also ordered Bristol to inform
Inonu that the economic interests of both Turkey and the
United States required reciprocity in commercial matters.
In particular, Kellogg instructed Bristol to caution Inonu
that the president of the United States could retaliate
against Turkish restrictions on American goods.

Bristol

was to say, indirectly, that the best targets for retaliatory measures were the most important Turkish exports of
figs and tobacco.4

Of these two products, tobacco was the

more important as it comprised almost 50% of direct
American imports from Turkey in 1927 (see Table 3), while
figs and raisins together accounted for only 7%.5
Bristol's velveted message emphasized the tobacco trade's
larger importance.
Indeed, the aromatic tobacco was important in several
ways.

Tobacco was by far Turkey's most valuable export,

and by 1929, the tobacco monopoly provided almost 10% of
3Trask, U.S. Response, pp. 52-3.
4Kellogg to Bristol, 18 January 1927, FRUS 1927, 3,
766-8.
5Kazdal, "Trade Relations," p. 63.
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the Turkish regime's income.6

In the united States, taxes

on cigarettes provided the federal government with more
than $900 million in revenues from 1927-29, and the states
took in another $27 million in tax revenues.7

Most of the

cigarettes so taxed contained aromatic tobacco.

In addi-

tion, import duties on aromatic leaf from Turkey brought in
$14 million during this period.

Again, these figures do

not consider the economic consequences of the indirect
tobacco trade, which equalled the direct trade's volume,8
nor the hundreds of thousands of jobs provided by the
tobacco industry in Turkey and the United States.

This

broad, well-recognized importance made the tobacco trade a
diplomatic concern yet again in this period.
In May 1927, President Coolidge named Joseph c. Grew
as the ambassador to Turkey, succeeding High Commissioner
Bristol as the highest-ranking American representative
there.9

one of Grew's immediate concerns was commercial

6Hershlag, Turkey, pp. 51, 68.
7The federal tax on cigarettes at this time was $.06 per
pack. The Tobacco Institute, The Tax Burden on Tobacco,
Historical Compilation, vol. 19 (Washington, 1984), pp. 3-8.
8corrigan, "Tobacco Industry of Smyrna," Report No. 34,
1 June 1927, RG 84, CPR Smyrna, Supplement, NA, file 861.33
Field Crops-Tobacco, p. 25.
9The appointment of Grew--career diplomat, signer of
the 1923 treaty, and persistent advocate of better TurkishAmerican relations--boded well for American standing in
Turkey. Trask, U.S. Response, pp. 54-60.
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relations.

In lieu of a commercial agreement between

Turkey and the United States--something the 1923 treaty
would have provided--it was necessary to maintain the
commercial modus vivendi which provided mutual mostfavored-nation trading status.

Grew negotiated an

extension of this agreement, for the period May 1928 to
April 1929,lO but this limited life-span meant that the
problem of yet another extension would appear within
months.

The question whether Turks or Americans should

broach the subject of negotiations on commercial matters
was a sensitive one.

If Turkey did not take the initia-

tive, the United States would be left in a "hat-in-hand"
posture that Grew wanted to avoid of asking for an
arrangement.11
Grew wrote to Secretary Kellogg that Turkish Foreign
Minister Aras had good reasons to open negotiations on
commercial relations.

The United States was the largest

buyer of Turkish goods and the balance of trade between the
two countries favored Turkey heavily.
the Americaan trade would harm Turkey.

Any disruption of
Without the tobacco

trade, neither of these would have been true.

At the same

lOpapers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United
States. 1928, (3 vols., Washington, 1942-43), 3, 950-4
(hereafter cited as FRUS 1928).
llTrask, U.S. Response, p. 110.
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time Grew pointed out why Aras might not be inclined to
open negotiations.

If the modus vivendi lapsed, Turkish

law would automatically increase duties on American imports
into Turkey.

If this occurred, however, the United States'

willingness to respond with retaliatory tariffs on Turkish
goods was questionable.

Grew wrote:

The American tobacco interests alone would
doubtless have something to say on this subject.
If the Turkish Government is aware of this
situation, there might be no great incentive to
induce Turkey to take the initiative in the
matter under discussion.12
In the fall of 1928, to Grew's relief, Aras requested
negotiations for a commercial treaty.1 3

Kellogg countered

by proposing an indefinite extension of the commercial
modus vivendi.

As the reason for this move, Kellogg noted

that lingering domestic political conflicts made Senate
ratification of a treaty difficult.

Kellogg argued for

Turkish acceptance of his plan, stating again the
importance of the American trade to the Turks and
emphasizing the American president's legal ability to
retaliate against any country discriminating against
American commerce.14
12Grew to Kellogg, 12 September 1928, FRUS 1928, 3,
958-60.
13Grew to Kellogg, 2 October 1928, FRUS 1928, 3, 961.
14Kellogg to Grew, 26 December 1928, FRUS 1928, 3, 9624.
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Both countries wished to protect their commercial
interests and in formulating their negotiating positions,
both countries perceived the tobacco trade as an effective
weapon in their respective arsenals.

Turkey would suffer

from tariffs imposed against its tobacco.

On the other

hand, tobacco interests in America might make the
imposition of such tariffs politically impossible.

The

tobacco trade was a double-edged diplomatic sword which was
better left sheathed.

Recognition of this fact, along with

a new willingness in the Senate to view favorably a simple
commercial treaty with Turkey, led to renewed treaty
negotiations in 1929, despite the rejection of ratification
by the Senate as recently as 1927.15
These negotiations led to the signing of a commercial
treaty on 1 October 1929, 1 6 providing additional diplomatic
support for the tobacco trade.

The new treaty provided

most-favored-nation status for customs and other duties.
Some provisions of the treaty were open to different
interpretations.

Article I, for example, mandated

taxation of foreign companies on the same basis as native
companies.

The Turks interpreted this article as not

15Trask, U.S. Response, pp. 110-1.
16Text of the treaty found in Paoers Relating to the
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1929, (3 vols.,
Washington, 1943-44), 3, 838-40 (hereafter cited as FRUS
1929) •
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applying to taxes on profits and incomes of foreign firms.
Though these taxes were conceivably included in Article I
by the phrase "other duties and charges affecting
commerce, 11 1 7 Ambassador Grew accepted the Turkish
interpretation.

This gave the Turks a degree of liberty in

taxing American corporations operating in Turkey, that
became an important concession in view of later events.
Both the State Department and tobacco interests, however,
considered this treaty necessary.

Some of the same groups

that opposed the 1923 treaty spoke out again in 1930, but
as Grew later put it, "by that time the Armenians • • • had
shot their bolt. 11 18

After extensive lobbying by the State

Department, the Senate ratified the commercial treaty
without debate on 17 February 1930.

This marked another

new beginning, as it was the first approved treaty between
Turkey and the United States since the 1917 break in
relations.
This period witnessed another new beginning as well.
For the first time, each of the four major American tobacco
manufacturers had active subsidiaries in Turkey with no
other serious American competitors operating there.

In

December 1927, the Big Four all maintained offices in Izmir
17FRUS 1929, 3, 841-2.
18Trask, U.S. Response, p. 114.
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to buy tobacco:

Alston represented P. Lorillard; Gary,

Liggett & Myers; American of the Orient, American Tobacco;
and Glenn, R. J. Reynolds.19

One American tobacco journal

reported that these firms collectively bought from 17 to 22
million pounds of tobacco there each year.

Three of these

companies purchased from 6.5 to 9 million pounds around
Samsun,20 where they employed ten American tobacco buyers
in 1927.21

This new beginning, however, was not a conse-

quence of renewed Turkish-American diplomatic relations and
the security these ties represented.

Rather, it repre-

sented the culmination of gradual changes over more than a
decade,

~uring

which the subsidiary buying agent system had

proven itself economically.
In contrast to the effect of diplomacy on American
buying of Turkish tobacco, the renewal of diplomatic ties
affected Turkey's manipulating role in the Turkish-American
tobacco trade.

In 1927 three American firms employed 3500

19rrcrop Prospects in Turkey," TMCA, no. 108 (1927): 9.
20In general, these companies sent 75% of their Turkish
purchases to America, discarding the remainder as unfit or
reselling it to buyers who did not demand leaf of a high
quality--mostly Europeans. "The Tobacco Industry of Smyrna,"
TMCA, no. 113 (1927): 9; "Turkish Tobacco," TMCA, no. 166
(1928): 8.
2lrrcrop Prospects in Turkey," TMCA, no. 108 (1927): 9.
The Glenn Company had no permanent employees in Samsun. Ed
Leight, interview with author, Walkertown, NC, November 1985.
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workers for manipulation in Izmir,22 but new manipulation
facilities there were essential.

Existing structures were

unsatisfactory makeshift buildings, lacking proper ventilation, lighting, and sanitary conditions.23
conditions resulted from two factors:

These poor

the ongoing shortage

of buildings since the 1922 fire, and an American unwillingness to construct new buildings given the "uncertainties of experimental tax legislation. 11 24

Following the

renewal of diplomatic ties, however, two American companies
made plans to build their own warehouses and manipulation
plants in Izmir.

Thus, as one consular pointed out,

diplomatic initiatives did have an effect on the tobacco
trade.

The regularization of relations strengthened

22corrigan, "Tobacco Industry of Smyrna," Report No.
34, 1 June 1927, RG 84, CPR Smyrna, Supplement, NA, file
861.33 Field crops-Alkaloid Plants, p. 14.
23This presents a sharp contrast to a November 1923
report in which H. G. McMillan, a Commerce Department officer
in Turkey, reported that magazines where tobacco was processed and stored were "very clean, orderly and the work
systematically directed." H. G. McMillan (Clerk to Trade
commissioner, Istanbul), "Smyrna Tobacco," Special Report
No. 39, 14 November 1923, RG 84, ER Constantinople, 861.33
Field Crops-Tobacco.
24American companies had other concerns as well; as
late as 1927 most of them still carried war-risk insurance
on their property and tobacco in Izmir.
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American companies' faith in Turkey as a site of the
manipulation industry.25
But renewed diplomatic ties may not receive all of
credit for this industry's gradual return to Izmir, because
conditions in Trieste were influential as well.

For in-

stance, a 1927 currency revaluation in Italy made the
Italian lira more expensive for Americans.

The Italian

Fascists opposed American companies' attempts to lower
wages in response to this change.

Increased shipping

costs,26 warehouse rental rates, and Magazzini Generali
fees all contributed to making Trieste less attractive.27
These factors did not immediately drive American firms out
of Italy; American of the Orient and Alston still
manipulated tobacco in Trieste, and Gary stored tobacco
there in 1927.28 American shipments from Izmir to Trieste
25corrigan, "Tobacco Industry of Smyrna," Report No.
34, 1 June 1927, RG 84, CPR Smyrna, Supplement, NA, file
861.33 Field Crops-Tobacco, p. 14.
26shipping to America via Trieste was generally handled
by Italian shipping firms, whereas, according to Dick English,
American bottoms carried most of the shipments directly from
Turkey. "Trieste Leaf Exports to America Increase," USTJ,
vol. 109, no. 3 (1927): 39.
27 11 Trieste Leaf Exports to America Increase," USTJ,
vol. 109, no. 3 (1927): 39; "Trieste Tobacco Receipts
Decline," USTJ, vol. 109, no. 22 (1928): 27.
28Bowman, "Annual Review of Commerce and Industries in
the Trieste Consular District," 5 February 1929, RG 84, CPR
Trieste, NA, file 600 Commercial Relations; Bowman, "Summary
Value of Declared Exports at Trieste," 4 January 1930, RG
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increased through 1927,29 and in that year, $6 million
worth of the Turkish tobacco shipped to Italy was actually
destined for the United States.30

But Trieste's economic

boom of the mid-twenties was almost at an end.31

Shipments

of tobacco from Trieste to the United States reached their
peak in 1927, and generally declined thereafter (see Table
7).32

Ultimately, economic considerations determined

where and how American tobacco manufacturers did business.
American tobacco companies demonstrated their reborn
faith in Turkey as a target of investment.

Tobacco compa-

nies' holdings made up 20% of all American investment in
commercial and industrial enterprises in Turkey by mid84, CPR Trieste, NA, file 600 Commercial Relations.
29correspondingly, Corrigan cited a decrease from 1925
to 1927 in invoiced tobacco exports from Izmir to America.
John Corrigan, Jr., "Annual Declared Export Return of the
consulate at Smyrna, Turkey, for the Calendar Year 1927," 1
January 1928, RG 84, CPR Smyrna, NA, file 600 Commercial
Relations.
30 11 Turks Will Exploit Their Tobacco Here," USTJ, vol.
112, no. 20 (1929): 37.
31 11 Trieste To-Day," Times 24 December 1927, p. 7, col.
a. The Times reported incorrectly that most of the American
companies had left Trieste by 1927.
32shipments from Turkey to Trieste decreased dramatically after 1926. (Kazdal, "Trade Relations," p. 203).
But this was not solely due to changes in American shipping
habits. The creation of a large tobacco trust in Germany
in 1927 also influenced Trieste's trade because the trust
began importing aromatic tobacco through Hamburg and decreased shipments through Trieste. "The Manipulation of
Eastern Tobacco in Trieste," USTJ, no. 304 (1931): 1-2.
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1929.

This included $100,000 apiece for Alston and

American of the Orient, and $500,000 for Gary.

In the

first half of 1929, Gary bought a building valued at
$450,000 for manipulating and storing tobacco in Izmir.33
The speculation that American tobacco firms would make
large investments in Turkey after the restoration of
diplomatic relations became reality.

Gary's purchase was a

manifestation of faith.
One should note, however, the words that Franklin

w.

Bell of Gary Tobacco wrote to Admiral Bristol in February
1922.

Less than five months after the fire ravaged Izmir,

Bell stated:

"It is our plan to continue manipulation at

Izmir so long as it is possible for us to do so. 11 34
same Bell was still in Istanbul in 1929. 3 5

This

Full diplomatic

relations had not triggered the incentive or willingness to
invest in Turkey, as they had been there all along.

In the

end, the effect of the improved diplomatic relations must
33Memo, K. Carlson, "A Study of the Economic Life of
Turkey," n.d., March 1930, RG 84, ER Constantinople, NA,
file 850 Turkey-Economic Life of; v. Hall (Clerk, Izmir),
"Survey of American Interests," 14 October 1933, RG 84, CPR
Izmir, NA, file 610 Trade Extension, p. 9.
34Bell to Bristol, 3 February 1923, RG 84, ER Constantinople, NA, file 851.2 Taxation.
35Memo of conversation between Ambassador Grew and
Franklin w. Bell, n.d., 1930, RG 84, ER Angora, Correspondence, NA, file 350 Claims.
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be considered in conjunction with the economic factors that
played a role in Gary's decision.
Of course, since diplomacy was not the only factor
affecting the Turkish-American tobacco trade, the
consequences of the Turkish government's reforms must also
be analyzed.

The efforts of Ataturk's government had no

more effect than Turkish-American diplomatic relations had
had, and both appeared rather insignificant in comparison
to the role of market forces.

Supposedly, the Turkish

tobacco monopoly exercised "rigid control" over the tobacco
trade in 1927 by supervising all phases of tobacco
cultivation, transportation, manufacture and sale,36 but
this control was dubious at best.

For example, the

financial condition of tobacco growers remained desparate,
in part because the government failed to alleviate the
growers' chronic indebtedness.

Despite a seventeenfold

increase in loans by the Agricultural Bank since 1922,37
the republic was incapable of stabilizing tobacco produc36corrigan, "Tobacco Industry of Smyrna," Report No.
34, 1 June 1927, RG 84, CPR Smyrna, Supplement, NA, file
861.33 Field Crops-Tobacco, p. 15.
37The Ottoman government established the Agricultural
Bank in 1888 as an organ of the central government. In
1923, the republican regime re-organized the bank as a
joint-stock company. In 1926 the government instructed the
Agricultural Bank to organize agricultural credit cooperatives on the village level. The bank was reconstituted as·
a government institution in 1937. Robinson, First Turkish
Republic, pp. 105, 107.
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tion by ensuring adequate financing.38

Growers in 1927

were still at the mercy of usurers who frequently were the
head men of the villages.39
The Turkish government's ineffectiveness is especially
glaring when compared to the effect that Americans had on
the Izmir tobacco market in 1927.

Normally, the tobacco

merchants and American exporting companies began buying
directly from growers on an agreed upon date in late
September, by which time the majority of the crop was
harvested and cured.
normal.

The 1927 market, however, was not

Edward M. Yantis, the manager of Gary Tobacco in

Izmir, initiated a bidding war by secretly instructing his
agents to begin buying on Sunday, 21 August, at a price of
40 piasters per pound, 10 piasters above the average price
of production.40

Telegraphed reports that Gary buyers had

made extensive purchases reached the other American firms
in the evening of the same day.

Feeling cheated and

deceived, the rival companies immediately joined the fray
and instructed buying agents to top Gary's opening offers.
The frenzied competition drove prices to 48 piasters in a
38Hershlag, Turkey, p. 56.
39corrigan, "Tobacco Industry of Smyrna," Report No.
34, 1 June 1927, RG 84, CPR Smyrna, Supplement, NA, file
861.33 Field Crops-Tobacco, p. 11.
40100 piasters equal 1 lira. The average rate of exchange during 1927 was TL 1 = $.51. Ibid., pp. 8-9.

144

few days, 83 piasters in a few weeks, and to as much as 107
piasters per pound for some tobacco.

These inflated prices

were for crops still growing in the fields.

Growers were

delighted, obviously, and a local paper praised Yantis "as
a man with the brain power required for one of Napoleon's
marshals."

But this sweet harvest soon turned sour.

In the Izmir region many growers who had sold their
crops in the field, did not put great effort into timely
harvesting, carefully curing, or selectively sorting their
tobacco.

Instead, they delivered much unripened, poorly

dried leaf to the purchasers, a portion of which was rain
and disease damaged.

The entire crop was regarded as

inferior; as much as 25% of it was damaged.

Naturally,

the foreign buyers, and especially the Americans who
demanded the highest grades of tobacco, would not pay for
inferior goods and returned the low quality leaf to the
growers.

The growers demanded the agreed upon price for

their entire crop, waste and all.
Some growers were angry and defiant, and their
reactions were overtly nationalistic.

In Akhisar, inland

from Izmir, the vice-president of the local branch of the
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"Ti.irk Ocagi" (Turkish Hearth organization)41 made a radical
speech, exhorting the tobacco growers to action:
Farmers, you know that the American tobacco
companies must have your tobacco. Are you men?
Are you Turks? If the foreigners do not take it,
let us drive them out of our country. You have
guns; don't you know how to use them? Prove that
you are Turks.42
Ambassador Grew relayed this information to Secretary
Kellogg, but he downplayed the threat to American
interests.

Statements such as the above did not represent

the official views of "Ti.irk Ocagi," wrote Grew, and the
American tobacco firms in Izmir had not even notified their
superiors in Istanbul of any problems.

Grew said, however,

that anti-foreign sentiments existed, caused by the unusual
1927 tobacco market.

Some growers had become suddenly

wealthy, while others had suffered severely.

These

economic tensions did produce hostility, but this was not a
product of sanctioned forms of Turkish nationalism.43
4l"Ti.irk ocagi" was a social and cultural society
founded in 1912 which espoused Turkish nationalism. Heyd,
Foundations, pp. 34-5; Shaw, Reform, pp. 301, 375-6.
42John Corrigan, Jr. to Joseph c. Grew (Ambassador), 12
November 1927, OS 867.61331/10, M353, 66/1293.
43corrigan to Grew 12 November 1927, OS 867.61331/10,
M353, 66/1293; John Corrigan, Jr., "Tobacco Market of
Smyrna," 15 November 1927, RG 84, CPR Smyrna, Supplement, NA
861.33 Field Crops-Tobacco, pp. 2-3; Joseph c. Grew to
Secretary of state (Kellogg), 21 November 1927, OS
867.61331/10, M353, 66/1288-90.
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Thus, American participation was a dominant factor in
the Turkish tobacco market, and in 1927 certainly more
influential than the Turkish government's efforts.

Rivalry

among American companies affected not only price, but also
the quality of the tobacco crop.

The American presence, in

this instance, also brought out the destructive side of
Turkish nationalism.
The heavy demand for aromatic tobacco in 1927 was the
result of several factors.

Shortages in Greece in 1926

made American manufacturers seek compensation in the 1927
crops.44

Stocks of aromatic leaf in America dropped to

dangerously low levels in 1926 as cigarette consumption in
the United States steadily increased. 4 5

The Turkish

tobacco market of 1927 shows that improvements in the
American cigarette market did not imply improvement in the
lot of the Turkish tobacco farmer.

Turkish tobacco

production reached a record 153 million pounds in 1927, but
due to the volume and the relatively low quality of the

44Raymond A. Hare, "Analysis of Declared Export Return
for 1926," 11 April 1927, RG 84, CGR Constantinople, NA, file
600 Commercial Relations.
45This is a possible explanation for the exceptionally
high tobacco imports from Turkey and Trieste in 1927.
Bowman, "Annual Review of Commerce and Industries in the
Trieste Consular District," 5 February 1929, RG 84, CPR
Trieste, NA, file 600 Commercial Relations.
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crop, and despite the initial flurry of buying, many
growers could not cover their costs of production.46
Ataturk was re-elected president of the Turkish
Republic in November 1927,4 7 and his program of reforms
continued.

Of direct relevance to the tobacco industry was

a program begun by the tobacco monopoly in 1927.

A

technical bureau sponsored by the monopoly gave instruction
in seed selection and provided free seeds to growers.

The

farmers that followed the monopoly's growing advice sold
the seed they produced back to the monopoly, which then
distributed that seed to other growers.48

Other reforms

that affected the tobacco trade less directly, but were
nonetheless important to Turkey's integration in the
western world, were the introduction of Arabic numerals in
June 192849 and a Turkish alphabet based on Latin letters
in August 1928.50

In 1928, however, none of the reforms

46 11 Review of the United States Tobacco Import Trade for
1928," TMCA, no. 192 (1929): 2; "Notes on Countries Supplying
United States Tobacco Imports," TMCA, no. 192 (1929): 8.
47Gesellschaft zur Erforschung, Geschichte, p. 459.
48John Corrigan, Jr., "Tobacco Industry of Smyrna,"
Report No. 10, 31 January 1928, RG 84, CPR Smyrna, NA, file
861.33 Field Crops-Tobacco. Hershlag reports that farmers
often sold the free seeds they received from the government,
but Hershlag was making a general comment not necessarily
related to tobacco growers. Hershlag, Turkey, p. 149.
49Gesellschaft zur Erforschung, Geschichte, p. 305.
50ibid., pp. 317-19.
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introduced by the Turkish government, not even the tobaccospecific reforms of the monopoly, had a decisive influence
on the tobacco market in producing stability or prosperity.
Turkish growers reduced their plantings of tobacco in
1928 by 50,000 acres--fully one quarter--from the 1927
level, due to the poor marketing of the 1927 crop.51

The

harmful consequences of the "embarrassingly" large crop of
1927 demonstrate just how "uncontrolled" tobacco production
in Turkey actually was, despite the tobacco monopoly's
supervision.52

But the decline in production from 153 mil-

lion pounds in 1927 to 95 million in 1928 was not solely
due to reduced planting.

Much of the 1928 crop was damaged

by "ak Damar" {white vein disease), brought on by hot north
winds and high night-time temperatures during the growing
season.

Affected tobacco brought very low prices, below

the cost of production, and in some districts crops failed
completely.53

In the worst-hit areas, American buyers

chose to forfeit the advances they had paid to growers for
51 11 Notes on Countries Supplying United States Tobacco
Imports," TMCA, no. 192 (1929): 8.
52 11 Tobacco in Turkey," TMCA, no. 109 (1927): 6.
53John Corrigan, "Annual Declared Export Return,"
Report No. 4, 31 December 1929, RG 84, CPR Smyrna, NA, file
600 Commercial Relations; John Corrigan, "Survey of Commerce
and Industries During 1929 in the District of Izmir," Report
No. 15, 31 March 1930, RG 84, CPR Smyrna, NA, file 610 Trade
Extension, p. 11.
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options on crops, rather than to buy the damaged tobacco.54
The 1928 tobacco crop represents proof that market forces
and growing conditions, not Turkish nationalist efforts,
were still the primary determinants of tobacco production.
In 1928 only about 40% of the Izmir tobacco was of an
acceptable American grade, that is, of a high quality, and
American companies purchased tobacco at an average price of
$.30 per pound.

The Turkish tobacco monopoly, by compar-

ison, gave farmers $.045 per pound for the tobacco they
could not sell elsewhere.

The monopoly used this tobacco

in its own cigarette factories or sold it in Europe.SS
Such efforts show that the Turkish government attempted to
carry out a social policy through the tobacco monopoly, but
that these efforts fell far short of supporting the tobacco
growers when the market failed them.

This failure takes on

special significance because it occurred in an industry
supposedly under the Turkish government's "rigid control."
The consequences of the tobacco trade's subjugation to
free market forces became even more severe in 1929.

The

poor prices growers received for their 1928 tobacco made
54John Corrigan, "The Tobacco Crop of the Smyrna District," Report No. 6, 15 January 1929, RG 84, CPR Smyrna,
supplement, NA, file 861.33 Field Crops-Tobacco, p. 7.
55John Corrigan, "Preliminary Survey of the Commerce and
Industry of the Smyrna District in 1928," Report No. 20, 1
January 1929, RG 84, CPR Smyrna, NA, file 600 Commercial
Relations.
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them overly dependent on money lenders in 1929, who
demanded rates from 60 to 120%.

The financial difficulties

in Izmir led to a harvest about half as big as the 1927
crop.

The same results held true for the entire country.

Growers produced only 80 million pounds versus the 153
million harvested in 1927.56
As usual, the American companies were among the first
buyers in Izmir, one of the perquisites of paying the
highest prices.

There was, however, lively competition

between the American companies to fill their requirements,
especially during a year of shortage such as 1929.

By mid-

December American of the Orient had already purchased 7
million pounds in Izmir; Gary, 4.8 million; and Glenn, 5.7
million.

In all, the American companies bought over 18

million pounds of the 32 million-pound Izmir crop at an
average price of $.66 per pound.57
56corrigan, "Survey of Commerce and Industries During
1929 in the District of Izmir," Report No. 15, 31 March
1930, RG 84, CPR Smyrna, NA, file 610 Trade Extension, p. 11.
57corrigan, "Survey of Commerce and Industries During
1929 in the District of Izmir," Report No. 15, 31 March
1930, RG 84, CPR Smyrna, NA, file 610 Trade Extension, p.
11; "The 1929 Smyrna Tobacco Crop," TMCA, no. 256 (1930):
5-6; John Corrigan, "Smyrna Tobacco Crop," Report No. 67, 10
December 1929, RG 84, CPR Smyrna, Supplement, NA, file 861.33
Field Crops-Tobacco, p. 2, 7. The statistics for tobacco
imports into the U.S. for 1929 are confusing. American
consular invoices showed 6.4 million pounds shipped to the
u.s, while official Turkish statistics report 5.2 million
pounds of tobacco exported to the U.S., not an abnormal
difference for these two statistics. Foreign Commerce and
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The advantages American companies enjoyed in the
Turkish tobacco market came not only as a result of paying
higher prices for tobacco, but also from paying their
Turkish employees much more than the tobacco monopoly
could.

Experts for the monopoly who scouted the tobacco as .

it grew and provided estimates of production and crop
damage received between 80 and 100 Turkish lira per month.
The Turkish employees in the field for American companies
received 200 to 1000 lira per month.

Understandably, it

was "difficult for the monopoly to retain the services of
competent men in the face of attractive offers from private
business. 11 58

The American tobacco companies knew the

tobacco crops more thoroughly and could, therefore, prepare
more effective buying strategies than their competitors.

Navigation of the United States reports 4.2 million pounds
imported into the U.S. in 1929. However, figures in the U.S.
Tariff commission's "Trade Agreement Between the United
States and the Republic of Turkey" of 1939, however, show
that 22.5 million pounds were imported (p. 37). This is
explained by a footnote which states: "Data revised since
publication in Foreign Commerce and Navigation of the
United states." There is a clear contradiction between the
4.2 million and the 22.5 million pound figures, a contradiction complicated by the fact that both sources state that the
total value of all goods imported from Turkey into the u.s.
in 1929 was $12.2 million (p. 19). I am at a loss to
explain this contradiction.
58corrigan, "The Tobacco Crop of the Smyrna District,"
Report No. 6, 15 January 1929, RG 84, CPR Smyrna, Supplement,
NA, file 861.33 Field Crops-Tobacco, p. 3.
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Superior personnel was crucial to success in this foreign
market and culture.
Despite the economic boon that the tobacco trade
represented to Turkey, and despite the new diplomatic and
commercial agreements that provided guarantees to American
firms in Turkey, the tobacco companies did not receive all
the cooperation from the Turkish government that they might
have hoped for.

Events in 1929 made this quite clear.

American tobacco companies paid local Turkish authorities taxes on prof its according to arrangements made individually between a company and tax officials.

American of

the orient, for example, normally paid a profits tax in
Izmir for its branches in Turkey, both in Izmir and in
Samsun.

The Samsun branch then officially notified the

Samsun fiscal authorities of this payment.

According to

the company's charter, American of the Orient received as
profit 6% per annum on the capital invested in Turkey for
equipment.

This capital amounted to $60,000 in 1928,

$40,000 in Izmir and $20,000 in Samsun.

Profits, then,

would amount to $3,600 for the whole country.

In other

years Turkish authorities levied 16% of this profit as a
small profits tax.
American of the Orient paid the tax for 1928 in the
usual manner, but through a "clerical oversight" failed to
notify the Samsun authorities of this payment by the proper
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time, March 1929.

In October 1929, only days after the

commercial treaty's signing, the local tax authorities
served a summons for the Samsun branch of American of the
Orient to pay LT 112,019.20 within fifteen days, or the
company would be closed down.

This sum was almost as large

as the company's total capital investment in Turkey.

One

half of the amount represented a tax on the profits made on
tobacco shipments for 1928, and the other half was a fine.
The problem, as the American consul in Izmir later wrote,
was that the Turkish authorities refused to believe that
American companies were not making prof its similar to those
of any other tobacco merchant, between 5 and 10% on all
tobacco purchases.

Therefore, these authorities calculated

what they believed to be a suitable tax and ignored the
company's charter.

This, of course, was not a new problem.

American of the Orient quickly turned to the American
embassy, and diplomatic support staved off Turkish threats
to shut down the company.

Appeals to several courts, how-

ever, brought no favorable decision for American of the
orient, and the Turkish minister of finance stood behind
the local authorities' demands for payment of the tax.

At

this point, in early January 1930, Russell Henry Kuhn, the
assistant general manager of American of the Orient, came
from company headquarters in Athens to Istanbul on his way
to a meeting with Joseph M. English in Ankara.

Kuhn made
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it clear to Ambassador Grew that America of the Orient
would withdraw all operations from Turkey if this "radical
departure in method of taxation" continued.

According to

its own claims, American of the Orient purchased more
Turkish tobacco in each year between 1926 and 1929 than any
other foreign concern.

Kuhn emphasized that his company

could buy in Greece, Bulgaria, or the Soviet Union, leaving
Turkey without one of its very best customers.59
So despite the 1927 exchange of notes and the 1929
commercial treaty, American companies in Turkey still faced
uncertain business conditions.

Such apparently arbitrary

taxation demonstrates why American business had supported
the retention of the capitulations during the negotiations
in Lausanne.

The Americans believed that only independence

from Turkish fiscal control would bring security.

On the

59The case dragged on for several years. No indication
of the outcome, however, is in the American consular or
embassy records. But American of the Orient continued
operations for many, many years, so it may be presumed that
this dispute was satisfactorily resolved. P. W. Flanagan
(American of the Orient) to Ambassador (Grew), 19 October
1929, RG 84, ER Angora, Correspondence, NA, file 350 Claims;
memo of conversation between Russell Henry Kuhn (American
of the orient) and Ambassador (Grew), 3 January 1930, RG
84, ER Angora, Correspondence, NA, file 350 Claims; Herbert
s. Bursley (Consul, Izmir) to General Charles H. Sherrill
(Ambassador), 25 June 1932, RG 84, ER Istanbul, NA, file
851.2 Taxation; memo, "Regarding Income Tax Cases Against
the American Tobacco Company of the Orient, Inc., 11 n.d.,
1932, RG 84, ER Istanbul, NA, file 851.2 Taxation.
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Turkish side, the presence of these well-off foreign companies making tremendous profits from the fruit of Turkish
soil, while paying only token taxes was reminiscent of the
capitulations and the affront to Turkish sovereignty that
they represented.
The Turks assumed that these companies, or at least
the parent companies of these tobacco-buying agents, were
profitable.

They did not know that American cigarette

manfacturers earned excessive profits, which they usually
did,60 but they sensed that these profits were not
returning to their source.

Resentment of this relationship

brought about cases such as the one involving American of
the orient, and this resentment threatened the future of
the Turkish-American tobacco trade.61
In conclusion, negotiators of the various TurkishAmerican agreements between 1927 and 1929 repeatedly acknowledged the political clout of tobacco.

As the dominant

factor in the Turkish-American trading relationship,
tobacco also was an influential element in the political
relationship of the two countries.

The product of these

60Tennant, American Cigarette Industry, p. 385.
61This was not the only case in late 1929. Gary Tobacco
was assessed another military transportation tax on 30
December, which Gary did not intend to pay. Memo, J.P.
[Jefferson Patterson], 30 December 1929, RG 84, ER Constantinople, NA, file 851.2 Taxation.
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negotiations were several diplomatic achievments that may
have encouraged American investment in Turkey.

Diplomacy,

however, was not the sine qua non for investment in
Ataturk's republic; economic considerations played an
equally important role.
In Turkey, the regime's efforts to control the tobacco
trade were unsuccessful, despite the tobacco monopoly's
continuing regulation of all phases of the tobacco
industry.

Much more influential were factors such as

weather, growing conditions, international demand for
Turkish leaf, and especially American buying habits.

The

drastic swing from peak production in 1927 to low in 1929
vividly demonstrates the Turks' lack of control over the
trade.
There were new beginnings in the late 1920s.

Treaties

and diplomatic notes laid the groundwork for a stable relationship between Turkey and the United States.

At the same

time, however, many of the traditional difficulties
remained.

Nationalist Turkey's hostility to any condition

perceived as exploitative was a potential powderkeg,
especially in times of economic stress. 6 2

New beginnings

did not end old problems.

62osman Okyar, "Development Background of the Turkish
Economy, 1923-1973," International Journal of Middle East
studies, 10 (1979): 330, 336.

Conclusion

The tobacco trade played a crucial role in TurkishAmerican relations between 1923 and 1929.

Growing demand

for aromatic tobacco, especially after World War I,
prompted American cigarette manufacturers to establish
extensive buying organizations in Turkey.

Through these

subsidiary companies, the manufacturers imported millions
of pounds directly from Turkey, and an equally large amount
indirectly from Turkey, via other ports such as Trieste,
Italy.

As the most important Turkish commodity imported

into the United States, tobacco also carried diplomatic
significance, and both countres' statesmen perceived the
trade as an economic means to broader political ends.
The American tobacco-purchasing companies• presence in
Turkey left them vulnerable to the momentous changes taking
place there in the 1920s.

The Greco-Turkish War (1919-22)

disrupted tobacco production and destroyed large amounts of
the companies' property.

The creation of a revolutionary

republican regime in Turkey altered the rules of the game
formerly played by foreign businessmen during ottoman
times.

The radical changes agreed to at the Lausanne

Conference (1922-23), such as the expulsion of minority
populations and the abolition of the capitulations, wreaked
157
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havoc in the tobacco industry, and also also subjected
American tobacco companies to Turkish taxation that was
frequently discriminatory and excessive.
But the Turkish-American trade remained perceptibly
independent of both diplomatic initiatives and Turkish
regulation, and in many ways the American tobacco buying in
Turkey was more of a leading force in the tobacco trade
than a passive presence.
trade brought it respect.

The economic importance of the
American diplomatic initiatives

during this period consistently supported the tobacco
trade's welfare.

Turkish leaders had to restrain their

natural anti-foreign tendencies to allow the American
companies to continue their operations in Turkey.

This

independence derived from the mutual economic benefits that
the trade devolved upon both countries.
At the same time, however, the Turkish-American
tobacco trade was a fragile enterprise.

The Izmir fire and

a distrust of Ataturk's regime caused the American companies to relocate the manipulating industry outside of
Turkey.

on several occasions, Turkish harassment led

American companies to the brink of despair, and they
threatened to quit all operations there unless the illegal
annoyances were discontinued.

The political rapprochement

between Turkey and the United States did not resolve the
many tensions created by the presence of profitable
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American tobacco companies working in a war-ravaged,
impoverished Turkey, but the trade's profitability, and the
desire of millions of Americans to smoke fine tobaccos,
made tobacco one of the fundamental and enduring links
between Turkey and the United States.
The outline of tobacco's history, as provided
here, will be sufficient to indicate that,
despite its many vicissitudes, the "divine herb"
has displayed an unusual virility. Man will not
willingly relinquish the plant which supplies the
means of satisfying the most social of his appetites. 1

lJerome E. Brooks, The Library Relating to Tobacco
Collected by George Arents (New York: New York Public
Library, 1944), p. 15.

Appendix
Table 1
Tobacco Production in Turkey
Total
production
in lbs.
1923
1924
1925
1926
1927
1928
1929
1930

57,518,086
114,352,510
124,105,530
119,751,920
153,448,740
94,874,398
80,475,190
104,081,120

Ave.
output
(lbs./
acre)
719
777
816
748
757
621
670
641

Acres of
tobacco
planted

Number
of
growers

Ave.
acres/
grower

79,795
146,193
150,877
159,086
201,134
150,297
119,510
160,843

125,542
175,962
179,651
169,266
178,496
110,782
81,550
99,704

.64
.83
.84
.94
1.13
1.36
1.46
1.59

Ave.
lbs./
grower
458
650
691
707
860
856
987
1,044

Source: Istatistik Yilligi 1 1941-1942, vol. 13 (Ankara),
p. 175.
Table 2
Tobacco Exports from Turkey to the United States
(According to Official Turkish Records*)
Pounds
(in thousands)
1923
1924
1925
1926
1927
1928
1929
1930

4,370
7,127
11,647
14,189
15,485
16,105
5,203
13,785

Turkish Lira
(in thousands)

11,562
10,675
11,517
12,998
3,125
10,423

Source: Istatistik Yilligi, 1934-35, vol. 7 (Ankara}, p.
409.

*Omissions indicate no data given
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Table 3
Total Value of General Imports of Merchandise from Turkey to
the United States and Percentage of these Imports Consisting
of Tobacco
(According to Official American Records)
Dollars
(in thousands)
1910-14* (ave.)
1915-19* (ave.)
1919
1920
1921
1922
1923
1924
1925
1926
1927
1928
1929
1930

19,251
5,219
37,003
39,767
20,143
21,693
13,009
14,616
14,648
16,832
20,070
18,388**
12,166
11,637

...

41.8%
49.1%
46.9%
57.0%
14.6%
29.9%
38.1%
32.9%
49.6%
41. 7%
16.8%
49.5%

source: United States Department of Commerce, Bureau of
Foreign and Domestic Commerce, Foreign Commerce and Navigation
of the United States (Washington: Government Printing Office,
1923, 1924, 1925, 1926, 1927, 1928, 1929, 1930).
*These two amounts are given for fiscal years, the rest
of the amounts refer to calendar years.
**This amount refers to "Turkey in Asia" only, "Turkey
in Europe" is not included.
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Table 4
Tobacco Imported into the United States
{According to Official American Records*)

1919**
1920**
1921**
1922**
1923
1924
1925
1926
1927
1928
1929
1930

Total Imports

Imports from Turkey

Pounds
Dollars
{in thousands)

Pounds
Dollars
{in thousands)

.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.

..

.
.

20,222
36,965
47,025
36,159
69,820
40,335
31,004
39,872

.
.
.
.

..
. .

. .
. .

13,773
33,134
33,281
22,519
41,207
20,614
18,072
17,725

14,973
21,817
13,780
19,649
2,986
6,995
12,085
9,812
20,957
15,624
4,162
14,280

15,469
19,512
9,441
12,368
1,896
4,375
5,582
5,530
9,953
7,664
2,042
5,758

Source: United States Department of Commerce, Bureau
of Foreign and Domestic Commerce, Foreign Commerce and
Navigation of the United States {Washington: Government
Printing Office, 1923, 1924, 1925, 1926, 1927, 1928, 1929,
1930).
*Omissions indicate no data available. Cigarette leaf
tobacco statistics were isolated after 1923, and the cited
statistics include only cigarette leaf from 1923 onward.
**Includes Greece in Asia.
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Table 5
Profits of the Turkish Tobacco Monopoly
Dollars
(in thousands)
1926
1927
1928
1929
1930

9,746
11,238
11,366
12,194
11,460

Source: Istatistik Yilligi, 1934-35, vol. 7 (Ankara), p.
577.

Table 6
Cigarette Leaf Tobacco Imported from Specified Consular
Districts
Izmir Consular District
Pounds
1921
1922
1923
1924
1925
1926
1927
1928
1929
1930

9,546,585
13,264,245
1,591,123
7,959,115
10,404,548
9,431,612
9,816,727
14,104,918
3,069,794
10,416,621

Dollars
5,121,126
7,497,293
1,006,526
4,395,425
4,554,945
4,276,733
3,890,273
6,617,935
1,418,556
3,684,350

Istanbul Consular District
Pounds
4,430,090
4,663,754
224,763
103,210
778,767
3,679,025
7,192,717
3,039,951
3,286,673
5,087,546

Dollars
3,364,559
4,210,805
277,384
119,908
454,773
3,432,155
4,115,970
2,002,946
1,551,965
2,377,788

sources: Annual Declared Export Return, 1921-31 RG 84,
CPR Smyrna and CGR Constantinople, NA, file 600 Commercial
Relations.
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Table 7
Tobacco Imports into the United States from Trieste, Italy
Pounds
1921
1922
1923
1924
1925
1926
1927
1928
1929
1930

none
54,784
3,194,385
7,649,331
9,777,883
15,141,257
16,785,129
8,906,159
10,083,529
12,267,901

Dollars
none
32,683
1,858,064
4,509,054
6,256,197
5,911,617
7,025,004
3,254,868
4,585,531
4,731,214

Source: Annual Declared Export Return, 1921-31, RG 84,
CPR Trieste, NA, file 600 Commercial Relations.
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